It's worth noting that in October 2002—even after the "shift in attitude" of June or earlier—Bush did return to the United Nations. He took this path—reluctantly and probably insincerely—at the urgings of Tony Blair, who warned him the British government could not go to war without a new Security Council resolution that provided legal justification. It's also worth noting that Vice President Dick Cheney strenuously opposed going back to the United Nations because that path was full of traps; Saddam could stretch the process out for months or years, giving in to demands a little bit, just enough to satisfy the Russians or the French but not enough to settle the issue of whether he had disarmed. In a way, from his perspective, Cheney's fears were justified. That's what started to happen—until French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin self-destructively declared that France would veto any resolution in which Iraqi non-compliance resulted in war. At that point, even Powell realized that U.N. pressure was ultimately hopeless and let the Cheney/Rumsfeld go-to-war-alone faction prevail. The point here—or one point anyway—is that, even after the administration (much less Bush or Cheney personally) had settled on war, nothing was inevitable.