The question of whether it has or hasn't points up not only the ambiguities of dealing with a completely closed society and a totalitarian regime, but also North Korea's bizarre diplomatic antics. Last Thursday, just as this week's talks were being set, the North Korean government issued on its English-language Web site the following statement: "We are successfully reprocessing more than 8,000 spent fuel rods at the final phase." After the State Department responded by threatening to pull out of the talks, the North Koreans issued another statement, with a note that the original declaration was a poor translation. The revision read: "We are successfully completing the final phase, to the point of the reprocessing operation, for some 8,000 spent fuel rods." It is almost certainly the case that the original's "mis-translation" was a deliberate attempt to gauge the Bush administration's reaction, to see how firmly it would hold its stance.

There is a broader question here, having to do with how we know what the North Koreans are up to. Several news stories have quoted administration officials as noting the absence of any intelligence information indicating that the reprocessing has begun. What kind of intelligence information would there be on this point? It is unclear. But globalsecurity.org, a private research firm, has noted that commercial satellite photos on Jan. 15 and Jan. 28 showed smoke coming from the coal-fired steam plant at North Korea's Yongbang nuclear reactor. The firm speculates that this was a test-run of the equipment, since no fuel rods were as yet at the plant (or so it is believed). Some reconnaissance satellites might also detect slight changes in heat or possibly even the release of Krypton-85, a chemical in fuel rods that would be released when they are dipped in acid during the reprocessing. It is not known, in the unclassified world, whether satellites could detect such minute shifts—or whether, for example, special operations forces have burrowed into North Korean territory and planted sensors that would detect such phenomena.

In another intriguing bit of skullduggery, the Australian Weekend reported that, in a U.S. intelligence program called Operation Weasel, 20 of North Korea's top nuclear scientists, including the "father" of the Pyongyang bomb, Kyong Wan Ha, have been smuggled into China, where they are currently giving up lots of vital information about the whole program. The implications of this report, if true, are unclear. Does it mean that, without these scientists, North Korea can't make much additional progress in building bombs? Does it mean the scientists are telling us about the reactor's vulnerabilities to an attack?