HOME / foreigners: Opinions about events beyond our borders.
No Man's LandGaza is a time bomb primed to explode again and again.
By Shmuel RosnerPosted Monday, July 3, 2006, at 12:37 PM ET
Ro'ee Rutenberg was murdered in the fields of Nachal-Oz, a small kibbutz not far from the Gaza Strip on April 29, 1956. The funeral was attended by hundreds of thousands of Israelis and is still remembered for one of the most famous eulogies in Israeli history. "The gates of Gaza were too heavy for his shoulders," proclaimed then military Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan, referring to the biblical story of Samson and the Philistines. "This group of youth, sitting in Nachal-Oz, carry on their shoulders the heavy gates of Gaza," he said, while "on the other side, hundreds of thousands of eyes and hands pray for our weakness to show, so they can tear our bodies apart. Have we forgotten?"
In those days, when Palestinian militants crossed the border to murder Israelis, the Egyptians ruled Gaza. Later, Israel became the occupier, and then the Palestinian Authority controlled parts of it. Last summer, with much fanfare, Israel left Gaza—for good, it was promised. The settlers were evacuated, and the military pulled out.
Related in Slate
In July 2005, Rebecca Sinderbrand explored Jerusalem-based Christian evangelists' views on the Gaza pullout; the next month she explained how Israeli soldiers were trained to fight Israelis. Last August, Shmuel Rosner wrote that the Gaza withdrawal was a matter of law and order. Michael Young rounded up the Middle East press's reaction to the Gaza pullout. In 2000, Emily Yoffe provided background on Hamas, Fatah, and other groups.
"A successful disengagement will enhance the security of Israel, and it should give a sense of confidence and trust between the Israelis and Palestinians as they look to a better future," said Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, praising Ariel Sharon for his "bold move." Hollow words, broken promises. Not even a year has passed, and the Gaza problem is as painful as ever—with no signs of improvement. The prospect of calm was dashed—again—under the heavy gates, and Gaza is still waiting for someone to take responsibility.
Israel's withdrawal didn't stop Palestinian militants from shelling Israeli towns with rockets. When Hamas came to power, it was even clearer that the Palestinian government couldn't be trusted to stop the militants.
Then came the Israeli retaliation and the preventive attacks—targeted killings that sometimes hit their targets and sometimes killed innocent civilians. In both cases, the result was more anger—and more reasons, or excuses, to attack Israeli targets. The Palestinian government didn't seem willing or able to stop them. The newly formed Israeli government had to react, since the Israeli public was frustrated with its lack of action. When a group of Palestinians executed a well-planned surprise attack on an Israeli military post—killing two soldiers and kidnapping one—there was no way to prevent the situation from deteriorating even further.
From the Palestinian point of view, Israel was overreacting. After all, the Palestinian president had denounced the attack—and even the Hamas government disavowed it, declaring that it wanted the soldier to be returned unharmed.
In fact, the incident ignited some interesting Palestinian political dynamics. Suddenly it was no longer President Mahmoud Abbas from Fatah, the good guy, against Prime Minister Ismael Haniyeh from Hamas, the bad guy. A delicate power struggle between the two men became a three-way game as Hamas leaders who live in places like Damascus and enjoy the support of Syria and Iran took a harder line in an attempt to prove that they are the real power brokers in Palestinian society. This could be seen as an encouraging development, hinting at the possibility of a more moderate Hamas leadership within the territories.
Why should Israel—no longer an occupier in Gaza—need to invest itself in all these nuances of Palestinian politics? The Palestinian government is responsible for the area, so it's only reasonable to expect it to act on its obligations and bring law and order to the border. If it doesn't, Israel has to defend its citizens and soldiers. No country would have allowed a neighboring entity to infiltrate its territory with rockets or enemy combatants.
But the really big problem emerging from the deadlock is one that will increase the likelihood of future waves of violence. The current crisis didn't only expose the gaps between the two branches of Hamas—it also showed that Prime Minister Haniyeh and his Hamas party can be as powerless as President Abbas was always said to be.
Intelligence reports suggested this weekend that the kidnappers didn't take orders from anyone. They are exalted by their achievements and encouraged by the support they received from the Palestinian street for the demands they presented to the Israeli government: to free Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the kidnapped soldier.
The people who abducted Cpl. Gilad Shalit simply ignored the prime minister and the president, they ignored Egyptian mediators, and they ignored the entire international community. Their actions proved, yet again, that Gaza is still a no man's land waiting for a Samson.
No Man's Land: Gaza is a time bomb primed to explode again and again.
Shmuel Rosner, a columnist and editor based in Tel Aviv, blogs daily on Rosner's Domain.
Photograph of Israeli tanks by Yoav Lemmer/AFP/Getty Images.
COMMENTS
Remarks from the Fray:
Many commentators including the author have missed the key benefit of the withdrawal from Gaza: moral authority. In the past, terrorist actions against Israel were defended with the argument that Israel was an aggressive illegal occupier and could be repelled by force. Now the Israelis can make the compelling argument that since the withdrawal, Gaza should be treated as a sovereign nation. Thus any violent actions taken by Gaza's residents against Israeli soldiers and civilians can be construed as an act of war and are deserving of serious military retaliation. The withdrawal was not intended to bring peace, as neither the Palestinians nor the Israelis are that concerned with peace. They are concerned with victory. The moral authority of withdrawal gives Israel a free hand and a vital weapon to achieve that victory.
One must remember that ALL of this conflict over the years is because Israel is an occupying nation. We must remember that the occupied are fighting against the occupier. You may say "Well Israel left Gaza, and they no longer occupy this land where the conflict occurs today". Ask yourself, if a person is restricted from movement outside a place, land sea and air, is subject to the person surrounding the boundaries for survival, food, electrics and water, the person controls what goes in and what comes out of the boundaries, and the world condones it, what do we call these kinds of places? Does the occupier have to stand right next to you to control you?
Let's be clear. One hundred years in a conflict between nations is not that long a time period. Read the history of most modern nation states, and you will find similar examples from all over the world. There is nothing unusual about the Arab-Israeli wars, except perhaps the press coverage.
I would hope and pray for peace between the peoples or Israel and Palestine. But I think the Arabs should well consider this thought. There doesn't have to be a Palestinian state. It is not necessary to the well-being of the world. If the Arabs In Gaza and the West Bank can't find a way to live differently than they do, to build a nation of their own--if all they can do is endlessly snipe at Israel, it wouldn't be out of the bounds of reason for Israel to drive all of them out, into other Arab countries.
Ever since Ariel Sharon came to power, the policy of the Israeli government has been quite consistent and clear. It wants to unilaterally impose its own settlement of the conflict, and that includes the annexation of large and strategic areas of the West Bank. This is something it would not be able to get through negotiations, because neither the Palestinians nor the international community would accept it. It has already drawn its minimum desires on the map, in solid concrete.
Therefore it is highly desirable, from the point of view of the Israeli government, to avoid anything that even comes close to a possibility of a negotiated agreement, and certainly an agreement based on the 1967 borders. Sharon's government (and now Olmert's) always accepted peace proposals in principle, but carefully coordinated this with bombings, assassinations and attacks carefully timed to remove any opening for actual talks. And simultaneously pursued a sustained policy aimed to destroy even the vestiges of a credible Palestinian government. If there is no negotiation partner, there can be no negotiations.
As in Bosnia, it is time for the rest of the world to start imposing a solution, instead of merely hoping for one. Israel must be forced, peacefully if possible and by force of arms if required, to withdraw its forces and colonists to within its 1967 borders. The Palestinians must be forced to accept these borders and live peacefully in the land that is given to them. The neighbouring states must get the message that they will have to accept that solution, or face the consequences.
In 2001, when Oslo collapsed for good, Israel decided to destroy Arafat -- not only strategically, but symbolically. The IDF leveled all artifacts of central authority in the occupied territories, beginning with the headquarters of administration and proceeding methodically to everything from police stations to school records.
Feeling apparently that Sharon's campaign against Arafat was a "win" for Israel, Olmert is now clearly trying to replicate it against Hamas. The pyrotechnical evaporation of Haniya's office -- despite the fact that, as Rosner observes, intelligence said the Hamas-run PA had nothing to do with this kidnapping -- was as clear an expression of strategic intent as could be. Deja vu all over again. [...]
Problem is, it's an idiotic strategy, and has always been idiotic. Israel has been pursuing it ever since 1967, this self-gratifying effort to destroy any semblance of centralized authority in Palestinian politics. It does undermine potential unifying forces, but contrary to their apparent belief, the vacuum is always going to be filled: by warlords of one kind or another. [...]
Either the Israeli leadership would in its heart of hearts like a power center to emerge but finds itself muddled by short term political interests and road rage, or it is perfectly willing to concede dribs and drabs of casualties -- a kidnapped soldier here and an assassinated settler there -- in the hopes of weakening Palestinian society so much, incrementally, that it can be managed in perpetuity without much financial, military or political effort.
Mr Rosner will have to tell us which of these scenarios makes the most sense to him. But the way he's put it here sounds an awful lot like the caricature of the self-justifying Israeli soldier. Hu yoreh u bocheh, as the sardonic Hebrew saying goes: "He shoots and cries."
After the Wall Tumbled In 1989, Central Europe's fate was supposed to be uncertain and bleak. Today the region prospers more than ever. Anne Applebaum | Nov. 9, 2009
Remarks from the Fray:
Many commentators including the author have missed the key benefit of the withdrawal from Gaza: moral authority. In the past, terrorist actions against Israel were defended with the argument that Israel was an aggressive illegal occupier and could be repelled by force. Now the Israelis can make the compelling argument that since the withdrawal, Gaza should be treated as a sovereign nation. Thus any violent actions taken by Gaza's residents against Israeli soldiers and civilians can be construed as an act of war and are deserving of serious military retaliation. The withdrawal was not intended to bring peace, as neither the Palestinians nor the Israelis are that concerned with peace. They are concerned with victory. The moral authority of withdrawal gives Israel a free hand and a vital weapon to achieve that victory.
--canuckle
(To reply, click here.)
One must remember that ALL of this conflict over the years is because Israel is an occupying nation. We must remember that the occupied are fighting against the occupier. You may say "Well Israel left Gaza, and they no longer occupy this land where the conflict occurs today". Ask yourself, if a person is restricted from movement outside a place, land sea and air, is subject to the person surrounding the boundaries for survival, food, electrics and water, the person controls what goes in and what comes out of the boundaries, and the world condones it, what do we call these kinds of places? Does the occupier have to stand right next to you to control you?
--ZanubiyaAhmed
(To reply, click here.)
Let's be clear. One hundred years in a conflict between nations is not that long a time period. Read the history of most modern nation states, and you will find similar examples from all over the world. There is nothing unusual about the Arab-Israeli wars, except perhaps the press coverage.
I would hope and pray for peace between the peoples or Israel and Palestine. But I think the Arabs should well consider this thought. There doesn't have to be a Palestinian state. It is not necessary to the well-being of the world. If the Arabs In Gaza and the West Bank can't find a way to live differently than they do, to build a nation of their own--if all they can do is endlessly snipe at Israel, it wouldn't be out of the bounds of reason for Israel to drive all of them out, into other Arab countries.
--justgreenleaf
(To reply, click here.)
Ever since Ariel Sharon came to power, the policy of the Israeli government has been quite consistent and clear. It wants to unilaterally impose its own settlement of the conflict, and that includes the annexation of large and strategic areas of the West Bank. This is something it would not be able to get through negotiations, because neither the Palestinians nor the international community would accept it. It has already drawn its minimum desires on the map, in solid concrete.
Therefore it is highly desirable, from the point of view of the Israeli government, to avoid anything that even comes close to a possibility of a negotiated agreement, and certainly an agreement based on the 1967 borders. Sharon's government (and now Olmert's) always accepted peace proposals in principle, but carefully coordinated this with bombings, assassinations and attacks carefully timed to remove any opening for actual talks. And simultaneously pursued a sustained policy aimed to destroy even the vestiges of a credible Palestinian government. If there is no negotiation partner, there can be no negotiations.
As in Bosnia, it is time for the rest of the world to start imposing a solution, instead of merely hoping for one. Israel must be forced, peacefully if possible and by force of arms if required, to withdraw its forces and colonists to within its 1967 borders. The Palestinians must be forced to accept these borders and live peacefully in the land that is given to them. The neighbouring states must get the message that they will have to accept that solution, or face the consequences.
--MutatisMutandis
(To reply, click here.)
In 2001, when Oslo collapsed for good, Israel decided to destroy Arafat -- not only strategically, but symbolically. The IDF leveled all artifacts of central authority in the occupied territories, beginning with the headquarters of administration and proceeding methodically to everything from police stations to school records.
Feeling apparently that Sharon's campaign against Arafat was a "win" for Israel, Olmert is now clearly trying to replicate it against Hamas. The pyrotechnical evaporation of Haniya's office -- despite the fact that, as Rosner observes, intelligence said the Hamas-run PA had nothing to do with this kidnapping -- was as clear an expression of strategic intent as could be. Deja vu all over again. [...]
Problem is, it's an idiotic strategy, and has always been idiotic. Israel has been pursuing it ever since 1967, this self-gratifying effort to destroy any semblance of centralized authority in Palestinian politics. It does undermine potential unifying forces, but contrary to their apparent belief, the vacuum is always going to be filled: by warlords of one kind or another. [...]
Either the Israeli leadership would in its heart of hearts like a power center to emerge but finds itself muddled by short term political interests and road rage, or it is perfectly willing to concede dribs and drabs of casualties -- a kidnapped soldier here and an assassinated settler there -- in the hopes of weakening Palestinian society so much, incrementally, that it can be managed in perpetuity without much financial, military or political effort.
Mr Rosner will have to tell us which of these scenarios makes the most sense to him. But the way he's put it here sounds an awful lot like the caricature of the self-justifying Israeli soldier. Hu yoreh u bocheh, as the sardonic Hebrew saying goes: "He shoots and cries."
--rummykins
(To reply, click here.)
(7/8)