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Mountain Division of LaborWhy it's OK to send in the Royal Marines.

By Scott Shuger
Posted Monday, April 1, 2002, at 1:12 PM ET

Are the U.S. Army's main mountain troops unprepared? A piece on the American Prospect Web site says so. The story, by senior correspondent Jason Vest, concludes that the U.S. military's request that 1,700 British mountain commando troops be brought in to help fight in Afghanistan "highlights some real shortcomings in the U.S. Army." Vest opines that the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division, assigned a key role in the recent Operation Anaconda, "does not, in fact, have any particular expertise in mountain warfare." He observes that while many members of the 10th Mountain have attended a two-week "mountain leader combat" course, and others have attended the U.S. Army's advanced mountain warfare school, they never do so with their entire unit. And, he adds, the terrain at that advanced school tops out at only 4,393 feet, while "high-altitude combat is defined as over 10,000 feet." Vest contrasts all this to the requested British Royal Marine troops, who spend 10 weeks a year as a unit in cold-weather training inside the Arctic Circle.

But Vest is wrong on two points.

Effective training doesn't require absolute replication. Yes, it would be nice if all U.S. infantry units headed for the mountains could train together at 10,000 feet. But it's not essential. If the soldiers in the 10th have trained over rough terrain and have been put into good enough shape at, say, 4,300 feet, then they've got the goods to perform well on such terrains at higher altitudes, if they're given an opportunity to acclimate. And thus far, there's no evidence they didn't do just that. Besides, press accounts indicate most of the Anaconda fighting took place not above 10,000 feet, but somewhere between 8,000 and 8,500 feet. A good example of what I'm talking about is the way the Navy teaches people how to safely jump off a burning aircraft carrier deck. Even though those decks are about 85 feet above the water line, sailors learn to jump just fine using a 25-foot (non-burning) tower. Also, provided that the troops who attend specialized training are encouraged to teach their buddies back at the unit what they've learned, a huge amount of the new skill set can trickle back down. Does Vest know that this is precisely the model employed by the world-class fighter-tactics school known as Top Gun?

What part of "allies" don't you understand? Mountain fighting is only one of myriad missions assigned to the U.S. Army. So, thank God we have allies like the Brits who have the luxury, by dint of not having nearly so many responsibilities, of being able to send troops off to the Arctic Circle en masse for more than two months at a time. It's not weakness to make use of them. It's good judgment. Wartime coalition-building shouldn't just be political image-making; it should also involve the cool-headed employment of allies' military assets.

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Scott Shuger is a Slate senior writer who spent five years in the U.S. Navy and served overseas as an intelligence officer.
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Reader Comments From The Fray:


If it "would be nice if all U.S. infantry units headed for the mountains could train together at 10,000 feet," then why train them at 4000? The army has multiple bases at higher-altitudes--notably Ft. Carson in Colorado Springs, which is over 6000 ft. and is literally walking distance to Pikes Peak at over 14,000. These troops should never have to acclimatize--a process that takes weeks--i.e. the entire duration of the training.

At its worst, altitude sickness can completely incapacitate a soldier, causing nausea and vertigo until he descends a couple thousand feet. (It's also worth noting that the British troops above the Arctic Circle are equally handicapped in this regard, they're just better prepared for cold.) We can expect that on occasion we may have to put troops in high altitudes immediately. What reason is there for not keeping the members of the Mountain Division in Colorado whenever they're in the country? Perhaps this is not the "real shortcomings" described by Vest, but it is such a simple solution, there is no excuse for having the problem at all.

--Zorro

(To find or answer this post, click here.)


The Royal Marines don't really compare to a regular U.S. infantry outfit, or for that matter to the U.S. Marine Corps. The level of training they receive would put them somewhat closer to a U.S. special operations group. A more valid comparision would be to the U.S. Marines Force Recon.

The Marines, btw, do mountain and cold weather training in the Sierras at at least 7K or 8K altitude, up to about 10K. As any hiker can tell you,there's a big difference between 8K and 4K. At 4K things like altitude sickness don't enter into the picture at all, while it does start to be an issue at 8 or 10k.

The 10th mountain keeps the title mainly as an honorific and for historical reasons.

--Matte Blacke

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Something I would like to have seen Scott Shuger address is why the Anaconda operation and its aftermath seem to have included none of the British Army's Nepalese troops, the Gurkhas. Specific altitude training or no, surely these of all the infantry in the world would be at home in fighting a mountain battle. My speculation, which is only that, is that Britain is reluctant to commit its Gurkhas to combat while there is so much political turmoil in their native Nepal.

--Joseph Britt

(To find or answer this post, click here.)

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