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The LAPD announced yesterday that after investigating 320 claims of racial profiling, not one could be sustained. The police commission is incredulous—“I find it baffling that we have these zeros.” said one commissioner. But actually, it’s not baffling at all.
The Los Angeles Times reports that the investigations concerned “allegations that officers stopped, questioned or otherwise confronted someone solely because of the person’s race.” I’m not at all baffled that none of the incidents investigated involved profiling, so defined. If profiling means stopping someone solely because of race, I’m willing to bet it almost never happens. But it’s well-documented that police do consider race—along with other factors such as age, sex, grooming, attires, demeanor, context, and behavior—when making traffic and pedestrian stops. I suspect the commissioner quoted thinks any use of race counts as “profiling”—that’s basically the position of the ACLU and other civil rights organizations. But the police, not surprisingly, employ a narrower definition.
The problem with the narrow definition is that it doesn’t encompass the problem—the police can be as biased as a lynch mob and still never “profile.” The problem with the broader definition is it hampers legitimate police methods. If the police know a racially exclusive gang is active in a certain part of town, do we really want them to ignore race entirely when patrolling there? What if the gang is on a crime spree at the time? What if they just robbed a bank and several witnesses describe them to police? At some point, the line between “profiling” and a manhunt for specific criminals, whose race is known, gets hard to draw.
As I’ve argued in my book, The Race Card, the reason racial profiling is one issue that almost everyone can agree on (we’re against it) is that no one bothers to define profiling very well. In fact, there’s almost a silent conspiracy among civil rights activists, government officials, and law enforcement to keep the definition as murky as possible. The activists demand an end to “profiling”—meaning any use of race in traffic stops; in response, police promise not to “profile”—meaning stopping people based solely on the basis of race. The activists get a symbolic victory; the police get a PR victory—nothing changes. Like an international treaty, the best way to get to a consensus is to let everyone interpret the key terms to suit themselves. Until, of course, it comes time to enforce the treaty …
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Thanks to Marty and Phil for highlighting the recent NYT report that the U.S. incarcerates more of its people-and for longer periods-than any other nation, bar none. I was disappointed, though, that the story did not discuss the devastatingly disproportionate rates of imprisonment of racial minorities.
The U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates that 32 percent of African American males can expect to be imprisoned during their lifetimes, compared to 5.9 percent of White males. The explanation is complicated, and much relates to how we treat drugs: the crack/cocaine disparity and beyond that, the fact that African Americans face disproportionately higher rates of arrest, prosecution, and conviction and disproportionately longer sentences. And those disparities, of course, translate to amazingly high rates of African Americans who subsequently are prohibited from voting, unable to find jobs, ineligible for student loans . . . the ramifications go on and on and on.
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A new poll that shows that 16 percent of Pennsylvania white voters who were asked whether “the race of candidate was important” said yes—80 percent saidno. Of those who answered “yes” 54 percent said they’d support Obama in the general election—27 percent said they’d defect to McCain and 16percent said they’d stay home on election day and polish their guns, cuddle up with their bibles and nurse their bitterness.
The New York Times says that this means “Obama’s race could be a problem in the general election.” First reaction: a hearty “no duh”. Butlet’s also unpack those poll results and ask what they really tell us. Of course his race will repel, well, racist voters, of which no one doubts there are some. But before we conclude that 16 percent of Pennsylvania whites are racists, notice that of the 16 percent who said race mattered, 54 would support Obama, which suggests that for some Obama’s race is a plus. But what about those that won’t support him—about 7 percent? All racists? Isn’t it at least possible that some won’t support him despite, rather than because of his race?
I tried this thought experiment: if asked whether the sex of the candidate is important, I would answer “yes” because I think all things being equal it would be great to have a woman President. But sex is not enough to convince me to support Clinton over Obama—I support Obama despite his sex and because of his other virtues. Truth be told, alot of people I know-- including a lot of feminists--are pretty sick of Hillary Clinton, Bill Clinton, even Chelsea, who, unlike her parents really hasn’t done anything to deserve their contempt, and they'd probably have it in for Socks the cat too if he turned up on TV. Now I suppose some of them mightwell answer a poll: yes I think sex is important (I’d love to have a woman President--just not Hillary Clinton)---and no if Hillary is the nominee, by gum I’ll vote for McCain, or Ralph Nader, or stay home on election day and cuddle up with a cold martini and my warm, fuzzy Northern Californian sense of superiority. And the Times would take that answer as evidence of voter sexism. I imagine some Clinton supporters are beginning to feel equally irritated with Obama as this nasty campaign drags on. So maybe a lot this polling data is evidence of the costs of a protracted fight for the nomination, rather than inveterate racism on the part of voters.
Another piece of potentially misleading poll data: Clinton supporters are much more likely to defect to McCain or stay home if Obama is the nominee than Obama supporters are to defect or stay home if Clinton wins. Isn’t is possible that this result is skewed by the fact that Clinton is losing and Obama looks like the inevitable nominee? If my candidate is poised to win, I can afford to be magnanimous: “of course Hillary Clinton is a fine candidate and if she were to win (but of course she won’t) I’d support her energetically.” But if my person is losing, I might start to get a tiny bit, well, bitter. And maybe I’d even say things like “if that old school, politics-as-usual beltway insider steals the nomination in a brokered convention with her insider connections and underhanded politics—well, I’ll be dammed if I vote for her! I’d rather have Attila the Hun (or JohnMcCain) than continue the corrupt Clinton dynasty!” You haven’t heard alot of this because Obama is the presumptive nominee, but post-Pennsylvania you’re already hearing rumblings of defections to the Green party among Obama supporters should Clinton get the nomination.
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Plenty of wags have compared Hillary Clinton to a zombie or the Terminator—she claws her way back to her feet and limps on when any mere mortal would be long dead. But the real reanimated corpse of this election is the contemptible question of whether sexism is worse than racism. This crude and divisive inquiry will not die, no matter how many times it is doused with the holy water of common decency and no matter how many times the wooden stake of good sense is driven through its heart. So I’m under no illusions that my attempt here will prove to be a magic bullet.
Judith Shulevitz’s post on "XX Factor" last week was the latest version of this question that I’ve seen (and far from the worst), but this question has become almost obligatory in any race- or gender-conscious discussion of the election. For instance, in her New York Times op ed, Gloria Steinem insists, “I’m not advocating a competition for who has it toughest,” but a scant four paragraphs earlier she declared a winner, asserting that “gender is probably the most restricting force in American life, whether the question is who must be in the kitchen or who could be in the White House.”
I want to convince you that the racism vs. sexism query is one that should never be posed much less dignified with whatever could possibly pass for an answer. It’s conceptualism at its nadir. (It has all of the futility of kids arguing over whether Superman or Spider Man would win in a fight, but with none of the charm.) Worse yet, the question, by its nature, invites the most base form of competition for victim status: Like a bad cultural studies conference where the most subordinated of them all gets to speak first, this question suggests that the people who labor under the more severe type of identity-based oppression somehow, by virtue of their victimization alone, deserve special priority—first question after the keynote, first grab at the coffee and Danish table, maybe even first dibs on our political loyalties.
And while wallowing in the worst of 1990s-style identity politics, it ignores one of the few valuable lessons 1990s identity politics had to teach: namely that social identities are situational and not essential, that how and whether race and gender are important depends on context. Typically when the question has been put, it has evoked some thin one-sided evidence as to why one or the other is worse for Clinton or Obama (Clinton has to put on makeup and worry about the color of her pantsuits/ Obama can’t go on the attack without sounding like a black thug), augmented by a long litany of gender or race grievances that don’t have much to do with the narrow question at hand (slavery, Jim Crow, job discrimination, racial profiling, segregation, the Tuskegee experiment, the Jena 6/ rape, pornography, anti-abortionists, sexual harassment, prostitution, the glass ceiling, lazy and macho husbands, dry cleaners who charge more for blouses than shirts), the sheer tedious length of which is meant to overwhelm all arguments to the contrary, leaving only one conclusion: Sexism (or racism) is worse.
Of course it’s true, as Shulevitz asserts, that “a woman seeking higher office faces obstacles that a man does not face, no matter what the color of her skin.” But this doesn’t suggest that gender is the greater obstacle generally—only that gender poses distinctive obstacles. It’s also true that a black person seeking higher office faces obstacles that a white person doesn’t face, no matter his gender. If (for God knows what reason) we were to take seriously the narrow question—who has it worse, Clinton because of sexism or Obama because of racism?—we’d need to consider all of the racially or gender-specific disadvantages each has experienced and somehow try to compare them.
And there are distinctive advantages to be considered as well: Geraldine Ferraro was right to say that Obama wouldn’t be a front-runner but for his race, but right only in the most banal sense: Candidates for high office are elected, in large part, based on the voter’s perception of their “character,” and that perception is derived in large part from biography; Obama’s includes the fact that he’s black. And of course many people are especially excited about the prospect of a black president. So, too, Hillary Clinton would not be a front-runner but for her gender—plenty of people are excited about her candidacy primarily because of the prospect of a female president. There’s nothing scandalous about this—race and gender are salient in our society, and the symbolism is relevant in a politician. But how could we know “which is worse?” without somehow performing this complex and context-specific cost/benefit analysis? No one has even tried to make such an accounting—and for good reasons—but that’s what one would need to do in order to make any sense of the “which is the greater obstacle” question.
This leads me to suspect that when people ask whether sexism or racism is the greater obstacle in the context of Clinton vs. Obama, what they really care about is whether sexism or racism is the bigger social problem (since the evidence cited so often goes to the latter inquiry and not to the former) and therefore whether it would do more good or be more profound, in some overall cosmic sense of “good” or “profound,” to have a female as opposed to a black president. It’s understandable that someone who has spent her life fighting sexism, like Ms. Steinem or Ms. Ferraro, would find it tempting to pose (and answer) this question. But this is precisely the kind of unresolvable moral question, shot through with self-interest, that epitomizes the worst of late 20th-century identity politics. That kind of question has ruined more potentially successful activist organizations, academic conferences, college seminars, and political movements than all of the agents provocateurs J. Edgar Hoover could have imagined in his soggiest of wet dreams. And it will ruin the Democrats as well if we let it.
One last thing: If it seems that right now the people most insistently posing this unfortunate question are feminists, that’s simply because Hillary Clinton is losing. If Obama were losing, you can be sure you would hear similar carping from racial activists. (Close your eyes, and you can almost hear it now: “The white power structure will always protect its own in the end. …” “Race is still the greatest oppressive force. …” etc., etc.)
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[by Rich Ford]
Diane,
Here's a take on Snyder and words left unsaid: Justices Roberts' and Alito's position in Snyder is perfectly consistent with a strict and rigorous colorblindness interpretation of the equal protection clause-- i.e. the same position they both adopted last term in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle. The equal protection clause is now as likely, if not more likely, to block race conscious efforts to remedy racial injustice as it is to block racial discrimination as conventionally understood. And so ironically, making it difficult to establish an equal protection violation-- once a conservative position--may soon be in the way of conservative efforts to reverse and prohibit race conscious remedial policies. So, if the Court can parse the record for evidence of discrimination in preemptory strikes can it also, say, parse the record for evidence of race consciousness in a selective university's admissions decisions or a local government's decision to award a contract to a minority owned business? This isn't to say their positions were cynical and strategic, but Supreme Court Justices do decide cases with weight of precedent in mind. I'm just suggesting that the ideological terrain of equal protection jurisprudence is trickier than it once was and it may be that we're simply looking a reorientation of conservatism in Roberts and Alito. Could this explain why so much was left unsaid?
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I thought Obama’s speech on race was possibly the best thing any politician has said about race in decades (note the qualification: any politician. )
Putting Rev. Wrights’ comments in the context of understandable, if misdirected, black anger over real racial problems was a rhetorical master stroke, made even better by the fact that it rings absolutely true. And it was gutsy: it’s plausible that much of Obama’s support comes from white voters who hope Obama represents a free pass on racial questions. But Obama didn’t offer a free pass—he offered a demanding challenge: we must address racial inequities and try to understand our fellow citizens even when they offend us. I thought this subtle but pointed rejection of a staple of politically correct thinking (if anyone ”offends” me then the conversation has to stop until they take care of my hurt feelings) was spot on—if we’re to get anywhere in dealing with race, we’d better get not be so quick to take offense.
And comparing black anger and white resentment helps make the important point that we’re now locked into a race dialogue that consist primarily of scandal and reaction (“you’re a racist”—“no, you’re just playing the race card.”) that’s based in large part on the politics of umbrage and outrage—a competition for who’s been more wronged. It’s really encouraging that Obama is thinking of a way to move beyond this depressing stalemate rather than simply exploit it for short term advantage (compare his and Clinton’s back and forth on race and gender after S Carolina or, Mitt Romney’s defensive reaction to questions about his religious convictions).
It wasn’t perfect: I would have liked more candor on the tough questions—given the legacy of Jim Crow racism about which Obama spoke, what should we do? It’s true that some racial problems are really just part of larger social and economic problems: for instance, the problem of the black “super ghetto” is in large part a consequence of the emptying out of industrial cities during the 60s and 70s as a result of profound economic changes, the decline of manufacturing, etc. So in that sense poor blacks in the South Side of Chicago have common cause with unemployed Ohio steel workers. But it's too easy to say this and stop: for instance, neighborhood and school segregation—probably the greatest unaddressed legacy of Jim Crow--may well require race conscious solutions such as affirmative action and busing. It’s understandable that Obama doesn’t want to wander into those mine fields, but her won’t be able to avoid them for long if he’s serious about confronting racial inequity.
But these cavils aside, it was a brave and profound speech and best of all it suggests how Obama will use his considerable rhetorical skills, not just to inspire political support, but to lead on contentious issues.
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by Diane Marie Amann
Today the issue of race divided conservatives in America.
In Snyder v. Louisiana, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed defendant's capital conviction for murder of his estranged wife on the ground that the exclusion of a single potential juror -- an African-American student teacher -- violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution. The 7-2 judgment is remarkable. That's not only because the majority included 3 persons typically identified with the Court's conservative wing: Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., the author; Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.; and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy. Also remarkable is the brevity of the opinion. Attorneys who have litigated Batson motions, as I have, no doubt will remark on the quick certainty with which the Court concluded that there had been a sufficient showing that the state acted "in substantial part by discriminatory intent" (pp. 12-13) simply by comparing the treatment of the student teacher with that of 2 white veniremen.
The Court left unsaid what well may be a prime source of that quick certainty: Snyder had come to be known as the O.J. revenge case, a case in which the prosecution struck not 1 but all potential jurors of African-American heritage. It was a case in which the prosecution alluded in his penalty-phase closing to the then-recent acquittal of O.J. Simpson on charges of murdering his ex-wife, and suggested to jurors that they should not let the defendant before them "get away with" it. All 3 of the members of Louisiana's highest court who dissented from affirmance of the conviction cited this overall context -- as 1 put it, "this injection of racial issues, and the fact that the prejudicial
arguments were made to an all-white jury" (942 So.2d 484, 501) -- as evidence that exclusions of potential jurors were racially motivated.
The U.S. Supreme Court is to be commended for what it did in Snyder. But on this day when America ponders Sen. Barack Obama's profound unmasking of the issue of race, it seems proper to question the decision of the Court to leave so much unsaid.
(prior Convictions posts on Obama's speech here and here)