I Scream, You Scream, We All Scream for Vaccines
From: Geraldine Brooks
To: Christopher Caldwell, Judith Shulevitz, Chris Suellentrop, and Ted WidmerPosted Tuesday, Nov. 6, 2001, at 1:42 PM ET
Who are these people?
This week's reading.
Here's an insomnia-inducing thought: A suicidal Saudi decides to bring jihad to the United States. Instead of hijacking a plane, he simply hangs out at an airport—after having infected himself and fallen ill with any one of a dozen fatal, contagious, antibiotic-resistant diseases. By the time he sickens to the point of collapse, he might have infected 50 people, who will by then have scattered to dozens of different cities, taking their deadly virus with them ...
These are the kinds of scenarios that suggest themselves as you read Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War and why it makes poor bedtime reading. The second part of the subtitle is a bit misleading because the book really chronicles the war we've consistently not been waging but should have been: the war against bioterror.
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It is, as they say, an ill wind, and some ill winds indeed have lofted this book out of the policy-wonk ghetto to which it might otherwise have been consigned and into the hands of the wide readership it deserves.
For Germs is no Hot Zone, Richard Preston's un-put-down-able, thrillerlike account of Northern Virginia's brush with the Ebola virus. This is a sober-sides book by a trio of New York Times heavyweights—veteran foreign correspondent Judith Miller, crack investigative reporter Stephen Engelberg, and Pulitzer-winning science writer William Broad. Despite a questionable and sometimes taxing structure that interweaves a half-dozen highly complex tales—the Soviet germ program, the effort to unmask Iraq's bioweapons, the history of cults and germs, bureaucratic struggles in the Pentagon and White House—the book maintains momentum through its exhaustive reporting and spare, unsensational style.
Luckily—and not just for the authors—the book arrives at a time when most of us have recently acquired a working knowledge of the difference between anthrax spores and live bacteria, can define the meaning of "weaponized" when applied to germs, and may even have acquired the interesting piece of trivia that b. anthracis gets its name from the coal-black color of the skin lesion its cutaneous form produces. And so, as agar to bacteria, we are a reading public primed to provide a perfect breeding ground for the book's central argument: that bioterror may be the biggest threat facing us and that we are woefully ill-equipped to deal with it. At the end of this book, one feels like running into the street screaming, "Forget missile shields! Get us some vaccines!"
For we don't have them: not for Ebola or Marburg or the dozen other ghastly pathogens this book describes and not in sufficient or quickly deliverable quantities for any of the significant possible threats. The military spends its biodefense budget on protective suits, questionable detectors, and other battlefield equipment and hasn't the resources for a proper vaccine program. Private drug companies can't make a buck out of it and therefore aren't doing it. Funding for basic medical research has been inadequate for decades, and what there is goes to known killers like cancer and heart disease, not potential ones—the new Black Deaths. Meanwhile, most of the public health facilities throughout the country—the first line of defense in case of germ attack—are operating without computers or even, in some cases, a microscope.
Germs is never shrill or polemical, but chapter by chapter it builds a lawerly case for monumental U.S. government incompetence. The threat of an anthrax attack has been clear since the early 1990s, when the military scrambled, and failed, to find vaccines for forces deployed to the Gulf. To claim now that anthrax is poorly understood, not something we could have prepared for, and not a threat the government should have foreseen or been better equipped for is exposed as the most egregious and self-serving of lies. To me, the most outrageous and scandalous revelation in the book is that the CIA had the goods on the exact whereabouts of much of Saddam's bioweapons stash yet failed to share the information with the U.N. inspectors who could have seen to its prompt destruction in the immediate postwar period when the weapons monitoring program had all its teeth.
Yet another reason we should be asking the question: Why, exactly, do we have the CIA?
I bet the authors would have liked to revise their concluding chapter in the light of the last few weeks' events. It opens with the heavy, measured tread of Times style: "Is the threat of germ weapons real or exaggerated? Our answer is both." Oy vey. "Political leaders undermined their credibility by asserting that a biological attack against the United States was inevitable in the next few years—a matter of 'not if, but when.' No such certainty exists." Oh, brother. Somebody, get me rewrite!
I Scream, You Scream, We All Scream for Vaccines
From: Geraldine Brooks
To: Christopher Caldwell, Judith Shulevitz, Chris Suellentrop, and Ted WidmerPosted Tuesday, Nov. 6, 2001, at 1:42 PM ETNotes From The Fray Editor:
Jamal Thalji calls for books by Arabic authors. ADAS says that "the charge of excessive attention to 'politics' is thrown at all established religions…[and] is, of course, usually true…To say that Islam's success is knotted to its politics is just to say that it was successful." BML looks at Islamic history here, while Uno Who is reading Tom Clancy, and wondering who else is.
Comments:
Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese cult, tried to use biological agents in a terror attack in some of Japan's most densely populated cities. The cult's membership included technicians and other people with graduate-school-level training in biochemistry, biology, etc. They were nonetheless unable to deliver their weapons, so they opted instead for sarin gas (which they also basically botched).
While I do believe that some of the biowar doomsday scenarios are plausible and worth taking extreme measures to guard against, I also think that it is perhaps more difficult to deliver these weapons than is popularly portrayed. During World War I, one of the earliest uses of chemical weapons backfired heavily when the wind shifted and the chlorine gas blew back toward the Germans.
Finally, I think that a suicide "bio-bomber" may be less of a threat than a hijacker for psychological and religious reasons. Dying in an instant of fire is a much more "religiously" appealing way to go. Dying slowly of a self-induced plague doesn't seem quite so, well, glamorous, and probably not as impressive to God.
--Ananda Gupta
(To find or answer this post, click here.)
The U.S. abandoned its biological warfare program because of its difficulty in use as a controllable weapons system and as a public relations exercise to improve the U.S.'s image during the Vietnam War. Nixon said at the time that he was unconcerned about the U.S. not having such weapons systems since they would nuke anyone that used such weapons against the U.S. During the Gulf War the U.S. government warned Iraq that it would retaliate massively (the implication being the use of nuclear weapons) if the Iraqis used chemical or biological weapons.
The tragedy of U.S. policy is that they have spent a tremendous amount of money on weapons systems for wars which it will probably never fight, but did so little to protect Americans from much more likely terrorist scenarios including biological terrorism. There are many clever, sophisticated, well-funded and ruthless people in the world who can and will develop the technology to use these weapons. New Missile Defense is a complete waste of money since it is beyond belief that any government will ever launch these weapons against the U.S., but horrific bio-terrorism is almost a certainty in the future.
--Martin Kannengieser
(To find or answer this post, click here.)
(11/8)
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Notes From The Fray Editor:
Jamal Thalji calls for books by Arabic authors. ADAS says that "the charge of excessive attention to 'politics' is thrown at all established religions…[and] is, of course, usually true…To say that Islam's success is knotted to its politics is just to say that it was successful." BML looks at Islamic history here, while Uno Who is reading Tom Clancy, and wondering who else is.
Comments:
Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese cult, tried to use biological agents in a terror attack in some of Japan's most densely populated cities. The cult's membership included technicians and other people with graduate-school-level training in biochemistry, biology, etc. They were nonetheless unable to deliver their weapons, so they opted instead for sarin gas (which they also basically botched).
While I do believe that some of the biowar doomsday scenarios are plausible and worth taking extreme measures to guard against, I also think that it is perhaps more difficult to deliver these weapons than is popularly portrayed. During World War I, one of the earliest uses of chemical weapons backfired heavily when the wind shifted and the chlorine gas blew back toward the Germans.
Finally, I think that a suicide "bio-bomber" may be less of a threat than a hijacker for psychological and religious reasons. Dying in an instant of fire is a much more "religiously" appealing way to go. Dying slowly of a self-induced plague doesn't seem quite so, well, glamorous, and probably not as impressive to God.
--Ananda Gupta
(To find or answer this post, click here.)
The U.S. abandoned its biological warfare program because of its difficulty in use as a controllable weapons system and as a public relations exercise to improve the U.S.'s image during the Vietnam War. Nixon said at the time that he was unconcerned about the U.S. not having such weapons systems since they would nuke anyone that used such weapons against the U.S. During the Gulf War the U.S. government warned Iraq that it would retaliate massively (the implication being the use of nuclear weapons) if the Iraqis used chemical or biological weapons.
The tragedy of U.S. policy is that they have spent a tremendous amount of money on weapons systems for wars which it will probably never fight, but did so little to protect Americans from much more likely terrorist scenarios including biological terrorism. There are many clever, sophisticated, well-funded and ruthless people in the world who can and will develop the technology to use these weapons. New Missile Defense is a complete waste of money since it is beyond belief that any government will ever launch these weapons against the U.S., but horrific bio-terrorism is almost a certainty in the future.
--Martin Kannengieser
(To find or answer this post, click here.)
(11/8)