For example, I join other skeptics of Huntington's thesis in wondering how NATO could back Bosnian Muslims against their Christian persecutors if indeed, as Huntington says, the West and Islam are as naturally antagonistic as any two civilizations on Earth. Huntington's feeble reply is to shift the focus to another question: Why did the West denounce atrocities by the (Western Christian) Croats less forcefully than those by the (Orthodox Christian) Serbs? Um, I don't know--maybe because the Serbs did most of the wanton slaughtering?

Certainly cultural ties between Croatia and (especially) Germany did matter. The question is whether, as Huntington claims, thinking first and foremost in terms of culture is useful. Throughout the book, the answer is seen to be no.

Another example: Huntington says that in the future (Orthodox Christian) Russia will probably "dominate" the Islamic states on its periphery. This prediction would seem to violate Huntington's basic law that weaker states tend to subordinate themselves to strong states that share their civilization. Of course, in explaining this exception away, Huntington can talk about history and geography. But that's the point: Things like history and geography will often trump culture.

And this fact, by the way, cuts in another direction. Huntington's model predicts that small Sinic states such as South Korea may eventually re-enter the orbit of their natural sun, China. But if so, that will probably represent their grudging concession to Chinese power and geographic proximity, not a joyful civilizational reunion. In other words, it will fulfill Huntington's prediction without actually validating his model.

Another variable Huntington confuses with the "civilizational" variable is economics. For (Latin American) Mexico to have joined (otherwise Western) NAFTA is somewhat at odds with his model. Thus he points gleefully to America's domestic opposition to Mexico's entry as evidence of tribalism. As further vindication he notes that South American states have formed their own Latin American trade blocs rather than join Western-dominated NAFTA. All true. And all economically, not culturally, determined. Though NAFTA's opponents sometimes tried to exploit purely nativist sentiments, their movement would have gone nowhere if not for the big wage gap between Mexican workers and American blue-collar workers. Similarly, the wage gap between American and South American workers is what motivated American opposition to the extension of NAFTA into South America.

In some other cases Huntington's emphasis on culture is more valid--as in his discussion of the European Union's reluctance to absorb Turkey. Still, his consistent failure to deftly separate the cultural variable from economic, geographic, and ideological variables does not inspire confidence in his overall thesis.