
Lonely Night in GeorgiaThe Bush administration's feckless response to the Russian invasion.
Posted Monday, Aug. 11, 2008, at 5:47 PM ET
It is impossible to think about the Russian assault on Georgia without feeling like a heartless bastard or a romantic fool. Should we just let Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev roll their tanks into Tbilisi in recognition of Moscow's sphere of influence—and let a fledgling democracy die? Or should we rally sanctions, send arms, and mobilize troops—none of which is likely to have any effect? Is there some third way, involving a level of diplomatic shrewdness that the Bush administration has rarely mustered and, in this case, might not have the legitimacy to pursue?
Regardless of what happens next, it is worth asking what the Bush people were thinking when they egged on Mikheil Saakashvili, Georgia's young, Western-educated president, to apply for NATO membership, send 2,000 of his troops to Iraq as a full-fledged U.S. ally, and receive tactical training and weapons from our military. Did they really think Putin would sit by and see another border state (and former province of the Russian empire) slip away to the West? If they thought that Putin might not, what did they plan to do about it, and how firmly did they warn Saakashvili not to get too brash or provoke an outburst?
It's heartbreaking, but even more infuriating, to read so many Georgians quoted in the New York Times—officials, soldiers, and citizens—wondering when the United States is coming to their rescue. It's infuriating because it's clear that Bush did everything to encourage them to believe that he would. When Bush (properly) pushed for Kosovo's independence from Serbia, Putin warned that he would do the same for pro-Russian secessionists elsewhere, by which he could only have meant Georgia's separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Putin had taken drastic steps in earlier disputes over those regions—for instance, embargoing all trade with Georgia—with an implicit threat that he could inflict far greater punishment. Yet Bush continued to entice Saakashvili with weapons, training, and talk of entry into NATO. Of course the Georgians believed that if they got into a firefight with Russia, the Americans would bail them out.
Bush pressed the other NATO powers to place Georgia's application for membership on the fast track. The Europeans rejected the idea, understanding the geo-strategic implications of pushing NATO's boundaries right up to Russia's border. If the Europeans had let Bush have his way, we would now be obligated by treaty to send troops in Georgia's defense. That is to say, we would now be in a shooting war with the Russians. Those who might oppose entering such a war would be accused of "weakening our credibility" and "destroying the unity of the Western alliance."
This is where the heartless bastard part of the argument comes in: Is Georgia's continued control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia really worth war with Russia? Is its continued independence from Moscow's domination, if it comes to that, worth our going to war?
At this point, the neocons would enter the debate—in fact some, like Robert Kagan, already have—by invoking the West's appeasement of Hitler's annexation of the Sudetenland in 1938. ("A quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing," is how Neville Chamberlain famously, and catastrophically, brushed away the aggression.)
A few counterquestions for those who rise to compare every nasty leader to Hitler and every act of aggression to the onset of World War III: Do you really believe that Russia's move against Georgia is not an assertion of control over "the near abroad" (as the Russians call their border regions), but rather the first step of a campaign to restore the Warsaw Pact in Eastern Europe and, from there, bring back the Cold War's Continental standoff? If so—if this really is the start of a new war of civilizations—why aren't you devoting every waking hour to pressing for the revival of military conscription, for a war surtax to triple the military budget, and—here's a twist—for getting out of Iraq in order to send a few divisions right away to fight in the larger battle? If not, what exactly are you proposing?
The same question can be asked of the Bush administration. Vice President Dick Cheney reportedly called Saakashvili on Sunday to assure him that "Russian aggression must not go unanswered." We should all be interested to know what answer he is preparing or whether he was just dangling the Georgians on another few inches of string. The U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Zalmay Khalilzad, told the Security Council, "This is completely unacceptable and crosses a line." Talk like that demands action. What's the plan, and how does he hope to get the Security Council—on which Russia has veto power—to approve it?
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Remarks from the Fray:
While I agree that all the tough talk coming from the administration has done nothing other than psych up Georgia into an overconfident pose, the situation is too serious to throw your hands in the air and give up.
On the one hand, [Kaplan] is right that lots of conservatives will cry appeasement, and offer no good plans of their own. Much like when talking about Iran, conservatives are likely to say that this or that is "unallowable" and "must not go unanswered"and leave it to the listener to ponder whether or not that means war.
What we should actually do is cut a short term behind-the-scenes deal to give Ossetia and Abhekazia independence (i.e. Russian control), and give an ultimatum that the government of Georgia must remain intact. As soon as the ceasefire is in effect, we should put peacekeepers and a moderate contingent of US forces into Georgia temporarily, while rebuilding and rearming Georgia. This is something that we can, in fact, get Europe to agree to and help foot the bill.
Forget the insignificant little provinces. Georgia matters, so focus on keeping that beachhead intact.
--jwschmidt
(To reply, click here.)
I have some suggestions: recall of our ambassador to Russia (for "consultations"), ramming through a mutual defense treaty with the Ukrainians ASAP, expulsion of Russia from the G-8, and/or the deployment of several hundred Marines to Tblisi to "secure the embassy," to name just a few things off the top of my head. Oh, and the administration should issue a heartfelt "Fuck you" to the Russians when they complain. Slap them down and slap them down hard--it should have been done as soon as Putin started his antics, but too many people in this country have been laboring under the delusion that Russia is a "partner."
(Actually, I suppose Russia could be considered a partner: the kind of partner who sleeps with your wife, embezzles all the company's money, and then flies off to Rio laughing all the way, but a partner nonetheless.)
Of course, I don't really expect the Bush Administration to do anything of a particularly forceful nature, as it has already shown a willingness to screw over in the name of "pragmatism" or "realism" those who were stupid enough to believe all the promotion of democracy talk. No, they'll just make the proper disapproving noises, put on their Darfur/Tibet/Burma frowny face, and six months from now it'll be business as usual.
--fenngibbon
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I would think that the Russian move actually increases the chances of NATO expansion in the near abroad areas. Moldavia and the Ukraine in particular will become very interested in looking at the security umbrella NATO provides.
Second, the Russian move will further cement American and European relations with China, giving tactic encouragement to China's economic incursion into Siberia. Coupled with this will be the foreign policy moves made by the multinational corporations. The recent difficulties that Exxon and BP have had with Russian oil development will make them wary of future involvements in Russian energy projects, and we can expect that this will not only hasten the development of alternative energy sources but to drop barriers on things like Brazilian ethanol and liquefied petroleum gases.
Also, if ever there was an argument for withdrawing from Iraq and healing our damaged military resources, this is a wake up call. The neocons should be leading the charge to accelerate withdrawal from Iraq so that we can focus our military forces on other parts of the world. […]
Tough talk against the Russians might make us feel good temporarily, but it's important that the United States take a longer term, more realistic perspective towards Russia than what the Bush administration has done.
--old new lefty
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The West's job now is not to get caught up in the waves of hysterical indignation and nationalist theatrics, or worse, to allow itself to be drawn into a geo-political melodrama that could easily spin out of control, with President Saakashvili playing the role of a latter day, and very faux, Archduke Ferdinand. The Russians will withdraw once they have secured their interests and those of their protégés in the two "breakaway" republics.
And if the West wants to "save" Georgia, it would do well to support a "regime change" in that country that would lead to real democracy, real transparency, real freedom and prosperity, that is, to deny itself the superficial and fatal -- to innocent bystanders -- satisfaction of allowing a dubious marionette to hold power in Tbilisi for the sole purpose of bloody-mindedly antagonizing Moscow.
--MarkEHaag
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