When President Barack Obama agreed to send 21,000 more troops to Afghanistan six months ago, he emphasized, "We will not blindly stay the course," adding that we "will not, and cannot, provide a blank check."
His rethinking of the whole business now may stem, in part, from a realization that a blind journey and a blank check are exactly what loom before him.
As senator, presidential candidate, and commander in chief, Obama has always stressed that his aims in Afghanistan were "limited"—not the ambitious and impractical vision of turning the place into a Western-style democracy (or, as Defense Secretary Robert Gates derided the notion, "a central Asian Valhalla") but rather a hard-core campaign of disrupting and defeating the Taliban and preventing al-Qaida from using the country as a "safe haven" for global terrorism once again.
It may be (I don't know for sure, and I doubt anyone on the outside has any great insight on the matter) that Obama has only recently come to understand that, according to classic counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, his "limited aims" cannot be accomplished by limited means; that simply chasing insurgents from one hillside or valley to another isn't going to turn the tide; that COIN, if it has much chance of success, requires an ambitious agenda of nation-building, a strategy—and enough troops and resources—to protect the Afghan people so that their government can supply justice and basic services, which will in turn inculcate popular loyalty to the government and thus dry up support for the insurgents.
And so, not unreasonably, the president is taking another look at whether counterinsurgency is the way to go. There are two key questions he might (or should, anyway) be asking:
First, is Afghan President Hamid Karzai likely to rally the support of his own people, especially given the massive fraud in the recent election? (If he doesn't rally this support, counterinsurgency is doomed to fail; this, the top U.S. military leaders acknowledge.)
Second, given the vast amount of blood, treasure, and time that a COIN campaign requires under the best of circumstances, are the prospective benefits worth the cost?
Another way to ask that first question: Assuming Karzai is re-elected (all the ballots, including the phony ones, have not yet been counted), is there any way that the United States and NATO can prod him to take steps that might broaden his legitimacy and regain the Afghan people's trust?
There might be one way: benchmarks.
Back in mid-2007, the George W. Bush administration came up with 18 benchmarks for Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to meet. Congress, in requiring Bush to file regular progress reports on the issue, declared that U.S. strategy in Iraq—including decisions on whether to add or withdraw forces—"shall be conditioned on the Iraqi government meeting" those benchmarks.
It was a good idea. The "surge" that Bush had ordered earlier in the year was designed to give the Iraqi political factions breathing space to get their act together; the benchmarks would measure how far they'd come along. The benchmarks included passing legislation to ensure equitable distribution of oil revenue, disarming militias, and de-Baathification reform, as well as increasing the number of Iraqi security forces capable of operating independently.
The problem was that Bush never enforced the benchmarks, never tied U.S. action to Iraqi compliance. The first report, in July 2007, concluded that the Iraqis had not made "satisfactory progress" toward meeting even half the benchmarks. But Bush did nothing to step up incentives; he never inflicted any punishments or rewards.
Many like to point to North Korea as an example of how poor nations can best use intimidation to get financial and other aid for their nations. Whenever North Korea needs more money they test fire a missile or test a nuke and it ALWAYS results in a slap on the wrist and a promise of aid.
Afghanistan might not seem like the same thing at first, but it sure is. Once one of the poorest nations in the world and heavily dependent on its heroine producing poppy crop, it now sees BILLIONS in US dollars flowing freely along with all kinds of aid...all in an effort to "stop terrorism" which is like trying to stop rain. Like the war on drugs, the war on terror is merely a bucket for money....a bucket which the fearful US taxpayer gladly fills with money in hopes that putting the money there might stop the next 9/11 from happening. Afghanis are laughing all the way to the bank while deciding who the next "terrorist" will be. For the small cost of making sure Bin Laden sends out a new tape every once in a while, more money will come.
Obama should simply pull us out of Afghanistan completely--this is the decision most other nations chasing their tales are doing including Canada. Canada took an honest look at the situation--the money being poured into it, the deaths by roadside bombs, and realized that really they have nothing to show for their time there. They haven't stopped terror and in fact US reports indicate our greater presence of armed forces has actually driven more people in the Middle East to join terror groups...in other words our strategy INCREASES terror.
Terrorism is a tactic. You cannot find it on a map nor determine who is and isn't a terrorist by a uniform. A terror group can be one moron working in his garage or thousands under the same leader...it is perhaps the single most ill defined military concept there is.
The best way to handle terror is to use spooks, spies, and other police forces which operate at a reasonable cost and have the brains to know a real terror threat from a nutjob. We can send in commandos or other expert military when the time and situation is right, but to occupy an entire nation in hopes it will "stop terror" is foolish and as I said earlier may even increase the problem.
Our best solution--indeed Obama's best decision will be to order the troops home and send a message to Afghanistan that the American gravy train is over. If they allow terrorists to operate there again the result will be bombs raining down rather than buckets of money and easy roadside bomb targets.
-- The Real RML
(To reply, click here)
The US is an extremely advanced industrial society while Afghanistan is a marginally functional agricultural economy. SO marginal that Afghanistan's economic evolution could be comparatively described as Middle Neolithic historically. That was a period of time in human history when we had just moved out of the Stone Age. The majority of Afghan's social structures are still clan and tribal based. Meaning that if a member of one clan is wronged by another clan member, they sharpen their mattocks and go and kill that individual. There is no central rule of law which operates within 90+% of Afghanistan. Therefore the first question is why are we trying to fight a conventional war at all in Afghanistan?
In order to wage an industrial age war, a centralized rule of law and evolved social structures must exist to effect change from the war. Afghanistan does not even posses city-states which hold any sway over their lands. The real first question should be: what would the result be if the US killed every single Taliban member and sympathizer, what would that "win" the US? Answer - nothing. There is no such thing as winning when there is no central authority. The Afghan's central authority is still over a thousand years in their future. They have a tremendous amount of evolution to go through to get to that point and nothing the US can ever do will change this requisite techno-economic evolutionary process that they must undergo to get there - if they ever do. Don't forget that several hunter-gatherer economies are still in existence today (Australian Aborigines are just one example). Not every society evolves to leading techno-economic.
The second question should be what kind of war should the US be waging against Al-Qaeda? Forget the Taliban, they simply represent the current point in evolution in world view there. The only viable approach would be for the US to wage a "Charlie Wilson" type war. Send money and guns to Pakistan to pay them to wipe out the insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This was the only way the terrorists of the 1970s were stopped (Baader Meinhof, Red Brigade etc).
The conventional war the US is waging in Afghanistan is fruitless. The US had better odds fighting the Vietnam War, as at least they had some central rule and were a very evolved agricultural economy comparatively speaking to the Afghans. And remind me again - how did that war turn out when an industrial economy battled an agrarian society?
History does repeat itself because the US is not as evolved as we think we are. We don't even have the most basic grasp on the evolution of human societies. Without it we fight these same wars over and over again . . .
-- reader999999
(To reply, click here)
What did you think of this article?
Join The Fray: Our Reader Discussion Forum
SPONSORED CONTENT
Many like to point to North Korea as an example of how poor nations can best use intimidation to get financial and other aid for their nations. Whenever North Korea needs more money they test fire a missile or test a nuke and it ALWAYS results in a slap on the wrist and a promise of aid.
Afghanistan might not seem like the same thing at first, but it sure is. Once one of the poorest nations in the world and heavily dependent on its heroine producing poppy crop, it now sees BILLIONS in US dollars flowing freely along with all kinds of aid...all in an effort to "stop terrorism" which is like trying to stop rain. Like the war on drugs, the war on terror is merely a bucket for money....a bucket which the fearful US taxpayer gladly fills with money in hopes that putting the money there might stop the next 9/11 from happening. Afghanis are laughing all the way to the bank while deciding who the next "terrorist" will be. For the small cost of making sure Bin Laden sends out a new tape every once in a while, more money will come.
Obama should simply pull us out of Afghanistan completely--this is the decision most other nations chasing their tales are doing including Canada. Canada took an honest look at the situation--the money being poured into it, the deaths by roadside bombs, and realized that really they have nothing to show for their time there. They haven't stopped terror and in fact US reports indicate our greater presence of armed forces has actually driven more people in the Middle East to join terror groups...in other words our strategy INCREASES terror.
Terrorism is a tactic. You cannot find it on a map nor determine who is and isn't a terrorist by a uniform. A terror group can be one moron working in his garage or thousands under the same leader...it is perhaps the single most ill defined military concept there is.
The best way to handle terror is to use spooks, spies, and other police forces which operate at a reasonable cost and have the brains to know a real terror threat from a nutjob. We can send in commandos or other expert military when the time and situation is right, but to occupy an entire nation in hopes it will "stop terror" is foolish and as I said earlier may even increase the problem.
Our best solution--indeed Obama's best decision will be to order the troops home and send a message to Afghanistan that the American gravy train is over. If they allow terrorists to operate there again the result will be bombs raining down rather than buckets of money and easy roadside bomb targets.
-- The Real RML
(To reply, click here)
The US is an extremely advanced industrial society while Afghanistan is a marginally functional agricultural economy. SO marginal that Afghanistan's economic evolution could be comparatively described as Middle Neolithic historically. That was a period of time in human history when we had just moved out of the Stone Age. The majority of Afghan's social structures are still clan and tribal based. Meaning that if a member of one clan is wronged by another clan member, they sharpen their mattocks and go and kill that individual. There is no central rule of law which operates within 90+% of Afghanistan. Therefore the first question is why are we trying to fight a conventional war at all in Afghanistan?
In order to wage an industrial age war, a centralized rule of law and evolved social structures must exist to effect change from the war. Afghanistan does not even posses city-states which hold any sway over their lands. The real first question should be: what would the result be if the US killed every single Taliban member and sympathizer, what would that "win" the US? Answer - nothing. There is no such thing as winning when there is no central authority. The Afghan's central authority is still over a thousand years in their future. They have a tremendous amount of evolution to go through to get to that point and nothing the US can ever do will change this requisite techno-economic evolutionary process that they must undergo to get there - if they ever do. Don't forget that several hunter-gatherer economies are still in existence today (Australian Aborigines are just one example). Not every society evolves to leading techno-economic.
The second question should be what kind of war should the US be waging against Al-Qaeda? Forget the Taliban, they simply represent the current point in evolution in world view there. The only viable approach would be for the US to wage a "Charlie Wilson" type war. Send money and guns to Pakistan to pay them to wipe out the insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This was the only way the terrorists of the 1970s were stopped (Baader Meinhof, Red Brigade etc).
The conventional war the US is waging in Afghanistan is fruitless. The US had better odds fighting the Vietnam War, as at least they had some central rule and were a very evolved agricultural economy comparatively speaking to the Afghans. And remind me again - how did that war turn out when an industrial economy battled an agrarian society?
History does repeat itself because the US is not as evolved as we think we are. We don't even have the most basic grasp on the evolution of human societies. Without it we fight these same wars over and over again . . .
-- reader999999
(To reply, click here)