Bowling Alone
Dear Bob,
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StumbleUponI'll get to the question of whether "community bonds" matter in a moment. As a preview, let me repeat that we are indeed closer in agreement on that issue than we are the current state of quiet desperation in America, though I doubt we'll be high-fiving each other in solidarity anytime soon.
But first, let's linger over the evidence for widespread "social isolation" a few minutes more. You write that, "When I present my argument to public audiences ... there is lots of lively debate about the implications of Americans' growing social isolation, but virtually no one questions the facts, because ordinary Americans know that what I've described fits their own experience." Two things jump out at me: For starters, such audiences are largely self-selecting, so such unanimity is hardly surprising. And are those really "ordinary Americans" in the crowd? What is an "ordinary American" anyway? That's not simply a rhetorical question: I'm sure you'll agree that it is in fact extremely difficult to grasp lived social reality with any sort of precision, especially in as large and varied a country such as our own. That's a major reason why, as I said in my first post, data will never be fully definitive in such matters.
But what about that data? Let's consider your book's chapter on "Altruism, Volunteering, and Philanthropy." As you note, that trio "is by some measures a central measure of social capital." Far from presenting a clear-cut picture of demise, the data show that something much more complicated is going on, as you suggest. You note that between 1975 and 1999, overall rates for volunteering have gone up, even after factoring in declines among 31- to 40-year-olds. At the same time, there has been a decline in "participation in community projects" (which seems canceled out by the earlier stat). Nothing in such data strikes me as particularly alarming. Indeed, when one factors in lifestyle changes (e.g., people getting married and having kids later in life; two-income households), the dip among 31- to 40-year-olds makes sense; it's a pretty good assumption that as today's thirtysomethings get older, once their careers are more established and their kids are a bit more self-sufficient, they'll volunteer more too. As for philanthropy, you grant that between 1960 and 1995, "real per capita giving doubled," from about $280 to $522 (in 1993 dollars). Yet the scold in you makes that cause for concern because the increase in giving didn't match the real growth in our disposable income ("real per capita spending on flowers, seeds, and potted plants almost tripled, and real per capita spending on all recreational goods and services combined ... nearly quadrupled"). In your post, you seemed to grant that we're a prosperous nation; maybe a doubling in real philanthropic giving is all that's called for in today's America. And that's coming from someone who works for a nonprofit, incidentally.
Let me exhume once again the corpse of Everett Ladd on this score, as he suggests another reason why your tallies of despair--however technically accurate--may measure less than they seem to. You chart "the rise and fall of the PTA, 1910-1997" in Figure 9 of your book, noting that since 1960, it's all been downhill for that once-popular organization. "One need not romanticize PTA meetings of the 1950s to recognize that many Americans nowadays are less involved with their kids' education," you write. Nobody, I think, will contest the data that PTA membership has declined. But it's a major mistake to rely on the PTA as a marker for parental involvement in education. As Ladd pointed out, "[t]he real reason PTA membership fell off wasn't that parents stopped participating; rather they associated increasingly with groups other than the PTA. ... This was a big deal for the PTA. ... But it has nothing to do with developments in civic America." Indeed, more parents participated in school-board meetings in 1995 than in 1969 (39 percent vs. 16 percent), and roughly the same percentage of parents signed up for "school service groups" in 1994 as did in 1974 (32 percent). What's more, between 1983 and 1994, other indicators of parental involvement--meetings with teachers, attending school plays and concerts, attending athletic events, etc.--were all also sharply up (again, this is something that comports with my own experience; all my friends who teach in grammar and high schools complain that they have too much contact, not too little, with parents these days). Let's not confuse the demise of the PTA--or other easily counted organizations--with the end of civil society.
For someone taught not to speak ill of the dead, incidentally, you do deliver a seemingly devastating critique of Ladd's figures on political involvement. However, his chapter in The Ladd Report on political involvement is in fact much more nuanced and multi-sourced than you suggest. Far from citing polls from only '81, '90, and '95, he offers a host of measures on voting and other activities that date back to the '40s and up through the '90s; many of these measures do show some declines in certain activities. But let me grant for argument's sake your "steady long-term declines of 40 percent to 50 percent since the early 1970s" in "political participation." Why draw a sinister implication from such a trend? Simply because people are no longer interested in affiliating with the Democrats or Republicans is no sign of apocalypse. Indeed, it may be a sign of sanity. Whatever time people might have devoted to such activities is now being spent engaging in other sorts of (often social) behavior, ranging from volunteer work to taking vacations to going to movies to watching TV to checking out the Internet. I assume that people find this sort of thing more rewarding, which might make their lives a little happier, if less noble to some.
So what about those "community bonds"? Do they matter or not? Well, Bob, it all depends--on the nature of the bonds and the terms under which they operate. I'm glad a lot of organizations have taken it on the chin; sad that some others can no longer draw flies. As you yourself point out in your book, social capital enables everything from the PTA to Oklahoma City bombers. I've benefited mightily from certain connections (and have mightily benefited others) and have gotten screwed because I didn't have other connections. The most important of those connections, though, are unlikely to show up on any sociologist's radar screen. Can you grant that there may be real, meaningful networks of association and meaning out there that may not show up in official counts? And that maybe these networks help explain why things are going so well when your thesis about eroding trust and reciprocity says the opposite should be happening?
This much seems certain to me: At least since World War II, America has gotten a lot richer and more educated across the board. And not uncoincidentally, a lot more antinomian. It's a hell of a lot harder today to make people do things they don't want to do, to regiment them along any single idea of the good or proper life. That doesn't mean contemporary America doesn't have community. It just means that people have more options to sign up with or to walk away from. Which isn't a bad thing.
This week, Nick Gillespie grills Robert Putnam on his book Bowling Alone (click here to read the first chapter of the book, and click here to buy it). Gillespie is the editor of Reason and a frequent contributor to the Web site suck.com, where he writes under the name Mr. Mxyzptlk. Robert Putnam is a professor of public policy at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government. 
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Reader Response from The Fray--to be read after the final entry:
It seems to me that income inequality is the elephant in the middle of the room that nobody's talking about here. Mr Putnam's findings that social capital multiplied until about 1970 and has dwindled since at least coincides in time with the pattern of income inequality, which dropped steadily until the 1973 oil-crisis and has risen every year since then. Dr Richard Wilkinson, an English epidemiologist, has written a very provocative book called Unhealthy Societies which suggests that the reason public health suffers as income inequality increases is that more unequal societies are less socially cohesive than more equal ones. The fine points of his argument are too involved to go into here, but Dr Wilkinson's basic reasoning is definitely intuitively plausible: He figures that in relatively unequal societies where people live at similar standards of living, it's far easier for them to identify with one another, to trust each other and to come together in civic groups. The more unequal the society, the more difficult it is for people to really identify with one another's daily lives, and the less likely they are to come together socially.
--F.Toro
(To reply, click here.)
The author replies: Excellent question, Francisco! I discuss the links between social capital and income inequality at length in Bowling Alone. There is a strong positive correlation across American states, across countries in the world, and (as you point out) across time in the U.S. between equality and social capital. No one yet knows which way the causal arrow runs, but most researchers now think it runs both ways. It's easier to connect in a society with smaller cleavages, but better connections also encourage policies that narrow cleavages. Interestingly, Richard Wilkinson himself has written very nice things about my work, saying that social capital is a key part of the story about inequality. On the health effects, the best work so far (not including my own work) suggests that the correlation between health and inequality is, in fact, mostly explained by differences in social capital.
As a political matter, the social capital agenda and the social justice agenda are complementary, not competitive. Both injustice and disengagement badly need to be fixed, and fixing one will help fix the other.
--Bob Putnam
(To reply, click here.)
Bob Putnam appears to believe that relationships premised upon proximity are stronger. This is only half-true and ignores that fact that many people in the past lived lives of quiet desperation. You were often stuck in destructive and eviscerating relationships because it was very difficult to travel regularly more than a few miles away from your front door. Modern communications and traveling dramatically increase the odds that we will find relationships more enriching and sustainable. It is not that Putnam's body of work is totally wrong, but I am convinced that the good far outweighs the bad if we barely say hi to our next-door neighbors. Our everyday relationships should be primarily premised upon having something in common with the other person. I will also reiterate what I have said previously: the clock will not be turned back! It would behoove us to instead focus upon enriching our standard relationships while reminding ourselves not to overlook those individuals within our immediate physical environment.
--David Thomson
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(6/20)
Mr Gillespie, after ranting about how much richer Americans are, criticizes Mr Putnam's book as follows:
This is a classic example of burning a straw man. Gillespie attributes an argument to Putnam that Putnam did not make (otherwise Gillespie would have quoted it) and then rebuts the argument. Putnam's view is that Americans suffer from isolation and emotional poverty--not that they suffer from economic poverty. Thus, Gillespie's assertion that we are all materially better off is utterly beside the point. The Bible asks whether it matters if a man gains the whole world if he loses his soul (loosely paraphrased); even 2000 years ago, people were aware that one could be materially wealthy and spiritually poor. Why can't Gillespie see something so obvious?
--Michael Lewyn
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My mother has a card club of couples she's gathered to eat, drink and play with for about 20 years. They've been through two couples' divorces, one remarriage, kids w/drug problems, kids with chronic illnesses, people moving, etc. They are a tight community. I want to find that where I live, but nothing seems to be gelling. Maybe I have to wait until I have kids and then other parents will become our friends, but I don't think it will be easy to find a group like my mom has. Just some thoughts. I agree the informal and formal social networks are dissipating. People have too many cell phones, houses that don't face the street, no front porches and too many commitments.
--AM
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How about email, and this message board itself. People are forming communities and gathering socially in different ways than they did before. It is not necessary for people to meet face to face in order to share ideas, converse or be political. All these things are happening now in non-traditional ways. A study that purports to measure social capital must take into account the new ways in which people are communicating with each other and forming social bonds or its results cannot be considered valid.
--Trev
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To Trev: Thanks for your insights. I agree completely that it would be irresponsible in 2000 to write a book about social connections that ignored the Internet. I didn't. When you have a chance to check out Bowling Alone, you'll see that I devoted the better part of a chapter to reviewing dozens of studies on cmc ("computer-mediated communication"), on-line communities, and the like. Frankly, the empirical evidence is mixed, and I'm ambivalent, so you may not agree with what I write. But I certainly don't ignore the topic. Here in synthesis is my take on the issue:
(1)The Internet had nothing to do with the downturn in social involvement. The evidence clearly shows that the downturn was underway before Mark Andreessen was born.
(2) Some research shows Internet usage associated with more social interaction, some with less. It's much too soon in the process to be sure whether the Internet will turn out to be a nifty telephone (helpful to social connection) or a nifty TV (unhelpful). Predictions at a comparable stage of the evolution of the telephone turned out to be mostly off the mark, so we need to be modest about our own wisdom.
(3) Technology is not a force beyond our control. We have it in our power to develop and use the new tools of electronic communication to strengthen old bonds and make new ones. We need to be about that task with gusto.
--Bob Putnam
(To reply, click here.)
The very freedom that the Internet provides to form communities based on interests, identities, and just about anything else we can dream up, is part of the problem when it comes to the death-of-local-community ties. I am certainly not going to argue that Internet communities are somehow lesser than other types because of the medium they use. I will point out though, that they don't foster involvement with local institutions, and their ability to support their members begins and ends with advice/encouragement. You can't really expect your friend from Yahoo clubs to travel halfway across the country to watch your kids when you are sick.
--Reality Check
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(6/15)