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I'll get back to the substance of our legal debate on presidential authority in a sec, but first a response to Marty's two more general points.
Does anyone care what the Somalia air strikes tell us about the current legal status of the "war on terror"? Doesn't look like it, Marty says. Quite right, Marty. Though I'm wondering if/whether the story would've played differently if all eyes hadn't been riveted to the rather gripping Democratic primary battle right here in the territorial United States.
But even if it weren't for the availability of better blog fodder elsewhere, Marty asks, does anyone think law has anything to do with any question of war, foreign affairs, and/or military force? Great, and big, question. My quick take: Folks often don't, but they should. There are all kinds of reasons why there are differences between the laws governing, say, the military and the laws governing, say, health care. But a country of laws is a country of laws. I've never been able to see why it seems so easy for so many to see security as something altogether outside that framework. In any case, the law in, about, and of war has been with us for a long time. And as I've noted elsewhere, it has more than once in our history been the military at the forefront of making sure it's here to stay.
Back to Somalia. I'm confident Marty is right that the current administration (and likely most other executives) would assert that the president has the constitutional power to pursue a strike like this without going to Congress for prior authorization first. But what I think this administration would say about its power here in particular is that this strike was the latest salvo in the ongoing "war on terror" (or whatever they call it these days). That is, they'd say it is part of the president's commander-in-chief power to direct the use of the armed forces in an ongoing conflict. So for them it's not, as Diane suggests, a question of what legal authorization is required to start a war (Somalia, after all, seemed to consent to this attack), but what legal limits there are on how a war is carried out. It's in that respect, I think, that what the AUMF says about "necessary and appropriate" matters. Whether or not the president needed to go to Congress in the first instance for authorization to pursue a global "war on terror," Congress has now spoken on that subject.
Most folks (I include myself) think the AUMF surely contemplated the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Did it also contemplate, say, targeted killing in Somalia in 2008? Because Diane and I agree the law of war might shed some light on the scope of Congress' thinking here. I'd be interested to know whether jus in bello (the law during war, like the Geneva Conventions) would put this within the bounds of conduct in this case (assuming, Diane, that we're in the administration's particular world of war).
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In
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), a majority of the Supreme Court reaffirmed that in making reference to terms that are part and parcel of the international laws respecting the conduct of war
—to cite the Latin phrase still current,
jus in bello—Congress intended courts to look to that body of law in interpreting the statutory terms.
In considering whether the AUMF allows strikes against Somalia, the pertinent international laws concern not the conduct of war but the act of going to war; that is
, jus ad bellum. Since the adoption of the
U.N. Charter in 1945, that law renders a nation-state's use of force illegal, as a matter of international law, unless it is undertaken with the approval of the
U.N. Security Council. The charter permits only one exception, set forth in Article 51:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Presumably, the United States would argue that the Somalia strikes are permissible as exercises of "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence." But that claim would not end the story. Do the words that follow—"if an armed attack occurs"—mean that the attack already must have occurred, and if so, do the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, attributed to an al-Qaida leader then in Afghanistan, not Somalia, so satisfy this requirement that the United States may go after a different leader in a different country, nearly seven years after that other attack?
Let's assume, in the alternative, that the United States may attack before it is attacked to defend itself before it is so disabled that it cannot engage in self-defense. This seems reasonable; after all, the law generally allows a person who has a gun pointed at her to shoot first and not to wait for the assailant to shoot her before she may act to defend herself. Indeed, this reasoning is enshrined in international law as "anticipatory self-defense," a concept established more than 170 years ago during the
Caroline incident between the United States and Britain.
Accepting "anticipatory self-defense" as law does not end the inquiry, however. The exchange of letters that ended the
Caroline dispute indicate conditions upon this right
—conditions of "necessity" and "proportionality" that may be found in other doctrines relating to the use of force, such as the old doctrine of
reprisal, as our colleague, Notre Dame Law Professor
Mary Ellen O'Connell, explains
here. Within those two terms may be found a rule that use of force in self-defense must be genuinely necessary, that the threat must be imminent, that there must be no opportunity for deliberation or negotiation, and further that the use of force must be proportionate to the threat, so that any permissible strike goes after only the person(s) or camp(s) that are a menace, and avoids as much as possible any damage to any innocent person or any uninvolved item of property.
The U.S. Congress ought to be presumed to understand these well-settled principles—principles that derive from a dispute involving the United States itself. Thus its decision explicitly to require in the AUMF use of force be both "necessary" and "appropriate"—words nearly identical to the international law doctrine's "necessity" and "proportionate"—ought to be understood as limiting post-9/11 use of force to that which meets these requirements.
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