It may be a little too soon to say that privatization is back, but the factors that made it so attractive before are even more evident today. States and cities are desperate for money, and big banks need new sources of revenue. In a recent issue, BusinessWeek ran a piece titled "The Governors' Garage Sale." The article posited that sales or leases of assets were one solution to the budget woes facing states and listed a number of assets that were in play, including the Garden State Parkway, the New Jersey Turnpike, and Pennsylvania's liquor stores. Probitas Partners, which tracks fundraising, says that more than 99 new funds entered the market in 2010, supporting the view that infrastructure investing is back. And later this week, Democratic Sen. John Kerry of Massachusetts is going to introduce bipartisan legislation to create a federal "infrastructure bank" in which the government will partner with private funds to upgrade the nation's infrastructure.
But as Rosner asks, why is Kerry's infrastructure bank, with its split allegiances between profit-seeking private capital and social-policy-focused public assets, any different than National Partners in Homeownership? For those who don't remember, that was a public-private partnership between the government and the banks, announced with much fanfare by President Bill Clinton, to expand homeownership. We all know which group benefited the most from that effort, and it certainly wasn't citizens or taxpayers!
What's good for the banks isn't necessarily good for the rest of us. That 2008 GAO report looked at the privatizations of the Indiana Toll Road and the Chicago Skyway. It found many benefits to these deals, including the availability of cash upfront and the transfer of both operating and financial risks to the private sector. But it also warned that these deals could result in a loss of long-term value—stealing from the future to pay bills today. The GAO also noted that the United States failed to emulate Europe's example of employing a systematic, standardized set of procedures to make sure that such important considerations were taken into account—and that debate would be held in public.
Take Chicago's deal to sell its parking meters to the Morgan Stanley fund. In 2009, the city's Office of the Inspector General, which at that time was run by David Hoffman (full disclosure: He's a friend of mine), issued a scathing report. Among its conclusions: that Chicago was paid almost $1 billion less for the lease than it would have received had it retained the parking-meter system under the same terms that the city agreed to in the lease. You might argue, and the city did, that a private-sector company had more freedom to raise rates without provoking a public furor. But as a Chicagoan, I can attest that when the new owners raised parking-meter rates dramatically, the public expressed plenty of rage. [Update, March 16: Morgan Stanley points out that the rate increases for parking meters in Chicago, though carried out by the new owners, was mandated by the city.] It didn't dampen the ire that Chicago Mayor Richard Daley's nephew William Daley Jr., son of the current White House chief of staff, was and is an executive at Morgan Stanley, although the firm has said he played no role in this deal.
The Inspector General's report also concluded that there had been no meaningful public debate about the deal. It had been a closed process. The Chicago CFO's office never bothered to calculate what the parking meters might be worth to the city. The argument was that the city simply had to sell—it needed the money to fill a budget gap. As the report noted, "Numerous aldermen stated that they felt obligated to support the lease deal because the City's 2009 budget—passed one month earlier—was enacted with $150 million in revenue from the (potential) lease deal already included. To reject the lease deal in December would have been to jeopardize the entire budget passed in November, they said." (Morgan Stanley and the City of Chicago have both argued that the deal was in fact a good one for Chicago; Morgan Stanley also points out that it won a bidding process, and that the firm didn't advise Chicago on this deal.)
Morgan Stanley is a huge presence in the municipal bond market. The firm's Web site notes that since January 1998 it has "participated in municipal bond underwritings worth approximately $200 billion in par value, totaling more than 25% of industry volume." Nor is Morgan Stanley an oddity in the infrastructure world: Nationwide, of 2010's top underwriters of municipal debt, three of the top four have infrastructure funds. The banks, of course, will argue that there are strict firewalls between their infrastructure-investment funds, which seek to put public assets into private hands, and their municipal bond businesses. Morgan Stanley notes that there are information barriers in place so that information is not shared across businesses. But count me as a skeptic of the efficacy of such firewalls at each and every bank.
None of this is to say that privatization is necessarily the wrong answer. But with state and municipal budget holes in desperate need of plugging and banks looking out for their own bottom lines, the ingredients are ample for compromised decision-making. Given the magnitude of the sums involved, the decades-long time frame of many of these deals, and their impact on people's lives, mistakes in this area will not be small.