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from: Dahlia Lithwick
to: Walter Dellinger

Is There a Consensus on What Constitutes a Consensus?

Posted Monday, June 24, 2002, at 3:38 PM ET

Who are these people?

Hi Walter,

A disappointing morning for those of us who await vouchers and urine tests with bated breath. Still, today's death-penalty decision is worth a quick comment. I've read it only briefly, so I'll reserve the right to change my mind this evening.



Your thoughts on the Atkins case are tremendously insightful. But I disagree with the proposition that the court's efforts at curbing congressional overreaching (often to give powers back to the states) are at all analogous to what the Court did in Atkins—curbing a state's power to decide who is to be executed at all.

I also disagree that the court was, per se, ill-suited to make the call in Atkins. Yes, where the sole legal issue facing the courts is whether a consensus exists as to X, the legislative branch would seem to be uniquely and exclusively qualified to answer. But I wonder if the real issue in Atkins is not "Is there a consensus?" but rather "How the hell do you measure consensus?" That is a far trickier question and, unless you believe—as Scalia evidently does—that consensus means 100 percent of the population must agree on X in perpetuity, then there is a fundamental question for the court to determine: Is a consensus 60 percent of the states or 80 percent? Must it be constant over time? Can evidence of trends toward a consensus reflect a consensus? Yes, I agree Justice Stevens fudged those answers, but I'm not certain how a legislature could have answered this "meta" question either.

Briefly, on Ring: In Ring v. Arizona the court held today, 7-2, that juries, and not judges, must impose the death penalty under the Sixth Amendment. Justice Ginsburg's opinion argues, in effect, that if juries are competent enough to do the fact finding required for a conviction, they are also competent enough to be entrusted to decide who will be put to death. Interestingly, this argument cuts against the very "death is different" jurisprudence that lay at the heart of the Atkins decision last week.

Justice Scalia's dissent in Atkins was a heartfelt cry that death is not different. He believes if you can sentence someone who is mentally retarded to jail, you can kill them. You and I disagree with him, but why? Scalia forces us to articulate why we think death-penalty cases demand more legal vigilance and care. My answer has always been that death is irreversible. But there must be a better answer than that.

More later,
Dahlia

from: Dahlia Lithwick
to: Walter Dellinger

Is There a Consensus on What Constitutes a Consensus?

Posted Monday, June 24, 2002, at 3:38 PM ET
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Walter Dellinger is an attorney in Washington, D.C. and the Douglas B. Maggs professor of law at Duke. Dahlia Lithwick is a Slate senior editor.
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Notes From the Fray Editor:

The Breakfast Table Fray has remained a shining example for all. The Table moved from discussions of the merits of Atkins to broader discussions of the nature of court representation. The Fray moved along with it. Several incisive debates about the nature of contemporary judicial federalism and Dellinger's "rule of three" have ensued. One of the best Frays ever began with Dira Necessitas's supposition that Lithwick would stop her Scalia-bashing—a harmless introduction to a fascinating juridico-psychoanalysis (or psycho-juridical analysis).

Notes From the Fray:

[Dellinger] has the good sense to understand that judicial overreaching is not a liberal or a conservative problem but an institutional one that should be resisted by everyone who has a shred of faith in democracy and, in particular, in the increasingly quaint idea that popular legislatures should make legislative decisions….

There is a longer-term insidious consequence of judicial overreaching, too, that takes the form of executives and legislatures dallying about nearly everything really controversial in the hope -- increasingly realized -- that they will be relieved of the hot potatoes by the courts, especially the SCOTUS.

-- Publius

(To reply, click
here.)


I challenge [Lithwick's] shorthand characterization of that Federalism jurisprudence as "efforts at curbing congressional overreaching (often to give powers back to the states)".

That portrays some of the less controversial of the Court's Federalist opinions. But the most controversial and decidedly activist sequence of the Federalist opinions -- their so-called Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, named for the Amendment that they now admit does not say what they earlier said it says -- has nothing to do with Congressional overreaching. The issue in the cases I was referring to in the quoted paragraphs above (including the case that the Court agreed this morning to hear) and which I believe Dellinger was referring to did not concern federal legislation whose purpose was to usurp for the federal government powers traditionally held by the states. The statutes at issue have broad applicability not just to state governments but to private entities also.

The Court's conservative narrow majority says the Constitution protects states from being subject to such legislation, this notwithstanding their recent acknowledgment that the text of the Constitution actually contains no such protection.

-- Beverly Mann

(To reply, click
here.)


Let's apply Dellinger's analysis to Castillo's streak. The reason that the "Latin American record" was noted and celebrated was that it matters enormously to an important group of baseball fans - Latin Americans in their native countries. Prowess in baseball is an important signal to many in those countries that they belong (maybe more important than prowess in soccer, because the Dominican Republic et al. have great success in placing players in the best professional baseball league). That's why people in Latin American countries know which Latin American players have the most career hits, career wins, the best batting average, etc. Until they stop paying attention to the success of Latin American players compared to other Latin American players, then it's reasonable for baseball to do so, even under Dellinger's analysis.

Besides, it's good marketing.

-- randy khan

(To reply, click
here.)

(7/25)





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