Dear Phillip,
That war does not seem “made new” in this book may indeed be due to the timelessness of war, but I think it also reflects a shortcoming. The technological changes reviewed in War Made New advance war along an established continuum, leaving the basic paradigm unchanged. The opportunity to explore technology’s potential for a true revolution in military affairs is not fulfilled in the book’s concluding chapters.
Even though the technological evolutions Boot calls “revolutions” were rapid and had a broad impact on society, almost all the illustrations show that the advances fit into the same basic framework for thinking about and executing war. That framework is an organized military that plays hide-and-seek and tries to hit the opponent more accurately and/or from farther away than the enemy and cause so much destruction that the enemy is either obliterated or surrenders. Whether troops move en masse, in a line, in columns, or in small units, for at least the past 500 years, the confront-and-destroy model dominates. Information can move via smoke signals, courier, telegraph, telephone, television, computers, cell phones—what makes the leap from one medium to another count as a revolution? Did this progress fundamentally transform military affairs or just lead to the same kinds of activities being carried out on a larger scale or at a quicker pace?
Let’s say I accept that the revolution label can be applied to rapid changes that take combat to the next level. Following Boot’s analyses of previous wars, I was looking forward to reading what technological pursuits the current reigning power (the United States) might be missing out on as it clings to the information-centered paradigm of the day. Or will dominating the information revolution give us the advantage in detecting the next great change?
Unfortunately, that discussion never materialized. Even though Boot reminds us that even the most sophisticated technology has its limitations and may be ineffective in low-tech strategies, his glimpse into the future is dominated by technologies that are best suited for the war we’ve been preparing for—not the kind we have against al-Qaida. After noting how many of our military technologies are unhelpful in the current war on terrorism (e.g., long-range missiles) it is striking how the technologies in development for future wars tend to advance the same types of systems we already have.
I don’t see many signs of future revolutions here. I agree, Phil, that the book fails to carry a critical eye through to the end; it doesn’t ask whether the United States should be devoting so much of our investment in science and technology to improve capabilities in which we are already far superior to any other power—or even to all other powers combined. Given the premise of the book, I expected that Boot might ask about the military options we are not pursuing. Are others pursuing technologies that we are not? If so, will that give them advantages our current path will leave us unable to match?
For example, the realm of nanotechnology is being pursued vigorously in many nations and both commercially and at multiple government agencies here in the United States. But the Department of Defense has yet to lay out an agenda for nanotechnology research of strategic use to the military. Research is being pursued piecemeal. Although nanotechnology is being developed to improve the gear individual soldiers will wear, it is not also focused on the problem of how to lighten the Future Combat System vehicles so they can be transported on aircraft without removing and shipping the armor separately. We need strategic thinking about where we want nanotechnology to go and what vulnerabilities we have to other nations that are investing in it. In the context of this discussion, we should be asking how war might be truly transformed if it were conducted at the “invisible” level through nanotechnology. When sensors, weapons, and written messages can be built at the atomic or molecular level, does it even make sense to have a military as we know it? Other nations are already farther down this path than we are—will a lack of vision about how nanotechnology could do much more than advance the current paradigm result in this empire’s downfall?
Other innovations also challenge us to think about a true revolution in military affairs. How would we conduct war if we could kill people but leave the infrastructure intact? Or if we could disable but not destroy the infrastructure—take away the means to wage war—without killing a single person? How might the period following war then be radically transformed as well? What if the technology and growing intolerance for a superpower wiping out cities and civilians lead to both the ability and acceptance of wars fought only by assassins aimed at eliminating only the top levels of any enemy hierarchy or the center or key nodes of an enemy network?
What if al-Qaida has already begun what we could call a “human technology revolution,” which shifts military affairs to undercover forces fully integrated throughout the world? What if our token nods to the need for cultural knowledge, personal networks, and the ability to adapt indigenous resources (such as commercial planes and explosive materials) to serve as weapons signals our slowness to adapt? Might we all, at some point in the future, reflect back on history and think how strange it was that a nation would dress up all its troops in identifying uniforms and equipment, station and deploy them collectively, and only send them out to other nations for short periods of time (a couple of years maximum) and only when war was imminent?
I think Boot limits the imagination by stating, “Winning wars, as distinct from winning battles, will continue to require controlling territory, which in turn will require a substantial presence of ground troops, as the U.S. has learned in Afghanistan and Iraq. No wonder weapon will alter this fundamental reality.” I’m not ready to conclude that war will always require a substantial number of ground troops.
What was exciting about some of the discussions of the Revolution in Military Affairs in the 1990s was the focus on America’s own national security and whether wars were or could be fought against our country in ways that would keep us from recognizing or responding to them as such: via immigration, intentional dissemination of drugs throughout the country, cyberwar against our banking system, and so on. It is curious that national defense now falls in the realm of the Department of Homeland Security more than the Department of Defense.
I agree, Phil, that this book is written in a very engaging and generally accessible manner. It will be particularly valuable as an introduction for those new to the topic. For those who might think that the combatants with the most sophisticated toys will prevail in combat, it offers an important reminder that human beings must use those tools properly if they are to be effective. But those readers who hope the latter chapters will take the lessons of the past—or even the current war—and try to apply them to the future may be disappointed.
Are my criticisms unfair? Would war cease to be “war” if the kind of paradigm shift I’m talking about transpires? What would be your criteria for deciding whether changes constitute a “revolution”? Or is the whole discussion merely academic? Did you find the almost-exclusive focus on America at the conclusion of the book to be warranted?
Best,
Laura
