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A Glimmer of Hope in GazaWhy push Hamas toward collapse when a long-term cease-fire is closer than ever?

By Mitchell ProtheroPosted Thursday, July 5, 2007, at 5:10 PM ET

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Does this mean the United States, Israel, and President Mahmoud Abbas should suddenly embrace Hamas and help them prove their experiment could succeed? I doubt any of the three think that's such a good idea. But they should note that for the first time in Hamas' existence, the group desperately wants to be taken seriously as Palestinian political figures. It might be a risky gambit in light of Hamas' refusal to accept Israel's right to exist—it's not unreasonable that negotiating partners start with a premise that one side has a right to live—but shrewd, or even brutal, negotiations could eventually force Hamas to deliver things that the region certainly needs.

Take Islamic Jihad. The militant group has stayed out of inter-Palestinian politics, preferring to concentrate on killing as many Israelis as it can. Talk to any Islamic Jihad leader and you'll come away impressed—on some level—with their single-minded devotion to fighting Israel. They never negotiate with Israel or anyone else. They also ignore calls to halt rocket attacks against Israel from Gaza.

But since the Hamas takeover, some funny things have been happening. Both Hamas and Islamic Jihad have conducted a few rocket and mortar attacks on Israel, but most of them have been aimed at military instillations or have been responses to Israeli military incursions. At least two top Islamic Jihad commanders have been called into meetings with Hamas officials and told to halt rocket attacks on Israeli civilians. One categorically refused. The next day, his car exploded in what Hamas and Islamic Jihad called an Israeli airstrike. The Israelis—who tend to openly admit killing IJ commanders—denied responsibility. I saw the car, and after years of experience in Iraq, Lebanon, and Gaza, I believe a bomb had been planted under the driver's seat.

Other Islamic Jihad commanders are getting nervous. Every few days, confrontations between Hamas forces and IJ rocket teams almost turn into shootouts. Fatah—for all of its peaceful rhetoric—never actually tried to stop Islamic Jihad or Hamas from conducting attacks; they lacked both the means and the will.

There's also the matter of the quiet rise of al-Qaida-type groups within parts of Gaza. Jaysh al-Islam is only one of them, and, without a crackdown, more will appear. For now, Hamas has little in common with these groups, but until Hamas leaders are sure that they can hold onto power, it's hard to see them expending energy to completely destroy such groups. Still, the Alan Johnston incident has Hamas convinced that if they're going to run the place successfully, a bunch of guys who look to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi for inspiration aren't going to make life easier.

It's not hard to imagine that with some small carrots and big sticks—such as freeing up some money to pay the salaries of Hamas-appointed civil servants; easing some travel restrictions; or reducing the number of armed incursions into Gaza, which inevitably produce rocket responses—could force Hamas to deliver a semblance of peace around the strip.

By allowing Jaysh al-Islam to keep its weapons and failing to crack down completely on Islamic Jihad, it's also clear that Hamas isn't sure how this whole thing will play out. They cannot, or will not, openly come to peace talks with Israel. But both sides would benefit from an end to the nonstop, bloody drama in and around Gaza. And for once, Israel and America have someone to talk to that could actually deliver a version of peace. We're a long way from Hamas removing the stuff about destroying Israel from its charter, and we may never reach that point. But in the ministries and police stations of Gaza, there's a near pathological desire by Hamas officials to prove they can govern, and this could be turned into a long-term cease-fire, which Hamas admits they're willing to discuss.

The alternative—currently being pursued by Israel, the United States, and Abbas—is to refuse to talk and to increase pressure on Hamas and other militants, not for the sake of concessions but to push for outright collapse. On Wednesday, salaries were paid for the first time in over a year—but only to Fatah civil servants, who have refused to show up for work since Hamas took over. The intention is to strangle the new Hamas government until it collapses and is replaced with another Fatah regime that talks peace but can't even control crime, let alone clamp down on well-trained and motivated terrorists. Such a "victory" would send a tough, well-armed fighting force back underground with nothing left to lose. And alliances with Jaysh al-Islam, Islamic Jihad, and other militants can easily be repaired once this experiment in going legit fails. Throw in some more al-Qaida-types and suddenly the devil that is being called "Hamasastan" could be replaced by something much worse.

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Mitchell Prothero is a writer and photographer based in Beirut. He covers conflict and terrorism issues throughout the Middle East, Central Asia, and Europe.

Photograph of police by Mitchell Prothero.

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