Introduction
By Emily Bazelon, Phillip Carter, and Dahlia Lithwick
Every few months a new story of torture by American troops or agents emerges in the media. Usually it is misunderstood, spun for propaganda, or ignored altogether. Yet understanding U.S. interrogation practices is vitally important, now more than ever, because these events (and their coverage) have a decided impact on our national security. Whether through an account of a savage prisoner-killing in Afghanistan or a Quran being desecrated in Guantanamo Bay, the world sees and judges us based on these stories.

Many Americans feel uneasy about the idea of torturing prisoners; others accept that desperate times may call for desperate security measures. Either view leaves open hard questions. For those who are ready to countenance torture to prevent the detonation of a "ticking time bomb," who should be authorized to decide when that situation has arisen and how far interrogators should go? The number of official inquiries into whether the interrogation practices in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo rise to the level of torture—as many as 10 to date—demonstrates the difficulty of determining who in the chain of command bears responsibility for tactics that exceed the military's traditional limits.

The very word "torture" encompasses too many possibilities. Is scaring a prisoner with a dog really torture in the first place or just a modified fraternity prank? Is hooding a terrorist all that bad? Without a larger context, it's impossible to know how to frame these issues. Which explains why the American public finds itself either "for" or "against" torturing alleged terrorists, without having developed nuanced ideas of what such positions mean. We are debating in black and white instead of recognizing shades of gray. And much of the official thinking has taken place behind closed doors, preventing public understanding of where the relevant government actors have drawn the lines and why.

This series provides the facts and law to illuminate and add depth to the torture debate—not to persuade you to support or oppose it, but to help you formulate your own views on where the acceptable boundaries may lie. We've tried to separate facts from analysis, using principally the primary documents made available through government reports, leaks, or Freedom of Information Act requests. The aim is to inform the national conversation about the way America acts in the war against terror.

The Chain of Command
Who the players are.
By Phillip Carter
When the Abu Ghraib scandal initially broke in April 2004, attention focused on a small group of players, composed of the soldiers depicted in the abuse photos and the senior officers directly in charge of them. In the myriad investigations, trials, and news reports that have followed, the scope of the abuse allegations has widened to include locations in Afghanistan, Cuba, and secretive detention facilities at unknown locations.

It would be impossible to catalog every private, sergeant, captain, and colonel involved with the abuses, let alone the long list of CIA officials, government lawyers, contractors, and others involved with the scandal. Instead, Slate has compiled this chain of command, from President Bush down to the soldiers who served at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo.

The White House:
George W. Bush. What he did then: President of the United States (first term). What he does now: President of the United States (second term). Reported involvement: Critics allege that President Bush set the wheels in motion for the abuse scandals by deciding that the Geneva Conventions would not apply to certain detainees and by fostering a "gloves off" atmosphere for the U.S. intelligence community. The White House denies any direct or indirect role in the abuses that took place at Abu Ghraib or elsewhere.

Alberto Gonzales. What he did then: White House Counsel. What he does now: Attorney General of the United States. Reported involvement: As White House counsel, Gonzales coordinated the legal analysis by the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel for the President and various executive agencies on the subjects of detention, interrogation, and the president's war powers generally. Gonzales also published a Jan. 25, 2002, memorandum that concluded that the Geneva Conventions should not apply to the current war on terrorism. Critics charge that this memo set the legal conditions for the abuses that would follow.

Condoleezza Rice. What she did then: National Security Adviser to the President. What she does now: Secretary of State. Reported involvement: Rice coordinated policy between the State Department and the Pentagon via the National Security Council process and served as the president's most trusted adviser on foreign policy. There is no evidence that she directed or participated in any of the legal analyses that directly concerned interrogation. However, Rice played a central role in demanding "human intelligence" from detention facilities like Guantanamo and was likely privy to the sources and methods used to get such intelligence. She also is reported to have played some role in managing the administration's extraordinary-rendition policies.

Dick Cheney. What he did then: Vice President of the United States (first term). What he does now: Vice President of the United States (second term). Reported involvement: Like Rice, Cheney played a central role in the Bush administration's national security decision-making process. His counsel, David Addington, is also reputed to have coordinated legal analysis by the Justice Department and Defense Department that resulted in the now infamous torture memos.

Justice Department:
John Ashcroft. What he did then: Attorney General of the United States. What he does now: Private citizen. Reported involvement: On his watch, the Justice Department litigated a number of terrorism cases involving allegations of torture. In United States v. Moussaoui, Justice Department lawyers fought hard to keep out evidence about how certain detainees were interrogated for fear that it might taint the case against the alleged "20th hijacker." Jay Bybee and John Yoo, the Office of Legal Counsel lawyers who wrote the Justice Department torture memos and provided legal opinions about whether the Geneva Conventions applied to the Guantanamo detainees, reported to Ashcroft. However, it's not clear how much personal involvement the former attorney general had with these memos; it has been reported that he actually argued for moderation.

Paul Clement.

Jay Bybee. What he did then: Assistant Attorney General; Chief, Office of Legal Counsel, 2001-2003. What he does now: Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit. Reported involvement: Bybee served as the assistant attorney general in charge of the Justice Department's Office Legal Counsel from 2001 until his confirmation to the 9 th Circuit in 2003. OLC acts as a sort of in-house counsel for the executive branch, providing legal opinions to cabinet agencies. UC Berkeley law professor John Yoo worked as a deputy in Bybee's office and played a central role in developing many of OLC's most controversial memos on detention and interrogation. Bybee and Yoo's Aug. 1, 2002, "torture memo" created a legal framework for the authorization of abusive interrogation techniques by the president. Critics charge that this memo and its progeny amounted to a cookbook for unlawful conduct by the executive branch.

John Yoo.

Jack Goldsmith. What he did then: Assistant Attorney General; Chief, Office of Legal Counsel, 2003-2004. What he does now: Professor, Harvard Law School. Reported involvement: Goldsmith took over OLC after Bybee's departure with a reputation as one of the nation's leading scholars of international law. He wrote a March 2004 memorandum opining that the U.S. could transfer certain non-Iraqi detainees out of Iraq because they were not protected by the Geneva Conventions. Critics charge that this memo enabled the Defense Department and CIA to create "ghost detainees" by holding people without registering them or reporting them to the Red Cross. However, human rights lawyers have described the Goldsmith memo as "responsible and high quality scholarship" in contrast to the previous OLC memos by Bybee and Yoo, which have been roundly criticized as unsophisticated and intellectually dishonest. According to Newsweek, Goldsmith resigned his position in the Justice Department because he disagreed with the earlier Bybee memos.

Pentagon:
Donald Rumsfeld. What he did then: Secretary of Defense (first term). What he does now: Secretary of Defense (second term). Reported involvement: As head of the Pentagon, Rumsfeld was responsible for developing and implementing the policies for detention and interrogation at places like Guantanamo. More than any one else, he pushed the "new war" paradigm, which supports coercing terrorism detainees in order to extract intelligence from them. Rumsfeld personally reviewed the legal memoranda on interrogation practices and questioned lawyers about specific practices that he either found too lenient or too aggressive; he ultimately approved a list of 24 tactics for use at Guantanamo. According to the briefing releasing the Fay-Jones report, Rumsfeld also authorized the detention of "ghost detainees" after being asked to do so by former CIA director George Tenet.

William J. Haynes II. What he did then: General Counsel, Department of Defense. What he does now: General Counsel, Department of Defense; also nominated to a seat on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit. Reported involvement: As the Defense Department general counsel, Haynes also advised Rumsfeld on the selection of Guantanamo, and his office worked closely with the Justice Department to advance an expansive view of executive power to detain combatants that was repudiated by the Supreme Court in June 2004. News reports indicate that Haynes requested and supervised the now-infamous Defense Department torture memo, which built on the legal analysis performed by the Justice Department in its August 2002 memo to allow for interrogation techniques like stress positions, sleep deprivation, and the use of dogs.

State Department:
Colin Powell. What he did then: Secretary of State. What he does now: Private citizen. Reported involvement: In late 2001 and early 2002, Powell reportedly lobbied for a more moderate detainee policy. As a retired general and combat veteran, he argued that American soldiers could pay the price in future conflicts if our enemies decided to reciprocate the detention and interrogation practices then under consideration by the White House. Powell's attorney, State Department legal adviser William Howard Taft IV, prepared a memo for the White House, which it ultimately ignored, that countered the arguments being advanced by the Justice and Defense Departments.

William Howard Taft IV.

Southern Command
(SOUTHCOM)

Central Command
(CENTCOM)
Gen. Tommy Franks. What he did then: Commander, U.S. Central Command, responsible for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. What he does now: Retired from active duty. Reported involvement: As head of CENTCOM, Franks was responsible for combat operations and military activities in Afghanistan and Iraq. He developed the operational plan for the invasion of Iraq and oversaw its execution. In an after-action review, the Army's Judge Advocate General school noted that this plan left military police and intelligence units woefully under-resourced and underprepared to handle the large numbers of prisoners they would eventually encounter. Among other things, the JAG report states that the decision to deploy the 800th Military Police Brigade, the unit that managed Abu Ghraib, after the war's start put prisoner operations in a state of perpetual chaos. In its report, the Schlesinger commission said this chaos contributed greatly to the abuses at Abu Ghraib, where detainees outnumbered MPs by a ratio of 75 to 1.

Gen. John Abizaid.

Joint Task Force GTMO
Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller. What he did then: Commander of Joint Task Force Guantanamo from November 2002 to April 2004. Where is he now: Appointed as Deputy Commanding General for Detention Operations in Iraq in April 2004. Reported involvement: While at Guantanamo, Miller supervised the development of a system of interrogation that rewarded detainees for providing information and punished them for failing to do so. He was lauded by Pentagon officials for dramatically increasing the intelligence output at Guantanamo, although critics charge that the use of increasingly coercive interrogation measures produced more noise than good intelligence. The Taguba report says Miller was brought to Abu Ghraib in September 2003 to "Gitmo-ize" the facility, meaning that Pentagon officials wanted him to bring with him his harsh and successful methods. Miller wrote about Abu Ghraib that "it is essential that the guard force be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation of internees." An investigation into Miller's methods at Guantanamo was launched by the U.S. Southern Command in response to FBI e-mails that were obtained by the ACLU via the Freedom of Information Act. That investigation by Air Force Lt. Gen. Randall Schmidt is still pending.

Combined Joint Task Force 180
(Afghanistan)

Combined Joint Task Force 7
(Iraq)
Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez. What he did then: Commander, V Corps, U.S. Army (Germany), and Combined Joint Task Force 7. What he does now: Commander, V Corps, U.S. Army (Germany). Reported involvement: As the ground commander in Iraq, Sanchez was responsible for fighting the war there. He and his staff pushed the military police and military intelligence commanders under them to produce more intelligence from detainees in order to better fight the insurgency. According to the Fay-Jones report, Sanchez played a key role in the development of interrogation policy in Iraq, authorizing certain practices and then rescinding or changing his guidance. Sanchez also directly supervised Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski and the 800th MP Brigade. Punishment: Before Abu Ghraib, it was widely believed that Sanchez would receive his fourth star and be tapped to take over Southern Command, the equivalent of CENTCOM in Latin America. Neither the promotion nor assignment has come to pass, possibly because both would require Senate approval. However, most observers think Sanchez lost these opportunities because of his failure to stamp out the insurgency in Iraq rather than because Abu Ghraib happened on his watch.

Maj. Gen. Barbara Fast. What she did then: C-2 (Intelligence officer), Combined Joint Task Force 7 (Baghdad). What she does now: Commander of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, Ariz. Reported involvement: As Sanchez's chief of intelligence, Fast was responsible for the gathering and analysis of intelligence—making her, in effect, the customer for the information that came out of Abu Ghraib. She and her staff came up with the questions (called "priority intelligence requirements") for the Abu Ghraib intelligence personnel. Although Fast did not actually command the military-intelligence personnel at Abu Ghraib, she exercised some oversight over those units. The Army's investigation cleared her of any dereliction in the performance of her duties.

Col. Marc Warren. What he did then: Staff Judge Advocate for Combined Joint Task Force. What he does now: Serves in the Office of the Judge Advocate General for the Army in Washington, D.C. Reported involvement: As Sanchez's chief attorney, Warren vetted many of the key detention and interrogation policies used in Iraq, including those specified in memos dated Sept. 14, 2003, and Oct. 12, 2003, that authorized the use of stress positions, sleep deprivation, and dogs. Warren also served on the Security Internee Review and Appeal Board, established in August 2003, that decided whether to release detainees who were deemed not to be a security threat or of further intelligence value. Army investigators reported their belief that members of Warren's staff, and possibly Warren himself, knew about potential abuses and misconduct in violation of the Geneva Conventions at Abu Ghraib but did not pass this information up to Sanchez or anyone else. Punishment: The Army's chief lawyer clearedWarren of any professional impropriety under legal ethics rules and also cleared of him of the charge that he was derelict in his duties.

205th Military
Intelligence Brigade

Col. Thomas Pappas. What he did then: Commander, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade. What he does now: Recently relieved as commander, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade; pending reassignment. Reported involvement: Pappas commanded the intelligence personnel serving as interrogators, linguists, analysts, and supervisers at Abu Ghraib. According to Army doctrine, MI personnel should be strictly separated from the MPs assigned to work as prison guards. In practice, at Abu Ghraib the MPs were placed under the "tactical control" of Pappas and his intelligence unit, making them subject to his orders. Punishment: According to the Associated Press, Pappas was fined about $8,000 and given a letter of reprimand by his commanding general, Maj. Gen. Bennie Williams, for dereliction of duty while commanding his unit in Iraq. In May 2005, Pappas was formally removed from command of the 205th MI Brigade.

800th Military
Police Brigade
Col. Janis Karpinski. What she did then: Brigadier General and commander, 800th Military Police Brigade, responsible for Abu Ghraib and 16 other detention facilities in Iraq. What she does now: Army Reserve colonel; private consultant in the civilian world. Reported involvement: Karpinski was a one-star general in charge of a military police brigade headquarters. Once in Iraq, her brigade came to include eight subordinate military police battalions responsible for 6,000 to 7,000 detainees. According to both the Taguba report and the Fay-Jones report, Karpinski failed to exercise the requisite control over these units and personnel and failed to respond adequately to indications of trouble. In her defense, Karpinski has said that she did not have the resources to manage the gargantuan task of handling the Iraqi detainees. One retrospective Army report agrees with her. The Army's law-of-war manual, however, states that a commander may be criminally culpable if she knew or should have known that her troops committed war crimes, and failed to take necessary and reasonable steps in response. Punishment: The Army's inspector general found evidence that Karpinski had been derelict in her duties and that she had stolen a cosmetic item from a shop at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida in October 2002. Gen. Richard Cody, the Army's No. 2 general, issued her a formal reprimand. The Army also formally relieved her of command of the 800th MP Brigade in April 2005, and the president vacated her promotion to brigadier general, reducing her rank to colonel.

4th Infantry
Division

1st Armored
Division

519th Military
Intelligence
Battalion

Joint
Interrogation &
Debriefing Center
Lt. Col. Steven Jordan
Capt. Carolyn Wood. What she did then: Ran the interrogation unit at Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan from Aug. 2002 until Jan. 2003. In April 2003, she crossed into Iraq with the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, arriving at Abu Ghraib in July 2003. Where she is now: Fort Huachuca, Ariz., assigned to the 304th Military Intelligence Battalion. Reported involvement: Wood rewrote the interrogation policy at Abu Ghraib, adding to it nine techniques not included in the Army field manuals. According to the Fay-Jones report those techniques included the "use of dogs, sleep management, [and] stress positions." On May 19, 2005, the ACLU made public Wood's sworn statement to the Fay-Jones investigators, which was declassified and released by the Army in response to the ACLU's FOIA requests. Wood's name is redacted, but identifying data such as her rank, current unit, and past assignments make clear her identity. "We had used 'sleep adjustment' and 'stress positions' as effective techniques in Afghanistan," her statement reads. "I perceived the Iraq experience to be evolving into the same operational environment as Afghanistan. I used my best judgment and concluded they would be effective tools for interrogation operations at AG." Wood then reports that she "plagiarized" for use at Abu Ghraib the interrogation policy used by the secretive Task Force 121, an ad hoc organization of special operations units in Iraq. Lawyers she consulted told her the new policy was "within legal purview and authority," and her commanders also vetted and approved it. When she met with Miller and his team from Guantanamo during their Sept. 2003 visit to Abu Ghraib, she says that someone from the team called her policy a "good start" but suggested that Abu Ghraib should consider using other techniques approved for use in Guantanamo.

320th Military
Police Battalion
Jerry Phillabaum. What he did then: Commander, 320th MP Battalion, U.S. Army Reserve. What he does now: Retired from military service. Reported involvement: Phillabaum commanded the 320th MP Battalion, the parent headquarters for the 372nd MP Company in which the soldiers convicted of the Abu Ghraib abuses served. Phillabaum also commanded the U.S. base containing Abu Ghraib until a Nov. 19, 2003, order transferred responsibility for the base to Pappas. Punishment: Sanchez issued Phillabaum a career-ending "general officer memorandum of reprimand." He has since retired from the Army Reserve.

2nd Battalion 20th
Field Artillery
Regiment
Allen West. What he did then: Army Lt. Col.; Commander, 2nd Battalion, 20th Field Artillery Regiment. What he does now: Private citizen. Reported involvement: Army investigators learned that West participated in the August 2003 forcible interrogation of an Iraqi police officer thought to be involved in a plot to assassinate him and other soldiers. In their report, the investigators found that West directed four enlisted soldiers and a female civilian interpreter to punch and kick the Iraqi detainee repeatedly in an attempt to get information. The investigation also found that West brandished his pistol during the interrogation and fired it near the detainee's head in a mock execution to scare the detainee into talking. Punishment: Fourth Infantry Division commanding Gen. Raymond Odierno initially brought criminal charges against West, but a pretrial hearing officer recommended that those charges be dismissed. Instead, Odierno gave West an administrative punishment and fined him half a month's pay for two months, or about $5,000. In spring 2004, West retired from the Army.

Alpha Company,
2nd Battalion,
37th Armored
Regiment
Rogelio Maynulet. What he did then: Captain, U.S. Army and commander, Alpha Company, 2nd Battalion, 37th Armored Regiment. What he does now: Private citizen. Reported Involvement: On May 21, 2004, Maynulet and his men spotted a black sedan thought to contain rebel Iraqi cleric Muqtada Sadr, who was wanted by the U.S. military for his involvement with the ongoing insurgency and with the killing of a rival cleric. Maynulet's men gave chase and engaged in a running gun fight through the streets of Najaf and Kufa. Eventually, Maynulet and his soldiers stopped the sedan with their gunfire, seriously wounding the occupants. Upon reaching the scene, Maynulet found the vehicle's driver, Karim Hassan Abed Ali al-Haleji, mortally wounded with serious head injuries. Maynulet shot and killed him at close range in what has been described as a mercy killing. The act was captured on video by an unmanned aerial vehicle circling overhead. Punishment: The Army prosecuted Maynulet for assault with intent to commit murder and dereliction of duty, but he was convicted by a general court-martial of the lesser-included offense of assault with intent to commit voluntary manslaughter. He was sentenced to dismissal from the Army without prison time.

Asadabad
Air Base
(CIA Contractor)

David Passaro. What he did then: CIA contract employee, Afghanistan. Where is he now: Defendant, United States v. Passaro, pending in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. Reported involvement: Passaro, a former Army Ranger, was hired by the CIA to support U.S. military personnel at a small base near the town of Asadabad in Afghanistan. On June 18, 2003, a local Afghan named Abdul Wali surrendered voluntarily to U.S. personnel at the front gate of the base. According to his indictment, while interrogating Wali over the next two days Passaro repeatedly beat him with his hands and a large flashlight, leading to Wali's death in his cell on June 21. Passaro has been charged under a provision of the USA Patriot Act that potentially extends the criminal jurisdiction of U.S. courts to any American military or diplomatic facility anywhere in the world. Punishment: Passaro faces two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon and two counts of assault resulting in serious bodily injury. Each charge carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine.

Bagram Central
Collection Point
Capt. Carolyn
Wood

372nd Military
Police Company
Capt. Donald Reese &
Master Sgt. Brian Lipinski. What they did then: Commander and First Sergeant, 372nd Military Police Company. What they do now: Captain, U.S. Army Reserve, assigned to the 336th Military Police Battalion; Master Sergeant, U.S. Army Reserve, assigned to the 372nd Military Police Company. Both men have been released from active duty and are serving part-time in the Army Reserve. Reported involvement: The company is the basic building block of the Army. It includes roughly 100 to 200 personnel and is commanded by a captain who has been an officer for at least five years. The first sergeant is the most senior sergeant in such a unit, and is generally responsible for unit discipline and management. Reese and Lipinski were not implicated directly in any of the abuses; rather, their culpability stemmed from their command responsibility. According to the Taguba report, both men failed to effectively train their military police soldiers on detention do's and don't's; failed to supervise their troops effectively; and failed to respond appropriately to signs of abuse. In May 2004, a lawyer for one of the Abu Ghraib defendants told a military judge that Reese and Lipinski would testify in court that their MP soldiers were ordered by intelligence personnel to abuse the detainees at Abu Ghraib. The testimony was never given because of a plea bargain by Staff Sgt. Ivan L. "Chip" Frederick. Punishment: Reese was suspended from command on Jan. 17, 2004, right after the Abu Ghraib photos were given to Army criminal investigators. The Taguba report recommended that a general give him and Lipinksi career-ending letters of reprimand. But the Army refuses to comment on whether any administrative punishments have been doled out to the two men, citing privacy considerations.

Freelance bounty hunter
Jonathan Idema. What he did then: Freelance bounty hunter in Afghanistan who said he had ties to the U.S. Department of Defense and CIA. Where is he now: An Afghan prison. Reported involvement: Idema was an ex-Green Beret who went to Afghanistan to find Osama Bin Laden. In April 2002, he established his own operation to hunt down and find top members of al-Qaida and claims he had the approval of top Pentagon officials to do so. In his quest to gather information, Idema resorted to various abusive tactics such as physical beatings, sleep deprivation, and "water boarding." On July 5, 2002, Idema called Kabul police chief Baba Jan to turn over eight detainees and found himself and his crew under arrest by Afghan authorities. At his trial, Idema claimed he was working for the Pentagon's No. 2 intelligence official, Lt. Gen. William Boykin, and produced a tape at his trial of a conversation with someone in Boykin's office to corroborate his story. However, the Afghan court found this defense irrelevant, convicting him of torture and sentencing him to 10 years in an Afghan prison.

Abu Ghraib Nine. What they did then: Seven of the nine soldiers served with the 372nd Military Police Company, which provided security at the Abu Ghraib prison. Sivits and England were trained not as military police but as a truck driver and personnel clerk, respectively. Cruz and Krol were intelligence soldiers assigned to the 325th MI Battalion who worked in the Abu Ghraib prison alongside the MPs from the 372nd. What they do now: All of the defendants have been transferred out of Iraq. Those serving prison sentences or awaiting trial remain on active duty. The others have either been discharged or released from active duty. Reported involvement: Depicted in the abuse photographs turned over to Army criminal investigators in January 2004 by Army Spc. Joseph Darby, the seven soldiers from the 372nd MP Company are at the center of the Abu Ghraib scandal. These soldiers were assigned to guard inmates. The two MI soldiers facing court-martial worked as interrogators or analysts.

Punishment:

Pfc. Lynndie England: Pleaded guilty on May 2, 2005, but had her plea vacated by a military judge after introducing evidence that contradicted it. Military officials say they will likely bring new charges in a few months.

Spc. Jeremy Sivits: A special court-martial found Sivits guilty of maltreating detainees and dereliction of duty in Baghdad on May 19, 2004. He was sentenced to a year in prison, a bad-conduct discharge, and a reduction in rank to private.

Spc. Charles Graner: Convicted by a court-martial on Jan. 15, 2005, as the alleged ringleader for the Abu Ghraib abuses. Graner was sentenced to 10 years in military prison, a demotion to private, and a dishonorable discharge.

Sgt. Javal Davis: Pleaded guilty in February 2004 to making false statements, dereliction of duty, and battery. A military judge sentenced Davis to six months in prison, reduced his rank to private, and ordered a bad-conduct discharge.

Spc. Megan Ambuhl: Pleaded guilty in October 2004 to dereliction of duty. Sentenced to a reduction in rank and forfeiture of pay in exchange for agreeing to testify in the cases of the other Abu Ghraib defendants.

Staff Sgt. Ivan "Chip" Frederick: Despite statements from his lawyer in May 2004 that he would fight the charges by arguing that he was following orders, Frederick pleaded guilty in October 2004 to eight counts of conspiracy, dereliction of duty, maltreatment of detainees, assault, and committing an indecent act. A military court sentenced him to eight years in prison, a dishonorable discharge, and a reduction in rank to private.

Spc. Armin J. Cruz: Pleaded guilty on Sept. 11, 2004, to conspiracy and maltreatment of detainees. Sentenced to 8 months in prison, a bad conduct discharge, and a reduction in rank to private.

Spc. Roman Krol: Pleaded guilty on Feb. 1, 2005, to charges of conspiracy and detainee maltreatment relating to an Oct. 25, 2003, incident in which he forced detainees to crawl naked on the floor while he poured water on them. Krol also threw a foam football at the detainees while they were handcuffed and naked on the floor. He received a 10-month prison sentence, a bad conduct discharge, and a reduction in rank to private.

Spc. Sabrina Harman: Tried and convicted on May 17, 2005, of six of seven counts she faced for mistreating prisoners. Sentenced to six months in prison.

Legal Memos
How the rules were rewritten.
By Dahlia Lithwick
Released at approximately the same time as the Abu Ghraib photographs, the first internal legal memoranda written by various high-ranking officials in the Bush administration reveal the extent to which legal methods and language have framed the discussion about what constitutes torture and to whom the new rules apply. While the public expressed outrage at the photographic evidence of torture at Abu Ghraib, the writers and architects of U.S. torture policy have been largely forgiven. Many have been promoted. There is something about bare-bones legal analysis that immunizes—even sterilizes—the contents of the message.

Lawyers write memos for many reasons—to bounce ideas around, to elicit criticism and feedback, and to test novel ideas for the first time. What's most striking about these torture memos is their ideological consistency. Almost from the outset the principal ideas were set—that the Geneva Conventions might not apply to some prisoners; that torture could be defined narrowly so as to permit egregious conduct as long as the "intent" was not to violate the law; that conduct prohibited under national and international law could be redefined as permissible. A few critics raised objections along the way—and some of the more questionable practices were eventually halted. But for the most part, these memos reveal a remarkable and uniform willingness up and down the ranks to accept a rather extreme doctrinal and definitional view of torture. They suggest a party line, as opposed to a dialogue.

Another striking aspect of the torture memos is the secrecy that surrounded them. We would not know about most of these documents were it not for leaks, Freedom of Information Act requests, and subsequent investigations. There is, to be sure, an urgent need for a national conversation about which interrogation techniques are effective and necessary under exigent circumstances in an age of terror. But these memos reveal what happens when that conversation takes place in secret, within the echo chamber of the administration.

Memorandum for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense

Author: John C. Yoo

Title: Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Date: Jan. 9, 2002

Prepared For: William J. Haynes II

Title: General Counsel, Department of Defense

Key Issues: Analyzing whether international law, especially Geneva Conventions and War Crimes Act, apply to al-Qaida and Taliban detainees.

Key Legal Advice Given:

• The Geneva Conventions and the War Crimes Act don't apply to al-Qaida since its members are not state actors.
• They also don't apply to Taliban
  
  

Memorandum for the President, Subject: Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict With al Qaeda and the Taliban

Author: Alberto Gonzales

Title: White House Counsel

Date: Jan. 25, 2002

Prepared For: George W. Bush,

Title: President

Key Issues: Responding to concerns of secretary of state and reaffirming earlier advice regarding whether Geneva Conventions apply to al-Qaida and Taliban detainees.

Key Legal Advice Given:

• The president has the authority to decide that Geneva does not apply.
• The war on terror is a "new kind of war" … "in my judgment this new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions requiring that captured enemy be afforded such things as commissary privileges, scrip (i.e., advances of monthly pay) athletic uniforms and scientific instruments."

Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on the Applicability of the Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan

Author: Colin Powell

Title: Secretary of State

Date: Jan. 26, 2002

Prepared For: Counsel to president

Title: Assistant to President for National Security

Key Issues: Responding to draft memorandum on applicability of Geneva Conventions to conflict in Afghanistan.

Key Legal Advice Given:

• Suggests that draft memo being circulated doesn't present to president the full range of options before him, or identify pros and cons of each option.
• Pros of applying Geneva to conflict far outweigh cons and include: danger to U.S. troops; undermining support among allies; reversal of a century of U.S. policy.

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Author: John Ashcroft

Title: Attorney General

Date: Feb. 1, 2002

Prepared For: George W. Bush,

Title: President

Key Issues: On status of detainees as prisoners of war.

Key Legal Advice Given:

• President should make a determination that Geneva does not apply and thus afford "the highest level of legal certainty available under American law."

Comments on Your Paper on the Geneva Convention

Author: William Taft IV

Title: State Department Legal Adviser

Date: Feb. 2, 2002

Prepared For: Counsel to the President

Key Issues: More warnings against rejecting Geneva Conventions.

Key Legal Advice Given:

• "A decision that the conventions do not apply to the conflict in Afghanistan … deprives our troops there of any claim to the protection of the conventions in the event they are captured."
• Notes that CIA lawyers asked that Bush's pledge to abide by spirit of conventions would not apply to CIA operatives.

Title: President

Date: Feb. 7, 2002

Prepared For:

Dick Cheney
Title: Vice President
Colin Powell
Title: Secretary of State
Donald Rumsfeld
Title: Secretary of Defense
John Ashcroft
Title: Attorney General
Chief of Staff to President
Director of CIA
Assistant to President for National Security
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Key Issues: Whether Geneva Conventions apply to al-Qaida and Taliban detainees.

Key Legal Advice Given:

• Geneva doesn't apply to al-Qaida.
• President has constitutional authority to suspend Geneva altogether but chooses not to.
• Geneva does apply to conflict with Taliban.
• Neither Article 3 or 4 apply to Taliban.
• Nonetheless, human values demand that detainees be treated humanely and "consistent with principles of Geneva."

Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340A

Author: Jay Bybee

Title: Assistant Attorney General

Date: Aug. 1, 2002

Prepared For: Alberto Gonzales

Title: White House counsel

Key Issues: Standards of conduct for torture under American law (Sections 2340-2340A of Title 18 of the U.S. Code) Defining torture so as to justify gaining maximum information.

Key Legal Advice Given:

• Defines torture as methods that cause "severe physical or mental pain or suffering." Defines "severe pain" as involving damage that rises "to the level of death, organ failure, or the permanent impairment of a significant body function."
• Also concludes that torture requires specific intent to cause prolonged mental harm such that defendant's good-faith belief that the acts were not torture constitute a "complete defense to such a charge."
• To be torture, "acts must penetrate to the core of an individual's ability to perceive the world around him, substantially interfering with his cognitive abilities, or fundamentally alter his personality."

Action Memo, Counter-Resistance Techniques

Author: William J. Haynes II

Title: General counsel, Department of Defense

Date: Nov. 27, 2002

Prepared For: Donald Rumsfeld

Title: Secretary of Defense

Key Issues: Seeking approval for three counter-resistance techniques to be used in interrogations.

Key Legal Advice Given:

• Categories I and II approved; category III denied.
• Category I: Use of mild and fear-related techniques.
• Category II: Use of stress positions; use of falsified documents; isolation for up to 30 days; removal of clothing; preying on fears (i.e., dogs); interrogation outside standard interrogation room "so long as no severe physical pain inflicted and prolonged mental harm intended."
• Deprivation of light and sound, use of hoods, and use of 20-hour interrogations are all legally permissible.
• Category III: Use of death threats or threats of imminent physical harm not illegal but should be utilized with caution. Exposure to cold, water, or use of wet towel to suggest suffocation not approved.
• "Based on the Supreme Court framework utilized to assess whether a public official has violated the Eighth Amendment, so long as the force used could have plausibly been thought necessary in a particular situation in order to achieve a legitimate governmental objective and it was applied in a good faith effort and not maliciously or sadistically for the purpose of causing harm, the proposed techniques are likely to pass constitutional muster."

Action Memo, Counter-Resistance Techniques

Author: Donald Rumsfeld

Title: Secretary of Defense

Date: Dec. 2, 2002

Prepared For: William J. Haynes II

Title: General Counsel, Department of Defense

Key Issues: Approving Haynes' request, above.

Key Legal Advice Given:

• Notes in handwriting, "I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?"

Title: Secretary of Defense

Date: Jan. 15, 2003

Prepared For: Commander, Southern Command

Key Issues: Approved interrogation techniques at Guantanamo Bay.

Key Legal Advice Given:

• Rescinds approval for some of the above techniques at Guantanamo. But instructs head of U.S. Southern Command that, "should you determine that particular techniques in either of these categories are warranted in an individual case, you should forward that request to me." Such requests require a "thorough justification."

Memorandum for the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Subject: Detainee Interrogation

Author: Donald Rumsfeld

Title: Secretary of Defense

Date: Jan. 15, 2003

Prepared For: William J. Haynes II

Title: General counsel of Defense Department

Key Issues: Detainee interrogations.

Key Legal Advice Given:

• Seeks the establishment of a working group to assess all aspects of detainee interrogations.

Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operation Considerations

Author: DOD legal task force

Date: March 6, 2003

Prepared For: Donald Rumsfeld

Title: Secretary of Defense

Key Issues: Working Group Report on interrogation techniques in war on terror.

Allegedly this document was brought by Gen. Geoffrey Miller from Guantanamo to Iraq in 2003 to govern interrogations there as well.

Key Legal Advice Given:

• The Geneva Conventions do not apply to al-Qaida; Article 4 of the Geneva Conventions does not apply to the Taliban.
• The 1994 Convention against torture defines torture as "specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering" and that suffering refers to: 1) intentional infliction of pain or suffering; 2) administration or threats of mind-altering substances; 3) threat of imminent death; 4) threats to third parties. "In sum, the obligations under the Torture Convention apply to the … unlawful combatant detainees, but … only as defined in the U.S. understanding."
• "Customary international law cannot bind the Executive Branch … because it is not federal law."
• 18 USC Section 2340 (the federal torture statute) applies only to offenses that occur outside the United States. Guantanamo Bay is considered within the U.S. for purposes of the torture statute, "thus the torture statute does not apply to the conduct of US personnel at GTMO."
• Also, to violate 2340 the actor must have specifically intended "to disobey the law."
• Even if the defendant knows that severe pain will result from his actions, "if causing such harm is not his objective, he lacks the requisite specific intent even though the defendant did not act in good faith."

Memorandum for the Commander, US Southern Command, Subject: Counter-Resistance Techniques in the War on Terrorism

Author: Donald Rumsfeld

Title: Secretary of Defense

Date: April. 16, 2003

Author: James T. Hill

Title: Commander, U.S. Southern Command

Key Issues: Based on Working Group Report above, provides explicit detail on 24 interrogation techniques permitted at Guantanamo Bay.

Key Legal Advice Given:

• Approved techniques include: direct asking; offering or removing incentives; playing on love or hate detainee feels; inducing fear; playing on ego; "Mutt and Jeff" techniques; dietary manipulation; changing room temperature to foster "moderate discomfort: sleep adjustment (but not sleep deprivation); convincing detainee interrogators are not American; isolation.
• Contains detailed safeguards and scripts to walk interrogators through the procedure.

Taxonomy of Torture

The facts and the law.
By Phillip Carter
What is torture? Euphemisms like "stress position" cover a wide range of practices, from the merely uncomfortable to the wickedly cruel and painful. At Slate, we have wrestled with the definitions of abuse and torture and how best to present these morally and legally complicated terms. The taxonomy follows the legal maxim of res ipsa loquitur—let the thing speak for itself. The tactics below are listed in order from least to most severe.

Source: Army Field Manual 34-52 ("Intelligence Interrogation")

Description: Verbal questioning of a detainee. The Army's field manual for interrogation stresses the utility of this method, saying that it works in 95 percent of situations, especially with low-ranking soldiers who believe they have nothing worth concealing.

Physical, Psychological, or Other Effects: None

Locations Used: Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay

Legal Opinion: Considered legal for all prisoners of war. A prisoner who gives his name, rank, and serial number may still be questioned under reasonable conditions.

Name: "Fear up"—mild and harsh

Source: FM 34-52

Description: For example, the "dagger on the table" technique, in which an interrogator places a military knife on the table in plain view to make the implicit threat of stabbing the detainee. Or if an interrogator knows that a detainee is religious, he might focus on the detainee's fear of damnation by exposing the detainee to pornographic materials. In the most explosive form of this approach, "fear up harsh," according to FM 34-52, "the interrogator behaves in an overpowering manner with a loud and threatening voice. The interrogator may even feel the need to throw objects across the room to heighten the source's implanted feelings of fear."

Physical, Psychological, or Other Effects: Such questioning may rise to the level of psychological coercion or mental duress, according to FM 34-52.

Locations Used: Iraq, Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan

Legal Opinion: Generally acceptable up to a point. In its manual for interrogators, the Army recognizes the legal risk of violating the Geneva Convention's prohibition against the use of coercion and threats. Article 17 of the 3rd Geneva Convention does not allow "physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion" in interrogation. Article 31 of the 4th Geneva Convention states that "[n]o physical or moral coercion shall be exercised … to obtain information." The conventions also prohibit "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment." In deciding to withhold Geneva protection for al-Qaida detainees, President Bush removed these prophylactic rules.

Without Geneva, the limits on interrogation come from the 1994 Convention Against Torture, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the federal anti-torture statute for civilian personnel, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice for military personnel. The CAT defines torture as "any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person...by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity." Article 16 of the CAT requires signatory states to affirmatively stop any official "acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture." The U.S. Senate ratified the CAT and the ICCPR with the understanding that the U.S. would be bound to the extent that cruel, unusual, and inhuman treatment or punishment are prohibited by the U.S. Constitution. Mental torture, in particular, was narrowly defined as "prolonged mental harm caused by (1) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (2) the administration … of mind-altering substances; (3) the threat of imminent death; or (4) the threat of imminent death, severe physical suffering, or application of mind-altering substances to another."

The U.S. ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with the same understanding that its prohibitions would only go as far as U.S. Constitutional limits on official conduct. The Supreme Court has ruled that it is constitutional for government actors to use force they plausibly could have thought necessary to achieve a legitimate government objective, if the force is applied in good faith without malice or sadism. The U.S. government does not believe, however, that the CAT and ICCPR offer any protection to detainees held outside the United States.

Psychological tactics like "fear up" are unlikely to violate this permissive standard. Under the standards embraced by international courts like the European Court of Human Rights, however, these techniques would violate the CAT, ICCPR, and the Geneva Conventions, regardless of the detainees' status.

The UCMJ provisions addressing assault and the communication of a threat may also prohibit "fear up" if the tactic includes a threat of death or serious bodily harm.

Source: FM 34-52

Description: "Pride and ego up" involves flattering a detainee and tricking him into talking about the greatness of his military or terrorist organization. This approach typically works best on sources who have been looked down upon by giving them a chance to show they have brains or military acumen. "Pride and ego down" works in the opposite fashion. The interrogator attacks the source's intelligence, loyalty, military skill, leadership qualities, and questions his manhood to make him talk in order to redeem himself.

Physical, Psychological, or Other Effects: If the trickery works, detainees may feel remorseful afterward.

Locations Used: Iraq, Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan

Legal Opinion: This technique presents no obvious legal problems.

Name: Futility

Source: FM 34-52

Description: This approach adopts the motto of Star Trek's fictional Borg—resistance is futile. On a conventional battlefield, an interrogator might try to convince a detainee that his side has no hope, and therefore he should talk to help the U.S. win quickly so more of his buddies' lives will be spared. At a detention facility like Guantanamo, the futility approach means making detainees think they will be held forever unless they tell the Americans what they know. As the Army's manual puts it, "making the situation appear hopeless allows the source to rationalize his actions, especially if that action is cooperating with the interrogator."

Physical, Psychological, or Other Effects: The futility approach itself has no effects, but detainees who actually believe their existence to be futile may become depressed to the point of suicide. Guantanamo detainees have made at least 460 attempts at self-injury and 34 suicide attempts since the camp opened in January 2002.

Locations Used: Iraq, Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan

Legal Opinion: The futility approach does not itself offend the law. But it works best in conjunction with other law-breaking tactics, like the Bush administration's decision to hold detainees indefinitely at an island outpost with little to no legal process or contact with the outside world.

Name: "Mutt and Jeff" (aka "good cop/bad cop")

Source: DOD Working Group memo; Miranda v. Arizona; pick your cop show

Description: The "bad cop" threatens the subject or acts in a way that creates fear or anxiety. The "good cop" comes in to displace the bad cop, sometimes by physically ejecting him from the room to protect the detainee. The intercession is supposed to build rapport and trust and induce the detainee to tell the good cop what he knows, lest the bad cop come back.

Physical, Psychological, or Other Effects: Negligible

Locations Used: Iraq, Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan

Legal Opinion: This is, quite literally, one of the oldest tricks in the book. As a mental ruse, it rarely rises to the level of illegality. But under certain circumstances, some threats can evolve into the type of coercion that violates the Geneva Conventions. The April 16, 2003, Pentagon memo states that this technique may violate the conventions' prohibition against intimidating detainees.

Name: Dietary manipulation

Source: CIA KUBARK manual; DOD Working Group memo

Description: In the military lexicon, "MRE" stands for "Meal, Ready to Eat." (Soldiers often call this three lies for the price of one.) MREs are the U.S. military's field ration. The Army's lab designs them to be nutritionally balanced, shelf-stable, and chock full of calories. Still, they're not exactly gourmet cuisine, and most soldiers would sooner go hungry than eat them continuously. With the secretary of defense's blessing, interrogators withdrew hot meals from detainees in favor of an all-MRE diet as a form of punishment. It is unclear how well this worked.

Interrogators have also altered the timing of meals, along with a detainee's sleep cycle, to induce a sense of disorientation that accelerates the psychological breakdown of the detainee. Adjusting the sleep and food cycles can also be used to foster dependence by harnessing the detainee's innate desire for rest and nutrition. According to the CIA's interrogation manual: "The point is that man's sense of identity depends upon a continuity in his surroundings, habits, appearance, actions, relations with others, etc. Detention permits the interrogator to cut through these links and throw the interrogatee back upon his own unaided internal resources."

Physical, Psychological, or Other Effects: Feeding detainees an MRE diet is unlikely to harm them. It may even help them by providing them with solid nutrition. Sleep and diet modification, however, can induce psychological effects of the kind described in the CIA manual.

Locations Used: Iraq, Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan

Legal Opinion: Feeding detainees MREs is almost certainly legal. It conforms to the spirit of the Geneva Conventions, which generally require that prisoners' treatment be roughly equal to that of the soldiers guarding them.

Extreme forms of food deprivation, on the other hand—malnutrition or starvation—clearly violate Geneva and the Convention Against Torture, because starvation meets the standard for severe pain and suffering.

Army Field Manual 34-52 categorizes food deprivation as a form of "physical torture."

Name: Exploiting individual phobias, e.g. use of dogs

Source: DOD Working Group memo; Memorandum from Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez authorizing interrogation practices for use in Iraq

Description: When "fear up" doesn't work, interrogators may actively stimulate a detainee's fears. Pentagon lawyers described this tactic as "increasing anxiety by use of aversions." Photos from Abu Ghraib show a detainee seated before a large, snarling military police dog (a full-grown German shepherd, for example). This technique may be followed by a threat to repeat the scare session or to let the dog off the leash so it could tear into the detainee's flesh. The tactic can also be conducted in public areas to scare other detainees.

Physical, Psychological, or Other Effects: Severe emotional distress; paranoia; physical manifestations of the fear such as high heart rate, increased blood pressure, and uncontrolled urination and defecation.

Locations Used: Iraq, Guantanamo Bay

Legal Opinion: Army intelligence doctrine does not directly speak to dog use because the dogs belong to military police units. Military police doctrine does not allow threatening use of dogs.

The Geneva Conventions' prohibitions on physical and mental coercion also prohibit the use of dogs in this manner.

The Army lawyer who proposed the use of dogs at Guantanamo concluded that it was permissible if done for an important governmental objective, without intent to cause harm or prolonged mental suffering. This analysis reflects the U.S. reservations to signing the CAT and the ICCPR. But the lawyer's conclusion may be wrong because the U.S. reservation to the CAT defines impermissible psychological torture as "the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering." Army Field Manual 34-52 categorizes food deprivation as a form of "physical torture."

Name: Mild, non-injurious physical contact, e.g. grabbing, poking, or light pushing (aka "a little bit of smacky face")

Source: Decision Memorandum from Defense Department General Counsel William Haynes II to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, for commander, U.S. Southern Command, Dec. 2, 2002

Description: Physical contact can result in mild injuries such as cuts, bruises, and abrasions. In some cases, it can also result in broken or dislocated limbs.

Physical, Psychological, or Other Effects: Severe emotional distress; paranoia; physical manifestations of the fear such as high heart rate, increased blood pressure, and uncontrolled urination and defecation.

Locations Used: Iraq, Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan

Legal Opinion: International law is relatively permissive about actions at the point of capture. Unless it reflects a serious breach of the rules of engagement or a wanton act of cruelty, physical force used at the point of capture rarely rises to the level of a crime. But the law generally assumes that the need for force declines as the detainee is transported away from the front line. Physical force in the confines of a detention facility may quickly rise to a level of physical coercion that violates the Geneva Conventions. Administration lawyers took the position, however, that Geneva did not protect the detainees at Guantanamo Bay, and therefore any physical contact that did not create severe pain and suffereing (and thus violate the CAT) was legal. Military law is less forgiving. "The use of physical contact with the detainee, such as pushing and poking, will technically constitute an assault under Article 128, UCMJ." Such contact may also constitute cruelty and maltreatment of a detainee, a crime under military law. Likewise, civilian personnel who assault detainees during interrogations may be prosecuted under the federal criminal statute for assault, which applies to U.S. military missions abroad through a provision of the USA Patriot Act. This legal theory is being used by the government to prosecute CIA contractor David Passaro for an assault that led to the death of an Afghan detainee.

Name: Mock executions

Source: Not an authorized tactic; used by Lt. Col. Allen West to interrogate a detainee in Iraq; also reported in records released by the Army on May 18, 2005.

Description: In August 2003, West learned that he was the target of an assassination plot by Iraqi insurgents. He and his soldiers arrested an Iraqi police officer thought to be involved and forcibly interrogated him for several hours. After exhausting other techniques, West brandished his pistol in front of the detainee and fired it near his head in a mock execution. West was subsequently charged with criminal misconduct and given administrative punishment by his commanding general. Several of his soldiers were disciplined as well.

In a separate incident from July 2003, Army Capt. Shawn Martin was convicted of aggravated assault and battery for simulating the execution of a prisoner. According to the report, Martin's unit captured eight prisoners and forced one to dig his own grave. Martin then ordered a sergeant to fire a bullet over the detainee's head, so that the other prisoners would think he'd been executed.

Physical, Psychological, or Other Effects: Severe mental suffering.

Locations Used: Iraq

Legal Opinion: This tactic clearly violates the law. FM 34-52 categorizes "mock executions" as a form of "mental torture."

Name: "Sleep adjustment"; "Sleep deprivation"

Source: DOD Working Group memo, March 2003; DOD memo, April 16, 2003

Description: According to the Pentagon, "sleep adjustment" means altering the sleep cycles of detainees by reversing day and night to induce disorientation similar to jet lag. Commanders at Abu Ghraib were authorized to implement sleep-adjustment techniques for up to 72 hours. The DOD Working Group defined "sleep deprivation" as "keeping the detainee awake for an extended period of time (allowing individual to rest briefly and then awakening him, repeatedly) NOT to exceed four days in succession."

Physical, Psychological, or Other Effects: Moderate sleep deprivation can impair cognitive functions including memory, learning, logical reasoning, arithmetic skills, verbal processing, and decision-making. Prolonged sleep deprivation causes attention deficits, short-term memory problems, speech impairment, and other ailments. According to a study by Physicians for Human Rights, a group based in Cambridge, Mass., this tactic can also cause high blood pressure and cardiovascular disease and exacerbate existing ailments. Another study found that sleep deprivation can reduce an individual's tolerance for pain and ability to resist suggestion.

Locations Used: Iraq, Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan

Legal Opinion: Interference with sleep likely violates the Geneva Conventions.

FM 34-52 describes "abnormal sleep deprivation" as a form of mental torture.

The European Court of Human Rights and the Supreme Court of Israel have ruled sleep deprivation inhumane and unlawful. The DOD Working Group noted these decisions in its March 2003 memo but concluded that they do not apply to American actions because they were not binding on the United States.

Name: Removal of clothing; sexual humiliation

Source: CIA KUBARK manual; plan of instruction for various military schools

Description: Guards at Abu Ghraib used various kinds of sexual humiliation to break down detainees. According to the Taguba report, such acts included "photographing naked male and female detainees; forcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit positions … ; forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate while being photographed." Detainees were frequently paraded around Abu Ghraib without their clothing, often wearing hoods. An October 2003 visit by the International Committee of the Red Cross found a number of detainees held in solitary confinement who were naked.

At least one female interrogator sexually humiliated detainees on her own at Guantanamo, according to U.S. government reports and the statements of former detainees. After learning that one detainee was a devout Muslim, she stripped off pieces of her uniform and writhed on top of him. She also reached down into her pants and pulled her hands up covered with a reddish substance that she said was menstrual blood (but which was more likely paint). She then smeared it on the detainee.

Physical, Psychological, or Other Effects: Sexual degradation is a particularly effective tool for attacking the personalities of devout Muslims, because of their taboos concerning women and overt sexual behavior.

Locations Used: Iraq, Guantanamo Bay

Legal Opinion: Sexual humiliation tactics violate the Geneva Conventions. When the military learned of the female interrogator's actions at Guantanamo, it launched an investigation. Sexual pranks may also violate the UCMJ's criminal provisions relating to cruelty and maltreatment of detainees.

Name: Religious desecration

Source: Not an authorized tactic. However, some evidence from an Army employee suggests it may have been used during interrogation in Afghanistan. Other reports indicate Quran desecration as punishment in Guantanamo Bay.

Description: A sworn statement to the Fay-Jones investigators by an Army civilian employee, released on May 19, 2005, by the ACLU via a FOIA request, relays a second-hand account of Quran desecration. The employee gave the statement on June 30, 2004, when he was assigned to the Army's intelligence school at Fort Huachuca, Ariz. He said that on a visit to Abu Ghraib in October 2003, he had an "offline conversation" with an interrogator at the prison, who asked "for ideas as to how to get 'these detainees to talk.' " The employee recalled, "I told him of a story of an interrogator using a Pride and Ego Down approach. The interrogator took a copy of a Koran and threw it on the ground and stepped on the Koran, which resulted in a detainee riot." The employee was speaking of an account he'd heard in Afghanistan, which he'd visited the week before he arrived at Abu Ghraib. In an earlier sworn statement from June 10, 2004, the same employee says he used this story of Quran desecration from Afghanistan as an example of what not to do, in the context of a discussion with interrogators at Abu Ghraib about which techniques were prohibited or restricted. At Guantanamo, reports indicate that alleged desecration of the Quran in 2002 led to a detainee hunger strike there and induced the International Committee of the Red Cross to formally express concern to the United States. The Pentagon subsequently developed guidelines in January 2003 for handling the holy book, although it officially denies a link between the desecration reports and the policy's promulgation.

Additional FBI documents made public by the ACLU on May 25, 2005, include multiple allegations by detainees at Guantanamo Bay. The FBI interviewed one detainee on April 6, 2002, who said that Military Police "have been mistreating the detainees by pushing them around and throwing their waste bucket to them in the cell, sometimes with waste still in the bucket and kicking the Koran." A detainee interviewed on April 11, 2002, said that "some unknown detainees are not talking in retaliation to an incident where a guard kicked the Koran." A third detainee interviewed on Aug. 1, 2002, said of guards at Guantanamo five months earlier, "They flushed a Koran in the toilet." A detainee interviewed in March 2003—two months after the Pentagon promulgated its policy for respecting the Quran—said that "he would not provide any information until the U.S. government and interrogators in Camp Delta changed the way it treated the Muslim holy book, the Koran." According to the FBI document, the detainee said "he understood the United States to support the freedom of religion. Why was it then, he asked, that the Koran was used as a weapon." (For the detainee's statement, click here and go to Pages 59-61).

Physical, Psychological, or Other Effects: None

Locations Allegedly Used: Afghanistan and Guantanamo

Legal Opinion: Under The Hague and Geneva Conventions, "the personal convictions and religious practices of the detained must be respected," subject to reasonable regulation designed to maintain military "order and discipline."

During the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln issued the following order: "The United States acknowledge and protect, in hostile countries occupied by them, religion and morality. ... Offenses to the contrary shall be rigorously punished." Section 110 of the Army field manual on the law of war reproduces that language.

Quran desecration in itself probably does not violate the UCMJ's provision against cruelty and maltreatment of a detainee. However, violation of the Pentagon's policy mandating "respect and reverence" for the Quran may trigger criminal liability under the UCMJ statute governing disobedience of orders.

Name: "Stress positions, like standing"

Source: Decision Memorandum from Defense Department General Counsel William Haynes II to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, for commander, U.S. Southern Command, Dec. 2, 2002; CIA KUBARK manual

Description: Posing a detainee in an erect standing position for a period of several hours. No restraints or external devices are used. Variations of this technique include the extension of one's arms outward to the side. In an addendum to his memo approving this technique, Rumsfeld asked, "I stand for 8–10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?"

According to one Army intelligence officer with personal knowledge of these practices, soldiers in the field developed harsher variations of the stress technique. In one position reportedly improvised by soldiers in the field, known as a "short shackle," detainees are bound at the wrist and ankle with metal or plastic handcuffs and then doubled over with their wrists bound to their ankles, either while lying on the ground or sitting.

Other stress positions documented by Army investigators include the suspension of detainees from a shackle in the ceiling, with the arms extended, sometimes without their feet touching the ground. This practice bears a striking resemblance to the "strappado" first used in the 13th and 14th century during the Italian Inquisition, in which victims were suspended from the ceiling with a system of ropes and weights to induce pain in a series of five degrees of increasing intensity. Army investigators found that a version of strappado was used on Mullah Habibullah and Dilawar at Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan.

Physical, Psychological, or Other Effects: In 1956, the CIA commissioned two Cornell Medical Center researchers to study Soviet interrogation techniques, including standing for extended periods of time. They concluded, "The KGB simply made victims stand for eighteen to twenty-four hours—producing 'excruciating pain' as ankles double in size, skin becomes 'tense and intensely painful,' blisters erupt oozing 'watery serum,' heart rates soar, kidneys shut down, and delusions deepen.

In 1999, the Supreme Court of Israel ruled the use of sleep deprivation and stress positions to be forms of torture. Specifically, that court forbade Israeli security agencies from using the "shaback" position, in which a detainee's hands are tied behind the back of a chair in a painful position while he is hooded; and the "frog crouch," in which a detainee is forced to crouch on his toes with his hands bound behind his back for a long period of time.

Locations Used: Iraq, Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan

Legal Opinion: These tactics violate Geneva's proscriptions against physical abuse and probably against humiliating and degrading treatment. FM 34-52 recognizes this by stating that it is physical torture to force "an individual to stand, sit, or kneel in abnormal positions for prolonged periods of time."

In 1978, the European Court of Human Rights decided in a case from Northern Ireland that "five techniques" used to interrogate suspected Irish Republican Army members were unlawful. The techinques were "wall-standing" (a stress position); hooding; subjection to noise; sleep deprivation; and deprivation of food and drink. The court held that such tactics were not torture under the European human rights convention but constituted "inhuman and degrading treatment," a standard analogous to the one in the CAT and ICCPR. In light of this decision, international law would likely prohibit the stress positions that the U.S. has used.

Name: Isolation for up to 30 days

Source: Joint Task Force 170 memo, Oct. 11, 2002; DOD memorandum, April 16, 2003

Description: According to the Dec. 2, 2002, Pentagon memo, isolation can mean sequestering an inmate in a cell by himself with no outside contact for up to 30 days. It can also be applied in conjunction with tactics like "deprivation of light and auditory stimuli" and/or hooding. An April 2003 Pentagon memo says this should only be done with strict medical and psychological controls.

Physical, Psychological, or Other Effects: During the 1950s, a U.S. intelligence community study analyzed Soviet methods of interrogation and found that "the effect of isolation on the brain function of the prisoner is much like that which occurs if he is beaten, starved, or deprived of sleep." Solitary confinement is used frequently as a disciplinary or security measure in civilian prisons and has been found to result in psychological harm if used to excess.

Locations Used: Iraq, Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan

Legal Opinion: Article 90 of the 3rd Geneva Convention limits to 30 days disciplinary punishment meted out without a trial but does not speak to confinement or isolation for interrogation purposes. Isolation that results in severe mental anguish or suffering, for example in conjunction with light and sound deprivation, probably violates the CAT and ICCPR.

Name: Deployment of the Immediate Reaction Force (aka "IRFings")

Source: Standard operating procedures for Joint Task Force Guantanamo; Guantanamo by David Rose; lawsuits by detainees; ACLU documents gained through FOIA

Description: Guantanamo has an "Immediate Reaction Force," ostensibly to respond to threats like a riot. According to interviews with former detainees and declarations filed in lawsuits by former detainees, military police sent the IRF into cells to punish detainees for slight infractions, like having an extra water cup or talking back to a military police guard. A team of heavily armored military police would rush into a cell to grab a detainee, forcibly subdue him, bind him, and take him out. In one IRF training session, a U.S. soldier was beaten so badly that he was eventually medically discharged from service with a permanent brain injury.

Physical, Psychological, or Other Effects: The use of physical force, particularly by well-trained and armored soldiers against unprotected detainees, has frequently resulted in severe physical injuries.

Locations Used: Guantanamo Bay

Legal Opinion: According to military police doctrine, detention facilities should have a "quick reaction force" capable of responding to threats. The Geneva Conventions recognize that force is sometimes needed to maintain order inside prisons. But according to international and military law, guard forces must be trained to abide by rules of engagement that specify and limit the circumstances under which they can use force. The extreme incidents documented at Guantanamo could stray beyond these rules of engagement and violate international law, as well as the UCMJ.

Name: Water boarding

Source: Guantanamo commanders requested permission to use "wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of suffocation" in an Oct. 11, 2002, memo to the Pentagon. Rumsfeld denied permission in his memo of Dec. 2, 2002. The New York Times reported in May 2004 that water boarding was used by CIA officials to interrogate "high value" detainees like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi Binalshibh, held by the United States at secret locations.

Description: According to University of Wisconsin history professor Alfred McCoy, this technique was first developed by the French and published in a 16th - century interrogation manual. Practitioners of "water torture," or "question de l'eau," placed a piece of cloth over the victim's mouth and nose, and then poured water into the mouth to force the cloth down the victim's throat. The effect was to make breathing impossible, thus creating the psychological perception of drowning.

Physical, Psychological, or Other Effects: Severe mental suffering; no physical effects unless the tactic results in suffocation.

Locations Used: Unknown secret locations

Legal Opinion: The Geneva Conventions surely prohibit this method as torture and as a form of cruel or degrading treatment. The ICCPR and CAT also forbid water boarding because it inflicts severe mental suffering, as does the UCMJ and federal criminal law.

Name: Physical beatings

Source: No military or Pentagon document authorizes this tactic.

Description: In a number of cases, U.S. personnel have beaten captives during interrogation until they were seriously injured, or in some cases, died. Confirmed homicide victims include Mullah Habibullah and Dilawar, who were hung from the ceiling and beaten at Bagram Airforce Base. Detainees have also been beaten outside the interrogation context. One incident occurred in November 2003, when five former Iraqi generals suspected of inciting a prison riot at Abu Ghraib were shackled, blindfolded, and beaten by MPs "until they were covered with blood."

Physical, Psychological, or Other Effects: Several physical abuse has resulted in soft-tissue damage, orthopedic injuries, neurological damage, and death.

Locations Used: Iraq, Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan

Legal Opinion: This tactic is illegal, regardless of the circumstances. FM 34-52 lists "any form of beating" as a type of physical torture. Abuse allegations have resulted in criminal charges, for example against several members of an elite U.S. Navy SEAL team who were charged with assault and manslaughter in connection with the beating death of a detainee in Iraq. CIA contractor Passaro faces similar charges in connection with a death in Afghanistan.

The Military Reports

What Army and Pentagon Investigators Found
By Emily Bazelon
While the Army Criminal Investigative Command investigates individual allegations of abuse, reports of such abuse of prisoners in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay have prompted the military and the Pentagon to conduct wider high-level investigations. Depending on how you count, as many as 10 reports have been commissioned by the military and the Pentagon. Broadly speaking, they have concluded that the abuses at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere are the fault of military policies or the lack thereof, as well as the acts of rogue soldiers. Yet the investigators have stopped short of leveling serious blame against high-ranking military and civilian officials like Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld; Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, former U.S. Commander in Iraq; Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller, former commander of the detention facility at Guantanamo; and Gen. Daniel McNeill, commander of allied forces in Afghanistan. Some investigations had a limited mandate. Others cleared top commanders of wrongdoing, noting that they lacked direct knowledge of the abuse. If there's a pattern in the reports, it's that the inquiries conducted soon after the abuses were uncovered are more bluntly critical of the higher-ups than the recent follow-up inquiries, which had greater authority to recommend punishment.

Why so many commissions? Pentagon agencies and different military commands have initiated their own reports for their own reasons. For example, the secretary of defense appointed the Schlesinger Commission "to review DoD detention operations" and to "provide independent professional advice." Gen. Bantz Craddock of the U.S. Southern Command appointed Lt. Gen. Randall Schmidt to investigate accusations about mistreatment at Guantanamo made by FBI agents in internal memos released in response to an ACLU Freedom of Information Act request. The patchwork of investigations reflects the lack of a systematic response to the scandal. And why aren't commanders being held responsible for the acts of the lower-ranking officers and soldiers they supervised? The Pentagon would say that the inquiries and the reports they produced reflect the DOD's considered judgment about who should bear responsibility for Abu Ghraib and the other detention facilities, based on the evidence that was collected. Yet the findings in the Fay-Jones Report and the recent recommendations of Army Inspector General Stanley Green don't match up. And it's hard to ignore the conflict of interest that the military has in investigating its own misconduct, especially when the trail may lead to top commanders. Phillip Carter offers thoughts here and here in Slate about the unacknowledged problems inside the military that help account for the abuses. For a rundown of what the military and the Pentagon have to say for themselves click the reports on the left.

The Schmidt Report

What's being investigated: Interrogation practices at Guantanamo Bay.

Inquiry conducted by Lt. Gen. Randall M. Schmidt of the Air Force.

Prompted by internal reports from FBI agents about the mistreatment of detainees.

What has been released: Nothing. Unnamed military officials described aspects of a draft of the report to the press in April 2005 and said then that the report would be released by late May. The FBI internal reports to which this investigation responded were released after the ACLU made a Freedom of Information Act request.

Sources: Unknown.

Findings: According to the New York Times, Schmidt's investigators did not find evidence of physical mistreatment and "were examining whether interrogators improperly humiliated prisoners or used psychological abuse." It's not clear how far up the chain of command the final report will go.

Context: The FBI internal memoranda include one account of prisoners held in extremely hot or extremely cold rooms for up to 24 hours who "most times" had "urinated or defecated on themselves." The agent who made that report also saw a detainee "almost unconscious on the floor with a pile of hair next to him. He had apparently been literally pulling his own hair out throughout the night." Another memorandum describes a detainee arriving from Guantanamo's Temporary Holding Facility with "marks (burns) on him that seemed suspicious." The FBI agent said: "When questioned about the marks, the detainee stated that he had been tortured by his captors." In a third account, agents say they witnessed "sleep deprivation [redacted] and utilization of loud music/bright lights/growling dogs in the Detainee interview process by DOD representatives." A May 2005 report by Physicians for Human Rights found that evidence of "systematic psychological torture" at Guantanamo included the use of prolonged isolation, sleep deprivation, sexual abuse, and dogs.

The Green Report

What's being investigated: Role of top five Abu Ghraib officers.

Inquiry conducted by the Army Inspector General, Lt. Gen. Stanley E. Green.

Prompted by the photographs of abuse at the prison.

What has been released: Nothing. Unnamed military officials described aspects of the report to the press in April 2005.

Sources: Reportedly, sworn statements from 37 senior officials, including L. Paul Bremer, formerly the Bush administration's top administrator in Iraq, as well as reviews of the military's previous inquiries.

Findings: According to CNN and other news sources, the Green Report cleared Lt. Gen Ricardo Sanchez, the commander of Abu Ghraib at the time of the abuses there, as well as his deputy, Major Gen. Walter Wojdakowski. The report also allegedly clears two of the other high-ranking officers at the prison: Maj. Gen. Barbara Fast, who oversaw Abu Ghraib's interrogation center, and Col. Marc Warren, the top legal officer. That leaves Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski, the former commander of the prison's military police, as the highest-ranking officer to have been punished.

Context: Without giving details, the report mentions a Sept. 14, 2003, memo by Sanchez authorizing interrogation techniques. That memo, which was rescinded on Oct. 12, 2003, was made public by the ACLU at the end of March 2005. The tactics it allowed included "exploit[ing] Arab fear of dogs;" "sleep management" that entailed giving a detainee as little as four hours of sleep in 24 hours over a total period of 72 hours; yelling, loud music, and light control to "prolong capture shock;" and "stress positions"— sitting, standing, kneeling, prone—for up to one hour each and for a total of four hours. At a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee in May 2004, Sen. Jack Reed, a Democrat from Rhode Island, asked Sanchez whether he "ordered or approved the use of sleep deprivation, intimidation by guard dogs, excessive noise and inducing fear as an interrogation method" at Abu Ghraib. Sanchez answered about the time period at issue, "I never approved any of those measures."

The Church Report

What's being investigated: All Department of Defense interrogation operations.

Review conducted by the Naval Inspector General, Vice Adm. Albert T. Church III.

Covers winter 2001 through Sept. 30, 2004.

What has been released: Twenty-page executive summary of a much longer report completed in February 2005.

Sources: Eight-hundred interviews with military current and former personnel in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay.

Findings: Seventy-one substantiated cases of detainee abuse involving 121 victims and six deaths. Another 130 cases remained open as of Sept. 30, 2004.

Breakdown of findings:
Guantanamo is the site of eight of the 71 substantiated and closed abuse cases. All incidents were relatively minor, although two involved sexually suggestive behavior by female interrogators.

Afghanistan is the site of three of the 71 substantiated and closed abused cases. One of those three was a death. The other two were minor abuses.

Iraq is the site of the remaining 60 cases. Five were deaths. Twenty-six were serious abuses. Twenty-nine were minor abuses.

Context: According to Army and Navy investigators, 18 detainees in Afghanistan and Iraq have died since 2002 as a result of confirmed criminal homicides, and another eight have died because of suspected homicides. The first group includes Mullah Habibullah and Dilawar (Afghanis often go by one name), who were hung from their arms and beaten so badly at Bagram Air Force Base that their legs would have had to have been amputated if they had lived. An Army investigation, which the Church Report briefly mentions, recommended that charges be brought against 28 military personnel in connection with Habibullah and Dilawar's deaths. To date, only two low-level military policemen have been charged.

The Jacoby Report

What's being investigated: All American detention centers in Afghanistan.

Review conducted by Army Brig. Gen. Charles Jacoby.

What has been released: Nothing. Unnamed military officials have described aspects of the report, which was completed in July 2004.

Sources: Unknown.

Findings: According to the Washington Post, Jacoby found that many American prisons in Afghanistan lacked clear interrogation guidelines, "creating an 'opportunity' for prisoner abuse."

Context: Among the personnel in Afghanistan recommended for prosecution by the Army Criminal Investigative Command is an interrogator from the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion who reportedly "placed his penis along the face" of a detainee and later "simulated anally sodomizing him (over his clothes)." Members of the 519th were later transferred from Bagram to Abu Ghraib. To date, there are no reports of criminal charges in relation to this incident.

The Fay-Jones Report

What's being investigated: Detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib prison.

Inquiry conducted by Army Major Gen. George Fay and Lieut. Gen. Anthony Jones.

What has been released: A 177-page report completed in August 2004.

Sources: Four additional Army investigations, including those by Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba and Lt. Gen. Paul Mikolashek, then the Army inspector general, as well as 170 interviews with military personnel.

Findings : Fifty-four military personnel and civilian contractors were in some way responsible for or complicit in the abuses at Abu Ghraib, including 27 from the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade who encouraged military police to abuse prisoners, abused prisoners themselves, or violated laws and rules of interrogation. Seven low-ranking soldiers were criminally prosecuted. The report attributes the abuse at Bagram to the failure of leaders of the 205th and the 800th Military Intelligence Brigades to supervise or properly discipline their soldiers. It cites a proliferation of interrogation guidelines, but blames the layers of guidelines only for relatively mild forms of mistreatment. The authors cite the commander Sanchez and his deputy Wojdakowski—later cleared by the Green investigation—for failing to ensure proper oversight and for issuing "inconsistent" and "confusing" guidelines.

Context: In contrast to the Green investigation, the Fay-Jones Report tracks the breakdown at Abu Ghraib to the top commanders. But no disciplinary action is recommended for Sanchez or his deputies.