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Cruel To Be KindWhy Washington should not reach out to Muslim moderates.

By Ronald R. Krebs
Posted Thursday, Jan. 3, 2008, at 3:47 PM ET
Nawaz Sharif. Click image to expand.

The assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, with whom the United States had long cultivated a close relationship, has been widely seen as a setback for the forces of moderation in Pakistan and as another imposing obstacle to victory in the so-called "battle of ideas" in the "war on terror." With Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf discredited and Bhutto eliminated, the Bush administration responded in part by "reaching out" to Nawaz Sharif, the former prime minister it had held at arm's length because it did not see him as a faithful ally. For those who have long criticized the administration for its overly narrow definition of moderation, this seemed a promising development, consistent with the ubiquitous calls in Washington to support Pakistan's teetering democratic system more than individual politicians.

Few, beyond those conservatives troubled by Sharif's ties to Islamist forces, have questioned whether this move is wise. The relative silence reflects a broader bipartisan consensus. The Bush administration, Republican presidential candidates, and their Democratic counterparts all agree on the problem—the United States is losing the battle of ideas—and the solution: "reaching out" to Muslim moderates. During an election season, bipartisan consensus is rare, and when there is consensus, it should send up warning flags. The diagnosis of what ails the battle of ideas is on target, but the proposed treatment is wrong—with implications for U.S. policy in Pakistan and around the Muslim world.

The architects of U.S. counterterrorist policy have long identified the cultivation of Muslim moderates as a priority, yet they have made little progress. The reason is not a lack of effort, as some Democratic candidates have implied. Nor is it simply that Iraq hangs like a millstone around America's neck—though it does. Nor is the problem that U.S. policy-makers are uncomfortable supporting Muslim moderates who criticize U.S. foreign policy—though they are. Nor is it simply that many policy-makers hold a skewed vision of the "Muslim moderate" that excludes Islamists, even those committed to playing by the democratic rules of the game—though they do.

The fundamental problem lies with the strategy itself. Muslim moderates cannot be mobilized until they exist as a legitimate political force with an agenda distinct from that of their extremist co-religionists. Typically suspect in the eyes of their fellow Muslims, the last thing they need is for Westerners, and especially Americans, to "reach out" to them and to embrace them as potential "allies and partners."

Explicit or even implicit support from the United States has been the kiss of death for politicians in the Arab and Muslim world, as Lebanon's former President Amin Gemayel discovered in the August 2007 parliamentary elections, when a relatively unknown candidate defeated him. A Saudi reformer observed afterward, "The minute you are counted on or backed by the Americans, kiss it goodbye, you'll never win."

Outside the Middle East, the situation is little better. In Indonesia, even post-tsunami U.S. assistance, hailed for having tempered anti-Americanism in that country, has created an opening for radical groups and left moderates vulnerable. Nongovernmental organizations across the Muslim world are reportedly reluctant to accept U.S. aid for fear of being labeled American stooges.

This is not to suggest that bolstering legitimate Muslim moderates is unimportant. Just the opposite. It is crucial. They would constitute a credible political alternative for Muslim populaces, and their rise would translate into a decline in support for more extremist elements. Only they could forge connections across social and political boundaries, break down barriers, and link Western authorities with alienated Muslim populations. But they cannot act as brokers if they are perceived as the loyal servants of U.S. interests.

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Ronald R. Krebs is assistant professor and McKnight Land-Grant Professor in the department of political science at the University of Minnesota. He will explore these issues at greater length in the spring 2008 issue of Orbis.
Photograph of Nawaz Sharif by Asif Hassan/AFP/Getty Images. Photograph of Nawaz Sharif on the Slate home page by Rizwan Tabassum/AFP/Getty Images.
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