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We Finally Have a Strategy for AfghanistanUnfortunately, that may not be enough.

By Fred KaplanPosted Tuesday, Dec. 23, 2008, at 6:53 PM ET

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But if the cascade isn't triggered—because the successes don't happen, or because they're not big enough, or because they're nullified by more incursions from Pakistan, or for whatever reason—will President Obama be pressured to throw in more troops? (We can almost imagine the briefing: "Just three more brigades will do the trick, Mr. President.")

It is worth noting that Afghan President Hamid Karzai has reacted coolly to the idea of 30,000 more U.S. troops. Some dismiss his public disaffection as political posturing; they note that Karzai faces a presidential election this spring and so doesn't want to look like a stooge of foreign occupiers. But if that's the case, it means that a lot—maybe a majority—of the Afghan people view us as foreign occupiers, like the Russians and British before us, and that a higher-profile presence may turn them against both us and our sponsor, Karzai.

A counterinsurgency campaign has no chance of succeeding, if we—and, by extension, the government that we're supporting—are seen as the enemy.

And so there is a paradox: More U.S. troops are needed to provide security to the Afghan people; but these troops may, at the same time, fuel the insurgency—which will require more troops, and on the cycle goes.

One possible way to short-circuit this cycle is to demonstrate a few quick and easy successes. For instance, rush a flood of troops to a town that is not under grave threat from the Taliban at the moment and provide it with lots of services—roads, electricity, food, whatever aid is needed. At the same time, rush another flood of troops to an area of marginal Taliban control and crush them. And do all this without killing any civilians.

If this can be managed, the question will remain: What next? But in a contest for popular support, first impressions are important—and, with a new administration, there may still be a chance for first impressions.

Obama has said that we have "limited goals" in Afghanistan. He hasn't defined the term precisely, but it's clear that he suffers from no illusions that a Western-style democracy is imminent. (As a senior NATO officer said a few years ago, the country's barely post-medieval.) He has said that the main goal is to prevent it from once again becoming a sanctuary for terrorists who seek to attack the United States and its allies. But how do you prevent that? How secure, and how free of insurgents, does how much of Afghanistan have to be? How many troops and bases are required to ensure that? There are people in the Defense Department whose job is to make these "requirements" as immense or as minimal as possible.

Meanwhile, the basic principles of counterinsurgency should be kept in mind. The point of these sorts of wars is not so much to defeat the enemy as to protect and win over the population; the former can happen only if the latter happens first.

It's possible that, despite all the smart strategists and the more sincere effort, the campaign simply won't work; most counterinsurgency efforts don't. In that case, President Obama's challenge will be to resist the pressures to stay locked in and to escalate, for the sake of perceptions, credibility, or false hope.