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How To Fix the New York FedThe nation's second-most powerful financial institution is a mess. These folks might be able to save it.

New York Federal Reserve Building. Click image to expand.In my last column, I wrote about how the New York Federal Reserve Bank, the most powerful financial institution in America after the national Fed, has been entirely dominated by Wall Street bankers, without any meaningful public input. In this column, I want to suggest how this governance crisis could be remedied.

Steve Friedman quickly resigned as New York Fed board chair two weeks ago, when it came out that he bought Goldman Sachs stock while the Fed was dealing with Goldman's regulatory issues. The New York Fed would have us believe that his resignation clears up any potential conflict at the institution. But the fact that Friedman, a former Goldman chairman, was on the board as a "public" representative requires us to look at the possible intersections between the Fed's actions and the business interests of the Fed's other "public " representatives.

Of the New York Fed's nine board members, six are chosen to represent the public. Three of these six are picked by member banks; the other three are selected by the Fed's board of governors in Washington, D.C. The member banks somehow have been able to fill only one of the three "public" board positions, so the public voice is limited to Jeff Immelt, the chairman of GE. Yes, that's right: The chair of GE, one of the nation's largest finance companies, is the only public voice on the New York Fed chosen by the member banks.

One might fairly presume that the public representative on the board and the company he chaired would not be a direct beneficiary of Fed policies and bailouts. Such connections would, of course, be contrary to the ideal of bringing the independent, nonbanking perspective of the public to the board. But GE has gained hugely from Fed policies. It has been a significant beneficiary of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility, created by the Fed in October 2008 to insure liquidity in the commercial paper market. By putting a federal guarantee behind GE's issuance of commercial paper, GE saves very significantly on its cost of capital, thereby increasing its margins.* A back-of-the-envelope estimate of the value of these federal guarantees on the $80 billion in commercial paper that GE has issued with CPFF support: roughly $2.5 billion per year.

Now, the fact that the Fed reinforced the commercial paper market and that GE therefore got these guarantees may be wholly justifiable as a matter of policy. But why is it that GE, unlike virtually every bank that got bailout funds, did not give warrants to the government to provide for some potential return of value to the taxpayer? That question remains to be answered.

Immelt is a good and honorable man, and I do not mean to suggest that he has abused his position as a New York Fed board member for personal advantage. But I do wonder whether the board has the breadth of vision that it's supposed to have, given that two-thirds of board members are supposed to represent the public. Despite a year of financial crisis and bailouts, Wall Street still doesn't seem to acknowledge that its insular, self-dealing structure has not only destroyed public trust but undermined financial institutions. There is still a fundamental misunderstanding at the Wall Street level about the propriety of board members benefitting personally from corporate activity, about the true meaning of "public" board member, and about the nature of the fiduciary duty that public board members owe to the public.

The structure of the New York Fed can be fixed, if the member banks take their responsibility to the public seriously. Instead of stocking the board with insiders such as Immelt, the banks should pick truly independent voices. Here are a few obvious choices: Jack Bogle, the brilliant founder of the Vanguard funds, now retired, and an essential voice on the nature of fiduciary obligations in the capital markets; Barbara Roper, the sophisticated director of investor protection at the Consumer Federation of America; Harvey Goldschmid, formerly an SEC commissioner and general counsel and currently a Columbia law professor whose writings about the capital markets are astute and prescient; Arthur Levitt, the former SEC chair, whose reformist tendencies were real and often at odds with the Wall Street's desires; and Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel laureate who has been remarkably accurate in his macroeconomic analysis.

The Fed has been absent as a meaningful Wall Street regulator for too long. The reform process can start if the existing board vacancies are filled with genuine public voices, not Wall Street-ers who masquerade as public representatives.

Correction, May 20, 2009: The article originally implied that GE is currently saving on its cost of capital by using the Commercial Paper Funding Facility. According to GE, it has not used the CPFF since February. (Return to the corrected sentence.)

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Eliot Spitzer is the former governor of the state of New York.
Photograph of the Federal Reserve Building in Lower Manhattan by Timothy A. Clary/AFP/Getty Images.
COMMENTS

This is Anne from GE. There are several factual inaccuracies in Mr. Spitzer's column, which we have alerted him to. They're set forth below but we take particular exception with the false and misleading suggestion GE has received a government bailout in any amount, let alone $2.5 billion.

Mr. Spitzer writes: "But GE has gained hugely from Fed policies. It has been a significant beneficiary of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility, created by the Fed in October 2008 to insure liquidity in the commercial paper market. By putting a federal guarantee behind GE's issuance of commercial paper, GE saves very significantly on its cost of capital."

This is not true. GE paid a fee of $98 million to the government (and indirectly to taxpayers) to use the program during a brief period from its inception until February 2009 when we fully refunded all borrowings. We continued to roll our paper throughout the crisis. We have paid above-market rates during our participation. The program was put in place to help the market overall, not GE, by promoting liquidity and restoring confidence in the short term funding market. Currently there is $160B of outstanding paper in the CPFF, $0 from GE. It's incorrect to suggest by paying fees to participate and by paying above-market rates, the company "increased its margins." At the time of the CPFF program's inception we made it very clear that we were going to "test" facility and help our customers who wanted to redeem and that we did not need this facility; we used the facility for a limited amount and fully refunded it in February.

Spitzer continues: "A back-of-the-envelope estimate of the value of these federal guarantees on the $80 billion in commercial paper that GE has issued with CPFF support."

This is also imprecise. The $80 billion cited was total CP outstanding back in the fall -- our current CP balance is $58B with a target of $50B by end of the year. Our average maturities are months long, so it is incorrect and misleading to calculate fees on an annual basis. In any case, we cannot discern how Mr. Spitzer begins to calculate the value of federal guarantees at $2.5 billion.

The column continues: "Now, the fact that the Fed reinforced the commercial paper market and that GE therefore got these guarantees may be wholly justifiable as a matter of policy. But why is it that GE, unlike virtually every bank that got bailout funds..."

It's important to note these were not bailout funds in any sense of the word. They were guarantees to buy paper if no one else would and we have already repaid them. At the same time, we have demonstrated ability to place CP without the guarantees.

"But why is it that GE, unlike virtually every bank that got bailout funds, did not give warrants to the government to provide for some potential return of value to the taxpayer? That question remains to be answered."

The answer is that GE did not give warrants to the government because that is not the nature of the CPFF program, as explained above. If perhaps Mr. Spitzer is confusing CPFF with TARP, GE does not participate in that program. If he is confusing CPFF with TLGP, a program that we do participate in, his math is still inaccurate. On that program, we have in fact paid the government $1.3 billion to participate.

To be clear: GE has received NO government bailout. Rather, we have paid money out to the government to participate selectively in two programs designed to ensure liquidity to the market overall, while at the same time demonstrating ability to issue commercial paper without government guarantees.

We are engaging with Mr. Spitzer and his representatives to better understand how he arrived at what we believe are erroneous and misleading conclusions. In the meantime, it's important Slate readers benefit from the above.

Anne Eisele, Director, Financial Communications at GE Corporate.

-- AFE
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