HOME / war stories: Military analysis.

Spy SurgePrepare for more domestic spying.

(Continued from page 1)

In data-mining, the NSA casts a vast "net" across the global communications system, encompassing, at least in theory, every phone call, e-mail, electronic signal, and so forth. The idea is not to monitor all these calls (there's not enough time or manpower to do that, in any case) but rather to detect patterns. If someone makes or receives a number of calls to or from, say, Pakistan, Iraq, or Syria—or if someone is in frequent contact with someone else who makes or receives such calls—this pattern would set off alarm bells. At that point, an intelligence officer might want to start monitoring that person or those people to see who they are, what they're doing, and whether anything about them or their behavior seems ominous.

I don't think anyone, other than libertarians, should have a problem with this sort of data-mining. Nor do I think there should be a problem with the idea of monitoring people whose calling patterns set off alarm bells. I say this even though I have probably set off some alarm bells myself. For instance, I have been in e-mail correspondence with a friend and former professor who is helping to set up a Western-style liberal-arts college in Pakistan. (I should apologize to other friends who could have been caught up in this hypothetical sweep if I phoned or e-mailed them shortly after communicating with my old professor.)

However, let me add a caveat: I have no problem with extending the probe from data-mining to monitoring if certain lawful procedures are followed.

Now, here's the catch: I don't know—and I don't think anybody else without a specially compartmentalized security clearance knows—whether the NSA or other intelligence agencies are currently following lawful procedures. More to the point, I don't know whether there are lawful procedures.

When the New York Times revealed in late 2005 that the NSA was data-mining inside U.S. territory, some critics demanded an end to the practice unless it had been approved in advance by the "FISA courts." These are highly classified panels of judges, set up under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, who approve (or decline, though they almost always approve) warrants to place foreign powers or their suspected agents under surveillance.

Bush administration officials responded, at the time, that warrants did not—and could not—apply to data-mining. And they were right. Warrants apply to specific individuals, entities, locations, or phone numbers. It's not possible to request a warrant to track the calling patterns of an entire country's population.

What was never settled in that controversy, at least not publicly, was whether FISA warrants apply to any subsequent monitoring that takes place as a result of these vast sweeps. If someone wants to monitor my calls because of the e-mails with my friend in Pakistan, does a FISA court have to give permission first? And are there limits to which of my calls can be monitored, what can and cannot be done with the resulting "intelligence," or how long it can be stored?

Again, I don't know the answers, nor do I know anyone who does (and I've asked around).

This isn't a trivial matter. Whatever the justification for this sort of surveillance in theory, the opportunity for abuse in practice is enormous—and even likely, as long as the current bunch is in power. The congressional leaders and intelligence committees can find out where these matters stand. They should ask and legislate new safeguards before the next "surge"—a surge in domestic spying—gets under way, because, by all indications, it's coming soon.

Print This ArticlePRINTEmail to a FriendE-MAILShare This ArticleRECOMMEND...Get Slate RSS FeedsRSS
Fred Kaplan is Slate's "War Stories" columnist and author of 1959: The Year Everything Changed. He can be reached at .
COMMENTS

Remarks from the Fray:

Kaplan's article [explains] the sort of surveillance I've suspected and inferred was going on for the last couple of years. Nicely done.

But he also proposes a view of civil liberties I find really disturbing -- the idea that a massive net of traffic analysis can be thrown over all our communications in order to single out targets for enhanced governmental scrutiny. And in breezily suggesting that the vast majority of us would approve of this, he makes it sound like a settled point of consensus.

I am no lawyer and am perhaps ill-positioned to take the pulse of the median American, but this strikes me as constitutionally suspect and sort of viscerally anti-American.

This is generalized suspicion on a grand scale -- a huge net thrown out to sift the population in hopes of turning up a few suspect individuals.

The 4th amendment requires probable cause "supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

That standard is not met merely because of the assertion by some federal official (who's likely to be outed any minute by the Washington Post as yet another un-qualified RNC shill who got the job by fundraising for Bush-Cheney '04) that somewhere out there there's a bunch of evil doers plotting to hurt us -- and we've got to put the 21st century equivalent of a PIN-register on every phone and internet connection in America to stop them.

God, would even the Roberts court buy that assertion? I pray not. I fear they would. But I know Kaplan should not suggest the question is virtually without controversy.

--guevera

(To reply, click here.)

(7/18)

What did you think of this article?
Join The Fray: Our Reader Discussion Forum
POST A MESSAGE | READ MESSAGES
TODAY'S PICTURES
TODAY'S CARTOONS
TODAY'S DOONESBURY
TODAY'S VIDEO
Logging.89/091116_TP.jpg
Cartoonists' take on entertainment.75/091116_TC.jpg
Where's Wali?61/091116_TD.jpg