John McCain says Al Gore and Bill Bradley are not qualified to be commander in chief "based upon their support of a litmus test for future chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." The Republican National Committee is now running ads that say the same thing. Leaving aside the minor nuance that Bradley never endorsed any test at all, let alone a "litmus" test for the Joint Chiefs chairman, is McCain right to argue that Gore's position is unreasonable?
Here's what Gore said in the debate on January 5, in response to a question from Peter Jennings on whether he would have a "litmus test" for the post of chairman of the Joint Chiefs:
I would try to bring about the kind of change in policy, on the "don't ask, don't tell" policy, that President Harry Truman brought about after World War II in integrating the military. And I think that would require those who wanted to serve in on the position of--on the Joint Chiefs to be in agreement with that policy. So, yes.
In answer to a follow-up question from Jennings, Gore modified his answer slightly. "I would insist, before appointing anybody to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that that individual support my policy," the vice president said. "And, yes, I would make that a requirement." Requiring "support" is somewhat different than requiring "agreement" (see "Kausfiles" for further analysis of this distinction). After he was attacked for the answer, Gore made clear his preference for his second response over his first. "I did not mean to imply that there should ever be any kind of inquiry into the personal, political opinion of officers in the U.S. military," Gore said, at an impromptu press conference two days later.
As Gore belatedly realized, "support" is the better answer, because it leaves open the theoretical possibility of appointing a military officer so honorable that he will work assiduously to implement a policy he personally disagrees with. But in reality, there isn't much of a difference between "support" and "agreement"--certainly not enough to constitute a "reversal," which was how the New York Times characterized Gore's adjustment. Chairmen and members of the Joint Chiefs who "personally" oppose this particular change in policy are not likely to put their feelings aside and implement it. They're likely to try to sabotage it.
Consider what happened to Bill Clinton when he tried to lift the ban on gays in the military in 1993. In theory, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs at that time, Colin Powell, was an obedient officer ranking directly below Clinton in the chain of command. In practice, Powell worked around Clinton to prevent a policy change that he disagreed with. After Clinton was elected but before he was sworn in, Powell gave a speech at the Naval Academy in Annapolis in which he told midshipmen that if the new policy violated their beliefs, they should consider resigning from the military.
George Stephanopoulos describes the political reality of the situation in his book All Too Human. "I knew we had no cards to play," Stephanopoulos writes, describing Clinton's first meeting with Powell and the Joint Chiefs. "If we didn't work out a compromise with the chiefs, they would sabotage us on the Hill. While they were obliged to obey their commander, they had the right to present their personal views to congressional committees publicly." It was, in fact, the prospect of Powell and the other chiefs testifying before Congress about their personal opposition to allowing gays to serve in the military that gave Sen. Sam Nunn the leverage to foist Powell's own preferred compromise of "don't ask, don't tell" on the administration. And had Congress not acted, it's entirely likely that the chiefs would have worked to sabotage the new policy at the bureaucratic level.
For this reason, Gore's "litmus test" position is not merely defensible; it's the only sensible one to take if you seriously intend to get rid of "don't ask, don't tell." By contrast, Bradley's stance--that he would expect the chairman of the Joint Chiefs to follow his orders--is utterly naive. As for the Republican line that all the Joint Chiefs ever do is offer advice and obey their commander in chief, it's worse than naive. It's disingenuous. Conservatives know that litmus-untested chiefs are likely to try to undermine a Democratic president's effort to allow gays to serve openly in the military. And what's more, Republicans want them to undermine it.
Highlights from the Fray:
In matters like this, it's helpful to keep in mind that the concept of the President as "Commander in Chief" is a Constitutional principle (the bulwark of civilian control of the military), not an operational reality. The last President to prepare personally to lead troops into battle was Washington, on the occasion of the "Whisky Rebellion" (mainly to overawe the rebels and, in the event, he didn't go). During the nullification crisis, Andrew Jackson characteristically threatened to lead an expedition to South Carolina to hang traitors.
For most of two centuries, however, the relationship has been a bit more distant, notwithstanding our Cold War imagery of a President with his "finger on the nuclear trigger." The size, organization, composition, leadership and even, arguably, use of the U.S. military are all matters subject to law and, thus, to Congress. The notion that the President sits the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff down and gives him his marching orders on any matter is a bit far-fetched. Rest assured that President Roosevelt gave General Marshall no "orders." For that matter, the full extent of the orders given to Gen. MacArthur as a theater commander were to retake the Indonesian archipelago from the Japanese (the geographic equivalent of marching from London to Prague). How MacArthur went about it was has affair, within the constraints of the resources that were allotted to him. Then, of course, when the same Gen. MacArthur ran himself afoul of Presidential policy in Korea by treating personally with Chiang Kai-shek, President Truman dismissed him.
The two MacArthur stories are emblematic of the reality of Presidential authority over ranking military officers. The idea that he can or should order them about like so many political White House aides is preposterous.
Ultimately, any non-discriminatory policy affecting the military will succeed only as a result of both Presdential and Congressional action that helped educate the public and establish a true consensus.
--Publius
(To reply, click here.)
If Clinton had actually issued the order to allow gays in the military, Colin Powell would have had two choices: obey or resign. He made it clear that he would leave first, as did the other JCS members. Clinton faced in the first months of his presidency a crisis of his own making. With all of the other issues facing him, he chose this one because he did not understand the military as well as he understand politicians. He would have been the first president to have the entire JCS resign on him, and quite likely find it hard to replace them.
The JCS have a duty and obligation to disagree with the Commander-in-Chief if they believe it is right to do so, right up to the point where an order is given. After that, the choices are to obey or resign (a choice not given to the average enlisted man, by the way).
Clinton never gave that order; he never made any preparation for this move nor did he really try to explain it. In his initial arrogance when taking office, he could not comprehend the possibility of anyone in the military not blindly following him. Joining the military does not mean you give up the right to think for yourself. At the very highest levels, it should mean that you are willing to risk your career by speaking the truth as you see it.
--Wardog
(To reply, click here.)
The chain of U.S. military command flows directly from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of nine "unified combat commands" (e.g., the European Command, led by Gen Wesley Clark).
The JCS are the leaders of all of the military staff functions, such as planning, personnel, supply and logistics and intelligence. In addition, the JCS serve as senior military advisors to the President and the Secretary. To ensure that these top brass cannot be left out of the loop on important military decisions, they also have the role of transmitting the orders of the President and Secretary of Defense to the Unified Combat Commanders.
Although this may seem a bit cumbersome, it is a structure that very sensibly sidesteps the problems associated with home-bound generals ordering theater commanders about, as well as, arguably at least, the thorny issues of a permanent "general staff" throwing political weight around.
So, what might this have to do with gays in the military? The JCS occupy a murky place in some ways. The Chairman is the President's "senior military advisor" (presumably meaning Clinton should pay more heed to GCS Chm. Shelton than to, say, Gen. Clark), but he plays this role without direct command authority. That puts the Chairman in a sticky position if his views are not in tune with the Combat Commanders. In Kosovo, we saw dimly in the news what was a raging conflict between Clark and the GSC over how aggressive to be.
I agree that any Chairman or Chief of Staff who could not in good conscience carry out a direct order from the President would resign. Equally troubling is that the JCS view would have to be somewhat in tune with that of the field commanders. I cannpt imagine a military "politician" adept enough to find a way to balance or reconcile what would certainly be sharply conflicting views.
--Publius
(To reply, click here.)
Ballot Box attempts to put Gore's statements in the context of working with or around the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By and large, I think it's a fair assessment of the facts and the situation, with a little Republican bashing thrown in. But I see two larger issues:
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are politicized. There are Republican generals and Democratic generals for presidents to choose from. Those who think the generals give unbiased advice are naive. The JCS will always do whatever it takes to advance their branch's interests with Congress--that cuts across party lines.
2. To allow gays to serve openly, the President must prepare the way. Bill Clinton was not willing to expend any real political capital on letting gays serve openly in the military--he said "I'm for it, let's go," rather than making serious appeals to Americans' sense of fairness, setting up a blue ribbon commission to study it, or enlisting prominent Americans to support it. Clinton's support for gays looked like he was just going through the motions for another "interest group." Gore hints that he might do the necessary groundwork , harkening to Truman, but he is running such an opportunistic campaign that it's hard to take his pledges seriously.
If it's so important to have gays serve openly, Gore ought to tell us how he's going to do it on a larger level than litmus test or pull rank on the JCS.
--Will
(To reply, click here.)
(1/13)
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Highlights from the Fray:
In matters like this, it's helpful to keep in mind that the concept of the President as "Commander in Chief" is a Constitutional principle (the bulwark of civilian control of the military), not an operational reality. The last President to prepare personally to lead troops into battle was Washington, on the occasion of the "Whisky Rebellion" (mainly to overawe the rebels and, in the event, he didn't go). During the nullification crisis, Andrew Jackson characteristically threatened to lead an expedition to South Carolina to hang traitors.
For most of two centuries, however, the relationship has been a bit more distant, notwithstanding our Cold War imagery of a President with his "finger on the nuclear trigger." The size, organization, composition, leadership and even, arguably, use of the U.S. military are all matters subject to law and, thus, to Congress. The notion that the President sits the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff down and gives him his marching orders on any matter is a bit far-fetched. Rest assured that President Roosevelt gave General Marshall no "orders." For that matter, the full extent of the orders given to Gen. MacArthur as a theater commander were to retake the Indonesian archipelago from the Japanese (the geographic equivalent of marching from London to Prague). How MacArthur went about it was has affair, within the constraints of the resources that were allotted to him. Then, of course, when the same Gen. MacArthur ran himself afoul of Presidential policy in Korea by treating personally with Chiang Kai-shek, President Truman dismissed him.
The two MacArthur stories are emblematic of the reality of Presidential authority over ranking military officers. The idea that he can or should order them about like so many political White House aides is preposterous.
Ultimately, any non-discriminatory policy affecting the military will succeed only as a result of both Presdential and Congressional action that helped educate the public and establish a true consensus.
--Publius
(To reply, click here.)
If Clinton had actually issued the order to allow gays in the military, Colin Powell would have had two choices: obey or resign. He made it clear that he would leave first, as did the other JCS members. Clinton faced in the first months of his presidency a crisis of his own making. With all of the other issues facing him, he chose this one because he did not understand the military as well as he understand politicians. He would have been the first president to have the entire JCS resign on him, and quite likely find it hard to replace them.
The JCS have a duty and obligation to disagree with the Commander-in-Chief if they believe it is right to do so, right up to the point where an order is given. After that, the choices are to obey or resign (a choice not given to the average enlisted man, by the way).
Clinton never gave that order; he never made any preparation for this move nor did he really try to explain it. In his initial arrogance when taking office, he could not comprehend the possibility of anyone in the military not blindly following him. Joining the military does not mean you give up the right to think for yourself. At the very highest levels, it should mean that you are willing to risk your career by speaking the truth as you see it.
--Wardog
(To reply, click here.)
The chain of U.S. military command flows directly from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of nine "unified combat commands" (e.g., the European Command, led by Gen Wesley Clark).
The JCS are the leaders of all of the military staff functions, such as planning, personnel, supply and logistics and intelligence. In addition, the JCS serve as senior military advisors to the President and the Secretary. To ensure that these top brass cannot be left out of the loop on important military decisions, they also have the role of transmitting the orders of the President and Secretary of Defense to the Unified Combat Commanders.
Although this may seem a bit cumbersome, it is a structure that very sensibly sidesteps the problems associated with home-bound generals ordering theater commanders about, as well as, arguably at least, the thorny issues of a permanent "general staff" throwing political weight around.
So, what might this have to do with gays in the military? The JCS occupy a murky place in some ways. The Chairman is the President's "senior military advisor" (presumably meaning Clinton should pay more heed to GCS Chm. Shelton than to, say, Gen. Clark), but he plays this role without direct command authority. That puts the Chairman in a sticky position if his views are not in tune with the Combat Commanders. In Kosovo, we saw dimly in the news what was a raging conflict between Clark and the GSC over how aggressive to be.
I agree that any Chairman or Chief of Staff who could not in good conscience carry out a direct order from the President would resign. Equally troubling is that the JCS view would have to be somewhat in tune with that of the field commanders. I cannpt imagine a military "politician" adept enough to find a way to balance or reconcile what would certainly be sharply conflicting views.
--Publius
(To reply, click here.)
Ballot Box attempts to put Gore's statements in the context of working with or around the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By and large, I think it's a fair assessment of the facts and the situation, with a little Republican bashing thrown in. But I see two larger issues:
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are politicized. There are Republican generals and Democratic generals for presidents to choose from. Those who think the generals give unbiased advice are naive. The JCS will always do whatever it takes to advance their branch's interests with Congress--that cuts across party lines.
2. To allow gays to serve openly, the President must prepare the way. Bill Clinton was not willing to expend any real political capital on letting gays serve openly in the military--he said "I'm for it, let's go," rather than making serious appeals to Americans' sense of fairness, setting up a blue ribbon commission to study it, or enlisting prominent Americans to support it. Clinton's support for gays looked like he was just going through the motions for another "interest group." Gore hints that he might do the necessary groundwork , harkening to Truman, but he is running such an opportunistic campaign that it's hard to take his pledges seriously.
If it's so important to have gays serve openly, Gore ought to tell us how he's going to do it on a larger level than litmus test or pull rank on the JCS.
--Will
(To reply, click here.)
(1/13)