
Fighting the "Real" FightFoolish myths about al-Qaida in Mesopotamia.
Posted Monday, Aug. 13, 2007, at 12:02 PM ET
Over the past few months, I have been debating Roman Catholics who differ from their Eastern Orthodox brethren on the nature of the Trinity, Protestants who are willing to quarrel bitterly with one another about election and predestination, with Jews who cannot concur about a covenant with God, and with Muslims who harbor bitter disagreements over the discrepant interpretations of the Quran. Arcane as these disputes may seem, and much as I relish seeing the faithful fight among themselves, the believers are models of lucidity when compared to the hair-splitting secularists who cannot accept that al-Qaida in Mesopotamia is a branch of al-Qaida itself.
Objections to this self-evident fact take one of two forms. It is argued, first, that there was no such organization before the coalition intervention in Iraq. It is argued, second, that the character of the gang itself is somewhat autonomous from, and even independent of, the original group proclaimed by Osama Bin Laden. These objections sometimes, but not always, amount to the suggestion that the "real" fight against al-Qaida is, or should be, not in Iraq but in Afghanistan. (I say "not always," because many of those who argue the difference are openly hostile to the presence of NATO forces in Afghanistan as well as to the presence of coalition soldiers in Iraq.)
The facts as we have them are not at all friendly to this view of the situation, whether it be the "hard" view that al-Qaida terrorism is a "resistance" to Western imperialism or the "soft" view that we have only created the monster in Iraq by intervening there.
The founder of al-Qaida in Mesopotamia was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who we can now gratefully describe as "the late." The first thing to notice about him is that he was in Iraq before we were. The second thing to notice is that he fled to Iraq only because he, and many others like him, had been driven out of Afghanistan. Thus, by the logic of those who say that Afghanistan is the "real" war, he would have been better left as he was. Without the overthrow of the Taliban, he and his collaborators would not have moved to take advantage of the next failed/rogue state. I hope you can spot the simple error of reasoning that is involved in this belief. It also involves the defeatist suggestion—which was very salient in the opposition to the intervention in Afghanistan—that it's pointless to try to crush such people because "others will spring up in their place." Those who take this view should have the courage to stand by it and not invent a straw-man argument.
As it happens, we also know that Zarqawi—who probably considered himself a rival to Bin Laden as well as an ally—wrote from Iraq to Bin Laden and to his henchman Ayman al-Zawahiri and asked for the local "franchise" to call himself the leader of AQM. This dubious honor he was duly awarded. We further know that he authored a plan for the wrecking of the new Iraq: a simple strategy to incite civil murder between Sunni and Shiite Muslims. The incredible evil of this proposal, which involved the blowing up of holy places and the assassination of pilgrims, was endorsed from whatever filthy cave these deliberations are conducted in. As a matter of fact, we even know that Zawahiri and his boss once or twice counseled Zarqawi to hold it down a bit, especially on the video-butchery and the excessive zeal in the murder of Shiites. Thus, if there is any distinction to be made between the apple and the tree, it would involve saying that AQM is, if anything, even more virulent and sadistic and nihilistic than its parent body.
And this very observation leads to a second one, which has been well-reported and observed by journalists who are highly skeptical about the invasion. In provinces like Anbar, and in areas of Baghdad, even Sunni militants have turned away in disgust and fear from the AQM forces. It's not difficult to imagine why this is: Try imagining life for a day under the village rule of such depraved and fanatical elements.
To say that the attempt to Talibanize Iraq would not be happening at all if coalition forces were not present is to make two unsafe assumptions and one possibly suicidal one. The first assumption is that the vultures would never have gathered to feast on the decaying cadaver of the Saddamist state, a state that was in a process of implosion well before 2003. All our experience of countries like Somalia and Sudan, and indeed of Afghanistan, argues that such an assumption is idiotic. It is in the absence of international attention that such nightmarish abnormalities flourish. The second assumption is that the harder we fight them, the more such cancers metastasize. This appears to be contradicted by all the experience of Iraq. Fallujah or Baqubah might already have become the centers of an ultra-Taliban ministate, as they at one time threatened to do, whereas now not only have thousands of AQM goons been killed but local opinion appears to have shifted decisively against them and their methods.
The third assumption, deriving from the first two, would be that if coalition forces withdrew, the AQM gangsters would lose their raison d'être and have nothing left to fight for. I think I shall just leave that assumption lying where it belongs: on the damp floor of whatever asylum it is where foolish and wishful opinions find their eventual home.
If I am right about this, an enormous prize is within our reach. We can not only deny the clones of Bin Ladenism a military victory in Iraq, we can also discredit them in the process and in the eyes (and with the help) of a Muslim people who have seen them up close. We can do this, moreover, in a keystone state of the Arab world that guards a chokepoint—the Gulf—in the global economy. As with the case of Afghanistan—where several provinces are currently on a knife-edge between an elected government that at least tries for schools and vaccinations, and the forces of uttermost darkness that seek to negate such things—the struggle will take all our nerve and all our intelligence. But who can argue that it is not the same battle in both cases, and who dares to say that it is not worth fighting?
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Remarks from the Fray:
It is amazing that there are apparently serious people who insist that we must withdraw from Iraq - and withdraw right now. Withdrawal, no matter how we choose to portray it, will be a defeat. And it will be seen as a defeat by everyone.
The next and obvious question will be: who defeated us? And that's where it gets ugly. We won't be able to say we were defeated by a well organized modern army. We won't be able to say we were defeated by a grass-roots movement that had vast popular support. We won't even be able to claim that we were beaten by a proxy group supported by a significant rival. Instead we will have to admit that we, as one of the main pillars of Western civilization and democracy with the largest and most formidable military in the world, were defeated by a loosely organized group of murderous thugs. We will have been beaten by scum.
The consequences of this will have very long term effects and will be truly disastrous. We can win, but what's more, we have to win.
--lowvoltage
(To reply, click here.)
'Realists' are not saying that we should not fight these people. We just have to fight them in a 'smarter' way. We cannot indiscriminately raid villages and alienate the population. We have to work with the locals (no matter how odious and corrupt they may be) just like they are belatedly doing in Anbar.
The problem in staying in Iraq and Afghanistan is that currently the Western presence in counterproductive. This is because local resistance groups, the Taliban, and Al Qaida are winning the PR war. The Americans are painted as arrogant occupiers that do not benefit the country. Despite huge spending, few benefits of aid are visible. Enemies of the US are able to do this because Americans initially did not understand that when your first concerns are food, shelter, and security, democracy is not high on your list of priorities. The American tactics have failed to win over hearts and minds, and now it is too late to win them back.
Now that US popularity is at an all time low, it is too late to salvage much from the situation. The Americans are stuck in both countries and will take casualties and bad press for many years to come. Hopefully, sometime in the next administration Americans figure out a strategy to appeal to the world. It shouldn't be that hard to look favorable relative to fanatical, backwards, homicidal fanatics!
--apechi
(To reply, click here.)
This argument creates a false choice between fighting a war right now, and doing absolutely nothing, paying no attention to Iraq, and letting it fester. Surely there was a middle ground containment policy involving inspections, that while less than ideal, was better than starting a war, the most heavy-handed, brutal, and unpredictable of all foreign policy choices.
Look at this statement again: "It is in the absence of international attention that such nightmarish abnormalities flourish." So war is the only way for the International community to pay attention to another country? This is a pretty simplistic and naive stance.
--slippedvoussoir
(To reply, click here.)
I don't think it's a matter of who showed up in Iraq first. I think it's more a matter of fact that these so-called "freedom" fighters have experienced a blooming of their efforts under our watch. Most people recognize the magnet we have generated by simply allowing ourselves to fall into reach of these poor bastards who think sending their little brothers off to die for the sake of killing random people will affect a positive change. I think that with this recognition comes a profound moral crisis in most people, particularly when you look at how popular the war was in the beginning. "For the greater good" is an easy concept to act upon, but the reality is far more complex than that and I think much of the criticism we see today stems from that dawning reality.
So, no, we didn't start the fire. We simply fanned the flames and claimed the resultant prairie fire was progress...even when it burned further than implied. My resentment comes down to this: if they knew it was going to be such a tough job, why did they send mixed messages by having morons like Cheney tossing out inane rhetoric about being greeted as liberators? I think the political machine that was Bush's strength was in fact his ultimate weakness. Sure they were great advertisers! Too bad that's just about all they've been very good at.
--maghmhor
(To reply, click here.)
(8/15)