Just as I was finishing this piece, German police apprehended an alleged terrorist of Turkish descent who apparently was planning to blow up some American servicemen. How does this square with my claim that Turkey ranks low on the list of terrorist-exporting Muslim countries? First of all, note that Germany has a very large Turkish community—more than two million people, larger than the population in Germany of any Arab nationality. So, the fact that most noted Muslim terrorists based in Germany (e.g., 9/11 hijackers) have not been Turkish is in a sense a testament to the relative moderation of Turkish Muslims. Still, it's worth stressing that European networks of radical Muslims can acquire a life of their own and become magnets for alienated Muslims of any national background. (And the Muslims needn't be immigrants. Radical mosques in Britain have attracted Muslims who were English-born—of immigrant parents—and steered them toward terrorism. And the Turkish man just arrested in Germany was according to some accounts born in Germany.) What to do about the power of these networks in European and other Western nations? To some extent that's a question for the individual Western nations, and the answers they come up with may impinge on things ranging from welfare policy to immigration policy. But, broadly speaking, I'd argue that this problem of magnetic radical networks in Western nations affirms the basic prescription laid out in this installment and the previous one. Namely: Draw Islamic nations more deeply into the web of economically modern, democratic nations. As that process proceeds, and Islamic nations slowly become more like Western nations in their political and economic norms and values, Muslims who move to Western nations will find the transition less jarring and alienating, and so will be less vulnerable to the appeal of radical Islam.