Convictions: Slate's blog on legal issues

The Logic of Indefinite Dentention: How All the World's Militants Are Connected to the 9/11 Attacks

Can the president indefinitely detain someone who has no connection to al-Qaida and who has not engaged in any belligerent acts against the United States?

Last week, an ideologically diverse panel (Judges Sentelle, Garland and Griffith) of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that the Bush administration had not established a sufficient foundation for its indefinite military detention of Huzaifa Parhat, who has been imprisoned at Guantanamo for more than six years. Much of the evidence that the court considered is classified, and therefore the court decided that it would publicly release only a redacted version of its opinion. The court released that redacted version on Monday.

Even in its redacted form, this extraordinarily careful and detailed opinion, authored by Judge Garland and joined in full by both of his more conservative colleagues, offers a stark depiction of the most significant problems with the Bush administration's detention policy-namely, that the military has relied upon a breathtakingly broad standard of who can be detained, and then has made particular detention decisions based on very speculative and thin evidence, even under that broad standard. The detention policy in practice, in other words, has been much more indiscriminate than any authority Congress afforded the president in the conflict against al-Qaida.

Within a week after the attacks of Sept. 11, Congress authorized the president to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons."

The administration argues that this Authorization for Use of Military Force authorizes the indefinite detention of Parhat, and several similarly situated detainees, at Guantanamo.

Now, it is undisputed that Parhat had nothing to do with the attacks of 9/11. Indeed, there is no contention that Parhat has ever participated in, or planned, or even supported, any hostile action against the United States or its allies. It is also undisputed that Parhat is not part of any nation or organization that "planned, authorized, committed, or aided" those attacks. In particular, it is undisputed that he is not a member of al-Qaida or of the Taliban. Indeed, the Pentagon's Combatant Status Review Tribunal did not even find him to be "an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaida forces." And the CSRT expressly found that he did not engage in hostilities against the United States or the Northern Alliance (an Afghani coalition partner of the United States).

So, who is Parhat, then, and what did he do to warrant indefinite detention at GTMO? He is a Chinese citizen of Uighur heritage (pronounced weegur). The Uighurs hail from the far-western Chinese province of Xinjiang, or East Turkistan, and they claim to have been systematically subjected to "oppression and torture" by the Chinese Government, including "harassment, forced abortions for more than two children, high taxes, the taking away of land, and the banishing of educated people to remote areas." In response to this treatment, Parhat fled China in early 2001, arriving at a Uighur camp in Afghanistan in June 2001. Parhat claims that he went to Afghanistan solely to join the resistance against China, and that he regarded China alone-not the United States-as his enemy.

In mid-October 2001, U.S. aerial strikes destroyed the Afghan camp, after which Parhat and 17 other unarmed Uighurs traveled to Pakistan. Two months later, local villagers handed the Uighurs over to Pakistani officials, who in turn delivered them to the U.S. military. In June 2002, the United States transferred Parhat to the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where he has remained imprisoned for more than six years.

In light of all this-and the utter lack of any connection between Parhat and any hostilities against the United States (let alone the 9/11 attacks)-what is the possible theory under which the Pentagon has purported to detain Parhat for the better half of a decade (with no end in sight)?

Find out at Balkinization. 

The War in Somalia

Well, Phil, two days out from the latest account of another U.S. missile strike in Somalia, and judging from the relative silence on the blogs, I take it pretty much everyone agrees with you that the president's authority for the strike falls within the "necessary and appropriate" force Congress intended in its September 2001 authorization to use military force (AUMF) against al-Qaida. Indeed, I'd bet that's what a U.S. court would have to say about it in the unlikely event it ever came up, even if it turned out this guy turned out not to be associated with al-Qaida after all. Not necessarily a happy picture, but I'm guessing where things stand under the current state of domestic law.

But that should hardly be the end of the discussion. Whatever force is "necessary and appropriate" is a troublingly vague notion for understanding the limits on what kind of power Congress actually wanted to delegate the president in a global campaign against the people, organizations, or groups who aided the attacks of 9/11.  Most folks seemed to think the AUMF didn't extend to giving the president the authority to engage in domestic wiretapping without a warrant (contrary to the administration's suggestion). The Supreme Court bought that the AUMF did extend to cover some U.S. detention operations, at least to detain those picked up by U.S. military on the battlefield in Afghanistan. But until Congress gets a bit more specific, I'm guessing we'll be having this debate for a while (with the executive's position getting weaker the farther in time we get from 9/11).

In any case, the legality of the strike under the AUMF is only part of the question. There's also the pesky issue of whether it's a law-of-war problem to target an individual who, at the moment of attack at least, appears to have been minding his own business, far from any traditional field of "armed conflict." If we find out someone's been contributing money to an organization that turns out to be affiliated with an organization we've identified as terrorist, could we bomb them in their sleep at anytime, anywhere they are in the world? I've no beef with those who say concepts like "armed conflict" and "direct participation in hostilities" aren't the most clearly defined aspects of the law of war. But even if we give the administration the benefit of the doubt as operating within the "necessary and proper" boundaries of congressional authorization under U.S. law, what exactly is the limiting principle they have in mind under the law of war? And to take it a final step, if it's not quite legal under the law of war, can it really be part of the "appropriate" force Congress had in mind? At least some on the Supreme Court have recognized in recent cases that this kind of international law can and should inform the interpretation of statutory mandates in the area. 

Marty, Diane—any enlightenment to shed?

Defining al-Qaida and the Authorization for the Use of Military Force

A predawn American cruise-missile strike against the central Somalia town of Dhusamareb killed between 10 and 30 persons today. Military officials said publicly that the target was "a known al-Qaida target." Confidentially, military officials told the New York Times that the target was Aden Hashi Ayro, reportedly one of al-Qaida's top operatives in Africa and the leader of an Islamist group in Somalia called the Shebab.

On a listserv this morning, one expert on armed conflict and international law questioned whether this strike portended yet another broadening September 2001 "authorization for the use of military force." I think it does, and I'm at a loss to articulate any limiting principle on the geographic, spatial, temporal, or political scope of this nation's military efforts against al-Qaida. 

I'm hardly the first to say it, but this highlights an important contrast between wars against states and wars against entities like al-Qaida. With the former, there is a limiting principle on the conflict. If the state ceases to be (such as Germany or Japan at the end of WWII), the war does, too. With the latter, there seems to be no limit. As al-Qaida evolves, morphs, grows, and franchises itself, so does the war, and so does any authorization for the use of force that is tied to the definition of al-Qaida.