Boyer makes much of Clark's push for an invasion option and quotes some officers as likening his plan to Gallipoli. A ground war would have been unwise. A look at a map of the Balkans suggests that Gallipoli isn't a bad comparison. Clark has maintained that he wanted only for Milosevic to perceive the possibility of an invasion, as a way of pressuring him to surrender. On one level, Clark was right; having an option for escalating the attack—and making sure Milosevic knew it—is sound military doctrine. Bill Clinton has, in the years since, admitted that he made a huge strategic error when he publicly announced, early in the war, that ground troops were off the table as an option. During the war, many politicians, including Sens. John McCain and John Kerry, criticized Clinton for disavowing the option, even while noting that they did not necessarily support an actual invasion. However, on another level, options are a dangerous thing. Had we amassed the troops and tanks for an invasion, and had Milosevic still not folded, would Clark have favored going ahead with the plan? If he hadn't gone ahead with the plan, wouldn't the mobilization have been counterproductive? Still, Clark's position was consistent with classic military doctrine, and was supported by many officials, Democrats and Republicans, in and out of the administration—though, true, not by the chiefs or the secretary of defense.