In 1978-79, President Carter issued directives, calling on his Cabinet to implement his troop withdrawal from South Korea—in part to fulfill a campaign promise, in part because an intelligence review he'd ordered concluded that the South Koreans could defend themselves after a few years' buildup. Several members of Carter's own Cabinet vigorously disagreed. Sometime in the spring of 1979, Warren Christopher, the deputy secretary of state, invited Rep. Les Aspin to play squash. The two were longtime friends. Aspin was chairman of the House Intelligence Oversight Subcommittee. I was Aspin's legislative assistant on foreign and defense policy. When Aspin came back from the squash game (or maybe it was the next day, I forget which), he told me and one of his committee staffers, Richard Anderson, to write a report concluding that Carter's troop-withdrawal plan was a bad idea. He confirmed to one of us (again, I forget which—we're talking 26 years ago) that Christopher urged him to do this at the squash game. At the time, Aspin was a leading light in Democratic arms-control circles. (He wasn't yet chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, much less secretary of defense.) If Aspin endorsed a weapon system, many doves would vote for it, reasoning, "If Aspin likes it, I guess it's all right." Similarly, if Aspin criticized a disarmament proposal, many doves would follow along for the same reason. This is why Christopher sought out Aspin for reinforcement. Once Carter read that Aspin opposed the South Korean troop withdrawal, he knew he could win no political support for the move, and he retracted the plan. This is what I was told by a few friends who worked in the State Department. I have since read an independent research paper, written by someone I don't know and have never heard of, that reaches the same conclusion.