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The Iraq Ultimatum

By Philip Gordon, Martin Indyk, and Michael O'HanlonPosted Monday, Sept. 9, 2002, at 4:24 PM ET

Are inspections of Iraqi weapons facilities a viable alternative to war? Or are they so certain to fail that further efforts to resume them are pointless, and war the only practical option for addressing the threat posed by Saddam Hussein? Despite the claims of Bush spokesmen that there's an internal consensus on the issue, these questions clearly continue to divide it. Vice President Dick Cheney recently dismissed the utility of inspections. Secretary of State Colin Powell endorses them. The position of the president himself—who is expected to speak about Iraq to the United Nations General Assembly on Sept. 12—remains unclear.

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The administration's divisions are understandable. The three of us also have differing views among ourselves as to whether inspections are preferable to the forcible removal of Saddam, with at least one of us believing that Saddam's overthrow by U.S. forces is the most desirable policy outcome and at least one other preferring disarmament through inspections and tighter sanctions as an alternative to war. But after much debate, we came to a counterintuitive conclusion: Regardless of one's views on the most desirable outcome, the same U.S. strategy is appropriate. We should present Saddam with a serious, final ultimatum for toughened up inspections and real disarmament and go to war if he refuses it or subsequently fails to cooperate with the inspectors.

It is time for the Bush administration to hammer out a similar bottom line. As things stand, the administration's ambivalence is undermining its own purposes and becoming harmful to American interests. It is leading much of the rest of the world to see in the views of Cheney, as well as those of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, evidence of little more than a unilateralist American desire to settle scores with an old nemesis. It also projects a schism within the broader Western alliance that Saddam will surely seek to exploit.

This schizophrenic U.S. stance—inspections are pointless, but possibly necessary—also keeps alive current U.N. arrangements for resumed inspections that Saddam may actually accept if convinced we are ready to use force. If he does accept them, almost all of the rest of the world, including most of our close allies, will quickly lose whatever willingness they may otherwise have to support our use of force. Yet based on the evidence of the past decade, the resumption of such inspections is unlikely to achieve the objectives intended for them, and Saddam is likely to interfere with them at some future point as well.

The Bush administration can rectify this situation by crafting an ultimatum to which it could take yes for an answer and around which the different factions in the administration as well as U.S. allies could unite. Launching a pre-emptive war without issuing such an ultimatum would deprive us of the strong international support we will surely need to make such a war as quick, decisive, and bloodless as possible and to ease the task of stabilizing Iraq under a new government thereafter. Not toughening up the ultimatum, relative to the standing offer we have made Saddam on inspections, would risk a meaningless disarmament process followed by a premature lifting of sanctions on Iraq while Saddam is still in power.

This ultimatum strategy requires people on both sides of the argument to compromise to some degree. For hawks, it means accepting the possibility that Saddam will for now remain leader of Iraq. For doves, it means recognizing that only a very real threat of war—to be carried out if Saddam rejects the ultimatum—can create the leverage needed to gain full Iraqi compliance with the disarmament demands placed upon it at the end of the Persian Gulf War. It also means recognizing certain flaws in the past U.N. inspection process and fixing them.

The first step is to try to develop a U.N. Security Council consensus around a new resolution that would contain the ultimatum. Britain is already supportive of U.S. goals in Iraq, and France seems willing to support force provided that the Security Council authorizes such an approach. Russia can be induced to cooperate with promises that its multibillion-dollar Iraqi debt will be repaid and that it will have a stake in future oil deals in Iraq. China can almost surely be convinced to support an effort that the other permanent members have all endorsed. Faced with the likelihood that we would take unilateral action against Saddam if they fail to reach agreement with us, our fellow permanent members may well be willing to join in the consensus if for no other reason than to have some influence over an operation that they cannot prevent.

The ultimatum should consist of the following key points. Rejection of any of them at any time would constitute grounds for war, leading to the deployment of U.S.-led forces and overthrow of Saddam:

1. Iraq must come into compliance with all U.N. disarmament demands and other requirements imposed on it after the Persian Gulf War, including but hardly limited to the immediate return of U.N. inspectors.

2. Those inspectors must not be impeded from visiting any potential weapons sites in Iraq, including presidential palaces and compounds, at any time and without notice. Nor can they be impeded from access to any Iraqis they choose to converse with, or from determining the composition of their inspection teams as they see fit.

3. The United Nations must have the power to immediately grant asylum to any Iraqi weapons experts as well as their families, should such experts provide information to the United Nations that could put their lives at risk.

4. Iraq must account for, display, and allow U.N. destruction of stocks of chemical and biological weapons and munitions that we know it possesses, and must do so within a short, specific time period.

5. Iraq must agree to intrusive, long-term monitoring of its weapons capabilities that would include no-notice inspections.

6. And even if Iraq were to comply fully with all these requirements, its future oil revenues would still have to be escrowed to control its purchases of dual-use equipment.

One additional but essential component of the ultimatum concerns Iraq's neighbors. Since they would all prefer to avoid a U.S. invasion of Iraq, they need to agree to stop their illicit trade with Iraq—by which oil comes out, and many goods (including weapons and dual-use technology) go into that country. This would require detailed negotiations with Jordan, Turkey, Syria, and perhaps even Iran, including some combination of economic incentives and strong pressure that would depend in its details on the country in question. Without tighter sanctions, weapons disarmament and inspections efforts will be far less effective.

There is a chance Saddam will accept this ultimatum and allow the return of the inspectors, if the clear alternative is his demise. Some would prefer that he do so, others that he refuse and, in doing so, provide undeniable justification for war. The key point, however, is that either outcome would be better than the current alternatives: allowing Saddam to keep his weapons and his power, or unilaterally waging war.

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The authors are senior fellows at the Brookings Institution. Martin Indyk was U.S. ambassador to Israel in the Clinton administration and is the director of Brookings' Saban Center for Middle East Policy.

COMMENTS

Notes From The Fray Editor:

Most respondents felt the call for a tough inspections regime was doomed to fail. The question then shifted to the strategy of such a call, given its failure, and any alternative means to a successful resolution of any Iraqi threat. John thought the Administration was taking the right approach to avoid war (Abre los ojos agreed, in a punchier paragraph), Cato the Censor thought the Administration was taking the right approach to justify war. Keep a Clear Eye thought the fracas over inspections owed at least as much to UN-bashing as to warmongering; Caliban Weeps reminded everyone that no new action is called for to resume inspections.

Remarks From The Fray:

If you want to start a war, one that might be legitimized by a vote at the U.N., the United States should issue the ultimatum that these authors have in mind. But what if what you really want are truly unfettered U.N. inspections? Here's what you do:

1. Put the evil and arrogant U.S. on a war footing

2. Have the evil and arrogant U.S. declare that further inspections would be meaningless (but reveal some apparent internal dissension on the point to keep the idea of inspections alive)

3. Have the U.N. negotiate with Hussein to allow inspections to resume, with the understanding that the U.S. is chomping at the bit to attack and will do so at the first sign that the inspections are being hampered in any way.

Hussein might actually agree to such inspections because he wouldn't look to the Arab world like he is fearfully caving in to the Great Satan (and he knows that the U.S. would never attack if the inspectors are given a chance to do their jobs). But if you would rather start a war, then just issue the recommended ultimatum. It's almost guaranteed to work. In fact, the Brookings Institution fellows seem more concerned about legitimizing a war with Iraq than about accomplishing the most important goal (namely, ridding Iraq of nuclear weapons and other weapos of mass destruction) by peaceful means.

-- John

(To reply, click here.)

After watching Cheney on Meet the Press yesterday, it seemed obvious that either Bush hadn't made up his mind what he would say at the UN or that he was going to give Iraq one last chance to submit to a draconian inspection regime. My bet is on the latter. Cheney would not state that inspections had been ruled out, which differs from what we have been led to believe is his position.

IMHO, the administration has purposely engaged in sending out mixed messages, as the hawks and doves have seemingly been battling out their differences in public. I think that the administration long ago decided that we would go to war with Iraq. They are also smart enough to know that there would be an almost universal outcry against a perceived pre-emptive strike. Therefore, they began ratcheting up the pressure with ever-increasing hints of war, as well as obvious preparation for war. However, wishing to appear flexible and responsive to domestic and international concerns, the administration first backed off its decision that it was unnecessary to consult Congress. Next, it will give Iraq and the UN one last chance to avoid war.

This is a brilliant tactic. We will wage war, yet the administration will have looked like it grudgingly gave peace one last effort.

-- Cato the Censor

(To reply, click here.)

This seems like a fairly naive article for three such well-connected authors. Everything that I've seen from the Bush administration indicates that they have decided on invading Iraq. The only question for them is whether the political cost of invasion is high enough to deter them from doing what they want. I can't think of any political figures who have less respect for the UN than George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, and Donald Rumsfeld. People like Cheney hate the UN because it has all the characteristics of democracy that he dislikes. Endless talk and debate. Diplomatic haggling over small details. Listening to non-entities. As Cheney says, he's a man of few words who isn't into public posturing. So, the only point to the whole inspections issue debate is whether the Bush administration senses that there is too much opposition to launch the kind of invasion they prefer. In this sense, I guess the authors are doing a public service by throwing their credibility behind inspections. But all the Bush administration is concerned with is the weight of their influence, not the weight of their opinions. The Bush people have already made up their minds.

-- Keep a Clear Eye

(To reply, click here.)

Let's remember that inspections originally were intended to permit verification that Iraq had disarmed itself. In that sense, inspections were a bone thrown to Saddam, a strategy by which Saddam could stop getting bombed yet continue running the country. He didn't have to surrender; all he had to do was disarm himself from weapons of mass destruction and let us satisfy ourselves he had done so. He could keep his army and his artillery, and all that other stuff. Just give up the gas, biologicals, and nuclear aspirations, and we would be cool.

Did we and our Gulf war allies somehow get satisfied that Saddam had disarmed? You know the answer.

I could live with a policy decision to wait and see, with fingers crossed and hopes that if something bad happens, we can blame it on somebody else. I could live with inactivity; Lord knows we've done it before. But I am getting tired of hearing the disingenuous "resume inspections" yapping.

If Saddam had disarmed, he'd be begging us to please resume inspections and to please give him an opportunity to prove he has disarmed. He isn't 'cause he didn't.

-- Caliban Weeps

(To reply, click here.)

it is time for the even those pundits who would prefer intrusive inspections instead of direct invasion of Iraq to give credit where credit is due. The (invasive") inspections, if they occur, will not have happened because Euro-weenies, during four years of being dissed on countless UN resolutions, said "Pretty please with a cherry on top, Mr. Hussein, it would ever so grand if you could possibly allow us to have peek at your place sometime. We realize that the last four years have not been, perhaps, the best time, of course, but whenever you find it convenient, we sure would appreciate it." The inspections will happen, if they do, because the Sheriff King Kong with the Smart Bomb---President Bush----swaggered into the saloon, rattled some chairs and sawdust and glasses on the bar, and Saddam said, "Hmmm, maybe we could let you have a peak after all....since I'm such a super sweetheart and all..."

-- Abre los ojos

(To reply, click here.)

(9/11)

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