
David Halberstam's breathless, deathless prose.
Sarah,
I'm glad you mentioned Gabriel García Márquez, because for me there was a faint whiff of magical realism about this book. No one exactly speaks in tongues or gets turned into a South American rodent. But Halberstam is yet again chasing ghosts and apparitions from the past, most of whom trace their origins to another magical place in the tropics--Vietnam. In his ceaseless questing backward, he seems like a writer searching for something he will never find.
You asked if I've read him before, and I have. Years ago, when I first encountered it, I thought The Best and the Brightest was powerful--his 1972 inside history of the foreign policy geniuses who conceived and executed our disastrous policy in Southeast Asia in the 1960s. Since this book is being coyly marketed as the long-awaited sequel (or, weirdly, its "younger sibling"), I was looking forward to reading it for a lot of reasons. One of those reasons was personal--I worked in the National Security Council from 1997 to 2000, and I wanted to know how a great journalist would interpret the issues that seemed so important at the time, but have already faded into the gloaming that is somewhere between tomorrow's history and yesterday's current events.
In quite a few ways, I was not disappointed. Many of his insights are important, and--what is rare for a foreign policy book--interesting. There are telling anecdotes, and you mentioned some of the best. Halberstam has been sharing late-evening off-the-record cocktails with foreign policy movers and shakers for over three decades, and it shows. He knows a lot, and we hear more than a few stories behind the story. One very valuable service that this book provides is that it gives a vivid sense of some important policymakers not generally known to public--people ranging from Lawrence Eagleburger in the Bush 1 administration to John Shalikashvili and Bill Perry in the Clinton administration (he's stronger on Clinton's first term than his second). Some people he really captures--Richard Holbrooke and Tony Lake spring to mind, and in each case, there's a good story to tell, one that winds sinuously back to Vietnam, where Halberstam first met them as a young New York Times correspondent.
But I was left with a feeling that he had not written a book with the energy and focus of The Best and the Brightest--and that his desire to live up to it, and in a sense, repeat it, is precisely what's wrong with the new effort. My problem, in a nutshell, is that Halberstam is trying to force three stories into one book. Near as I can figure it, he is trying to write 1) how Vietnam has cast a shadow over all subsequent U.S. foreign policy; 2) how the United States got involved in the Balkans in the 1990s; and 3) everything else that happened since then. All would be good on their own, but they're confusing jumbled together, and they water each other down. Some foreign policy gurus are haunted by Vietnam, but--newsflash!--many are not. Book 2--the Balkans story--would be important and deserves to be written by Halberstam, but this one wanders too peripatetically from geopolitical hotspot to hotspot to qualify. In the end, it's a pointillist mishmash--entertaining, observant--but muddled.
We don't have to look too far for an explanation. In the '60s Halberstam was a hungry young correspondent. Now he's a literary celebrity, summering on Nantucket, lending his name to charitable causes. Could there be a fate more horrible? Most of his recent books have been about sports heroes, particularly from the golden summers of yesteryear--a sure sign that a writer is losing his grip on contemporary reality. Do English intellectuals begin to fantasize about cricket matches of their youth as they fade into the sunset? Like George Foreman, Halberstam has come out of retirement to throw some more punches at the real world--and many of them connect. But not as many as I hoped.
I don't want to sound too harsh. I would genuinely recommend this book to someone who wants to know how we got entangled in the Balkans, or how foreign policy and strong personalities collide inside the Beltway. It's perceptive about many of the flaws in a system that is too diffuse, and on the sparks that fly between two cultures (White House and Pentagon) that are inherently in conflict. It's a decent primer on the major issues discussed in the Situation Room over the last decade (though there's precious little on Northern Ireland, the Middle East, China, nukes, or, what we really need--a clear explanation of what missile defense can and cannot offer). But in the long run, War in a Time of Peace does not do what it so often criticizes others for failing to do--provide a coherent strategy and execute it.
Best,
Ted
Obama's Small Masterpiece of a Speech at Fort Hood
Can Death Row Convicts Have Whatever They Want for Their Last Meal?
Does Rupert Murdoch Really Hate Google?
The Crops That Are Secretly Terrible for the Planet
The Three Kinds of Liberals Who Could Bring Down the Health Care Bill
Short Sayings That Make Me Happy













Reader Comments From The Fray:
[Notes from the Fray Editor: Both posts below are part of an interesting, and continuing, thread.]
The only reason Vietnam has cast a shadow over all other 'engagements' since then is that the war in Southeast Asia was so poorly managed and executed by the Yale and Harvard grads who occupied Washington during that time. We should never confuse war with politics ever again lest this country wants another civil war. If America finds herself at the brink of war ever again, it's all the way or nothing, there is no "in between."
I'm just afraid that Washington is still populated by Yale and Harvard grads, who have been coddled and supported by their own parents for so long, that their only motivation is power and prestige, whose perspective has been warped by wealth and privilege, and who really no nothing about sacrifice and courage.
--Forward Observer
(To reply, click here.)
I was there, too, FO. I don't draw the same conclusions as you do.
Warfare goes through ages and stages. Vietnam was the last of the era of wars that started with the American Civil War. They were characterized by heavy industry technology and civilian conscription. They tended to be ideological wars, because ideology and propaganda are how you motivate populations to sacrifice. Because of this characteristic, they tended also to become total wars, i.e., virtually all weapons and tactics available were employed and the distinction between military and civilians was blurred or ignored.
In our lifetimes a new type of warfare has emerged. Not just new technologically, but psychological and politically as well. Its levels of violence are relatively lower than in the old mass-levy wars, but its violence can be in certain ways more shocking because it is inflicted suddenly while an illusion of peace is still preserved, and can end just as suddenly. The violence of this style of warfare is, in theory at least, much more precisely calibrated to make political statements.
I was initially skeptical of this type of war, but it has grown and developed and is being employed or prepared for by a number of countries besides the U.S. Israel is an obvious example; but the Palestinians are also a less obvious one. They can't employ Israel's high technology, but they have found a fairly effective low-tech substitute: the suicide bomber, the ultimate smart bomb. The suicide bomber is, obviously, a political statement. If the Palestinians ever get what they want (and exactly what they want remains elusive to me), it will not be because they killed more Israelis, but because they mastered the military grammar of their particular conflict.
--Yukon
(To reply, click here.)
(9/5)