Given the messy imperfection of a world complicated by cultural differences, President George W. Bush has done an excellent job thus far in the War on Terrorism.

First of all, he was more clairvoyant than the media. Throughout the campaign and in the early months of his presidency, in statements and in meetings with visitors, he emphasized that America should not get bogged down further in places such as Macedonia because of great, unseen dangers ahead elsewhere. He specifically mentioned the Indian subcontinent. He resisted the slew of op-eds calling for deeper in involvement in Macedonia, while averting a great war there through a low-key special negotiator. This left his hands free to deal better with a catastrophe such as Sept. 11^th.

Because Middle Eastern societies are non-democratic and politics in these places contain a strong, unspoken element of thuggery, the fact that the overwhelming majority of Muslims abhor such terrorism is operationally insignificant. Even in democratic societies, committed elites often drive policies. It is even more so in the Middle East. The West on Sept. 11^th became embroiled in a war with a militant brand of Islam, whose adherents represent a committed and educated elite. But while recognizing the civilizational aspect of this war, President Bush was careful to publicly deny it at the same time. His rhetoric and coalition-building comprised the theme of crossing civilizational lines, so that the other side sounded extremist. Furthermore, he grasped that in non-democratic, unstable parts of the world, you intimidate your enemies and embolden your allies by projecting brute force in a way that allows your values to follow in its wake. Bombing from 52s liberated the women of Kabul. It led the Egyptian regime to instigate a ferocious crackdown on extremists that was little noted in the American media. It emboldened President Gen. Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan to risk his political and physical life on a similar crackdown. And it led, in another development that was little noted, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee of India to acquiesce to the American military campaign in Afghanistan despite our intention to give Pakistan $1 billion in aid. The Bush administration also rejected the spurious historical comparison with Russian and British defeats at the hands of the Afghans, a comparison that, as I noted at the time, briefed well but collapsed upon close inspection. The administration was also, thankfully, unfazed when a myriad of voices called for a reassessment of our policy after victory was not achieved in the first two weeks of bombing.

But what next?

The media are now propagating a new myth: that terrorism arose on Afghan soil because we neglected Afghanistan following the Cold War, which led to chaos there. That is a narrow version of the truth. U.S. negotiators worked hard and persistently to cobble together a united mujahideen front following the Soviet withdrawal in order to save the country. It failed because of deliberate interference on the part of the Pakistani intelligence establishment. Yes, there was chaos, but the U.S. contribution to it was not central. Out of the Pakistani-instigated chaos came the Taliban. But the Taliban could never have institutionalized their rule without the financial aid and logistical support of Benazir Bhutto's democratically elected government in Pakistan. The problem has not been U.S. neglect but Pakistani interference, under both democratic and military regimes.

Why do the Pakistanis interfere in Afghanistan? Because they require an Afghan puppet state to supply them with strategic depth for their conflict against India. Therefore, keeping Pakistan from making Afghanistan a base of extremism in the future will require constant U.S. involvement in managing the India-Pakistan rivalry.

Afghanistan has never had a government in Kabul that controlled the provinces. Zahir Shah was on the throne for 40 years, and he never succeeded at it. Thus, to expect the new regime there to control chaos, warlordism, etc., is to ignore Afghanistan's own history and to set an impossibly high standard of success. What can be achieved is the sort of weak central control and peaceful chaos engineered by warlords operating on the basis on mutual self-interest that will, in its own way, replicate the modest progress made from 1933 to 1973 under the royal government. We should be generous in terms of time, money, and diplomatic support for such a project. But with the exception of hunting for the remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaida leaderships, we should have as small a troop presence as possible in Afghanistan. I will go further into this in my next installment.

Bob, I look forward to your reply. 

Robert D. Kaplan