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A Glimmer of Hope in GazaWhy push Hamas toward collapse when a long-term cease-fire is closer than ever?

By Mitchell ProtheroPosted Thursday, July 5, 2007, at 5:10 PM ET

Gaza police officers on patrolGAZA CITY—Since the bloody coup in which Hamas seized power in Gaza from Fatah party rivals, Hamas officials want so desperately to be liked and respected by Westerners that meetings with them seem like uncomfortable first dates, with one side awkwardly eager to please.

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The charm offensive can be both superficial, as in the case of the giant neon banner outside my hotel that calls (in English) for an end to threats against "our foreign visitors and guests," and substantial, such as the group's pitch-perfect application of diplomacy and military pressure that led to the release of the BBC's Alan Johnston early Wednesday morning after 114 days in captivity.

After months of ineffectual rhetoric by both Fatah and Hamas against the kidnappers—a small, but effective, group of al-Qaida-style jihadis called Jaysh al-Islam that's part of a much larger and well-armed clan—Hamas made freeing Johnston a top priority. And over the last week, they performed with near elegance.

First they exerted pressure on Jaysh al-Islam and the large Dagmoush family by arresting or shooting anyone even remotely involved in the kidnapping. Then hundreds of its police encircled the family-dominated neighborhood in central Gaza City. All of Gaza was convinced that negotiations had failed and the time had come to settle both the kidnapping and a more complicated feud between Hamas and the family with violence. But even as black-masked members of Hamas' elite Izzidine Qassam Brigades could be seen entering the area for a final showdown—one that could easily have killed Johnston—Hamas paused long enough to talk it out.

For a week, Hamas leaders had been saying on background that maybe they should just storm the place: Better to look strong, even if it meant a bad outcome for Johnston. But as the pressure mounted, and it became clear that Hamas might just be frustrated enough to attack, moderates in the Dagmoush family forced the militants into a face-saving dialogue. At their request, Hamas delivered a neutral Islamic cleric, respected by both sides, to issue a ruling that the kidnapping was un-Islamic. And Johnston was freed.

But besides proving that they could be firm and nuanced at the same time, Hamas did something else that was widely overlooked in the understandably joyful coverage of Johnston's release: They failed to disarm Jaysh al-Islam, and they even released all the prisoners that had been taken in the campaign to pressure the family.

Why? Ask Gilad Shalit, the Israeli soldier captured just over a year ago in a joint operation between Hamas and, you guessed it, Jaysh al-Islam. Hamas might need to prove it can control Gaza, but it also has to maintain its street credibility among militants, at least for now. They are torn between guns and butter.

This tension between armed militancy and good governance is hard to reconcile. Hamas might have won the war to control Gaza, but it also finds itself more vulnerable to outside pressure than ever before in its 20-plus-year history. Hamas officials know that after their violent rise to power, they have to deliver more than rhetoric and martyrs. And Gaza is sick of both. It needs money, jobs, and security. In the past three weeks, despite the awful way they came to power, Hamas has delivered on the security. But to supply more, they need the help of their sworn enemies.

What is often overlooked about Hamas is that although destroying Israel is certainly high on its to-do list, the group represents the much broader agenda of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood, or "Ikwhan," is a Pan-Arab movement out to prove that most Arab regimes are corrupt, brutal, and ineffectual—a point that's hard to dispute when you've visited a few of them. The Brotherhood solution is to combine religious discipline with technocratic know-how to build a better society for the Arab world. Some consider them a moderating influence on the al-Qaida types, others point out that both groups share the same sources of intellectual inspiration, and many scholars make a reasonable argument that the Muslim Brotherhood is just radical Islam in a competent bureaucrat's cheap suit. That debate won't and can't be solved here.

But Hamas now runs Gaza, and it wants to succeed. They've delivered security, but they also know that if the economy doesn't pick up and wages aren't delivered, they're likely to be thrown out of power. If that were to happen, Gaza would descend back into chaos, and the best chance they've had to prove to the rest of the Arab world that they could meld Islam and modern governance will be lost.

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Mitchell Prothero is a writer and photographer based in Beirut. He covers conflict and terrorism issues throughout the Middle East, Central Asia, and Europe.

Photograph of police by Mitchell Prothero.

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