Monday, May 19, 2008 - Posts
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I'll get to Phil's McCain-Obama-and-the-courts question in a sec. But I first have to say that while I'm generally a big fan of David Savage's at the L.A. Times, there are parts of this latest piece that sound like they could've been written by Rush Limbaugh.
The McCain-Obama comments reflect a long-standing divide between conservatives and liberals on the role of the courts. Reduced to the simplest terms, conservatives say judges should follow the law, and liberals say they should ensure that justice is done.
Ugh. I appreciate the need to get this complex, age-old debate boiled down to within a journalistic word limit, but there's gotta be a better way. Of course both conservatives and liberals say judges should follow the law. Beyond that, and within the descriptive limits of the stereotyped terms, "conservatives" say that "following the law" means using the fewest possible interpretive clues to figure out what the law means (for statutes, text only; for the Constitution, at best, a guess at what the framers meant in 1789), and as a matter of practice they fill in any remaining areas of uncertainty (of which there are inevitably some in some cases) with broad ideological preferences—about the power of the government, the role of the courts, and the kind of society in which they want to live. "Liberals" believe "following the law" means looking to as many interpretive clues as might reasonably shed light on the text (legislative or other kinds of history, text and textual context, the purpose of the document, etc.). As a matter of practice, they, too, may fill in remaining areas of uncertainty with an equal and opposite set of broad baseline principles, including the principle that judges get to say what the law means.
There's no way around the problem of laws that are sometimes unclear. I think on balance the "liberal" approach to interpretation has a better chance at preserving the idea of "law" as having some sensible and identifiable meaning. But the reality also remains that vast swaths of the law are clear for both liberals and conservatives; that's why, among other things, not every dispute in the United States ends up in court. For those that do, there's also no way around the reality that judges will have baseline structural preferences and preferences about what they think "justice" would require in any given case. But I wouldn't deny (as many conservatives and some liberals do) that such preferences can matter, at least at the margins of judicial decision-making. That's why judges are politically appointed. That's why presidential appointments matter.
So what can we glean about McCain and Obama so far? I'd say that apart from some reassurance that the one reflects most conservative baseline assumptions, and that the other reflects most liberal baseline assumptions, not much. But to my colleagues who've watched this longer than I, I'd be pleased to stand corrected here.
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Professor Weisberg's thoughtful post responding to Megyn Kelly of The O'Reilly Factor on the Fox News Channel nicely illustrates an overlooked means by which Sen. Obama—seeking as our next president to build bridges and unbuild walls (disclosure: I endorsed the senator and give him lots of advice which I hope is helpful to him)—might defuse some of the acrimony that exists surrounding topics such as abortion and same-sex marriage.
While it was Kelly's thesis that it is activist and not in keeping with principles of federalism for state judges to trump the people, it was professor Weisberg's nice counterpoint that as in many claims of activism, whether one favors the state court over the people (Gov. Schwarzenegger's position in opposition to an anticipated November initiative that would overturn the same-sex marriage case) or vice versa depends on whose ox is being gored. It is not really possible to say that one is more in keeping with federalism than another.
But that is not to say that the distinction between the state and the people is unimportant. The phrasing in the 10th Amendment speaks of the "reserved [unenumerated power] to the states respectively, or to the people" for a reason. The phraseology illustrates that while the concept of federalism is typically associated with what is federal (viz. national) vs. what is local, the separate reservation in the 10th Amendment allows the people of a state to deny a delegation of their unenumerated reserved power to their state legislature. Indeed, the people may decide that no government entity—including themselves by initiative or referendum—should take a position on a given subject that has been so reserved.
This avenue for complete neutrality presents a possible common ground to defuse some of the rancor over abortion and same-sex marriage. Theoretically, it would be possible to declare both subjects as presently beyond the competence of government.
The California Supreme Court catches a bit of a glimmer of the potential for using neutrality as a reconciling device when it suggests that the California assembly might decide not to ascribe the sacred word marriage to any state license whether given to a heterosexual or homosexual couple. Rather, California state licenses might be called "civil unions" or "enduring unions," with the sacred affirmation of marriage being entirely reserved to nongovernmental actors to allocate in accordance with particular their religious traditions. Were California to follow that course, religious bodies would presumably then have less basis to argue that the civil law was affirming or honoring a relationship that cuts deeply against the revealed beliefs of those religions.
The same could be true with regard to abortion. Here, the formulation would mean that if Roe were overturned, the matter would not be returned to the states or to the people in their initiative/referenda legislative capacity but would be reserved to the people solely within their own church and family structures. It would be within those nongovernmental communities that the people would decide whether abortion is a matter of individual liberty or the taking of human life. Obviously, as a practical matter, this would leave the abortion decision to a woman and her doctor as Roe itself does, but critically, the law would not then be giving any civil-law approval or constitutional edge favoring one side over the other.
Would such reallocation of authority to the people outside of government be more accommodating of those who presently raise religious objection to abortion? Obviously, it does not put the full force of law behind stopping or curtailing the practice, but then it does not endorse it, either. The law would be entirely silent, leaving the people in their individually and voluntarily chosen communities to decide matters for themselves in accordance with their respective beliefs. That this would not be mere window dressing may be illustrated in the Catholic Church's own teaching, which, of course, is strongly against abortion. While the most preferred Catholic position is a construction of the Constitution that affirms the unalienable right to life for all persons from conception onward in the Declaration of Independence, the specific instruction of the church merely calls for the practice not to be "recognized and respected by civil society and the political authority," and admonishes its own believers to not exercise their free will to procure (or aid the procurement) of abortion.
The possibility of reserving sensitive questions over which the culture is deeply divided, and indeed, with respect to which there is insufficient consensus to justify either a positive law or judicial determination has more salience and potential for bridging even profound disagreement than the obscure 1791 formulation of states rights in the 10th Amendment may at first reveal.
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Robert Weisberg, of Stanford Law School, offers a guest post:
Dahlia Lithwick’s latest column about the California marriage decision shows how the availability of the "activism” trope is more than the intelligence (or other virtues like rationality, sanity, or honesty) of those decrying it can bear. I would add a twist: the conflation of concerns about separation of powers and federalism. On the Bill O’Reilly show the night of the decision, Fox New jurisprude Megyn Kelly first offered a fairly generic denunciation of the decision as matter of constitutional jurisprudence. Then, when asked (by O’Reilly!) whether the decision at least merited respect under the principle of states’ rights (O’Reilly also noted that the state court was mostly Republican appointees), Kelly got agitated and fumed that states’ rights are not about the rights of state judges but the rights of the people. Whatever the mens rea of Ms. Kelly’s rant (see challenged virtues, above), it wonderfully illustrates the power and plasticity of the activism trope. And the focus on California is especially ironic. Here in the Golden State we have a ruling that may last just a few months, given the voters’ penchant for—indeed their addiction to—direct democracy.
We do have an elected legislature here, but California voters love to do the legislative work themselves (both the restoration of the death penalty in the 1970s and the three-strikes law in the 1990s were passed the old-fashioned way in Sacramento but then got enhanced via initiative within one year), and the 50 percent rule applies to initiatives that change the Constitution as well. It is a state where the people seem quite willing to kick Supreme Court justices out of office (see Bird, Reynoso, Grodin over the death penalty in 1986) and, of course, find it easy to kick out a governor for no particular reason except dislike and mild buyers’ remorse. So in the separation-of-powers arena, the fourth branch of self-declared people’s sentiment seems quite able to take care of itself.
Of course, we could also put the problem with this reading of states’ rights in more abstract terms, noting, for example, that the presence of both the Ninth and 10th Amendments in the federal Bill of Rights suggests that in 1791 there was a big difference seen between the autonomy of states and at least one, admittedly vague, version of a residual power of the people. The venerable provenance of federalism in the 18th century is a strange bedfellow to a concern over the phenomenon of judicial review—which was hardly on the minds of the Framers, especially at the state level.
In any event, imagine that the D.C. gun ban had been enacted in a state; the U.S. Supreme Court had upheld it on broad collective rights grounds (contra the likely outcome in Heller), and the state Supreme Court had then struck it down as a violation of the state’s right-to-bear-arms clause: Would the chance of that decision being denounced as activist by pro-gun groups have exceeded zero, or the chance of those groups forbearing from proclaiming it as a vindication of states’ rights less than 100 percent?
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David Savage writes in today's Los Angeles Times about the deep divide between the Obama and McCain camps over what kind of judges should be appointed to serve on federal courts, including the Supreme Court. Savage boils down the issue to this:
Sen. McCain (R-Ariz.), in a speech two weeks ago, echoed the views of conservatives who say "judicial activism" is the central problem facing the judiciary. He called it the "common and systematic abuse ... by an elite group ... we entrust with judicial power." On Thursday, he criticized the California Supreme Court for giving gays and lesbians the right to marry, saying he doesn't "believe judges should be making these decisions."
Sen. Obama (D-Ill.) said he was most concerned about a conservative court that tilted to the side of "the powerful against the powerless," and to corporations and the government against individuals. "What's truly elitist is to appoint judges who will protect the powerful and leave ordinary Americans to fend for themselves," he said in response to McCain.
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The McCain-Obama comments reflect a long-standing divide between conservatives and liberals on the role of the courts. Reduced to the simplest terms, conservatives say judges should follow the law, and liberals say they should ensure that justice is done.
The McCain campaign is sure to make this a major issue in its campaign because this issue plays well before the conservative base. The tried-and-true Rove formula calls for running on God, gays, and guns, and all three issues strongly correlate with the appointment of conservative judges. Given the California Supreme Court decision last week on gay marriage, the current U.S. Supreme Court case on gun control, and continuing skirmishes over the role of God in government and public life, the GOP will likely turn to this page in the playbook once again. Such is the conclusion of Jeff Toobin in this week's New Yorker: "McCain plans to continue, and perhaps even accelerate, George W. Bush’s conservative counter-revolution at the Supreme Court."
So what about the Democrats? (Disclosure: I support the Obama campaign and have advised it on defense and veterans issues.) I think there may be an opportunity here. Sen. John McCain is an honorable public servant and war hero with great appeal to moderates and independents. To counter that, the Democratic party needs to remind voters that a McCain administration will appoint staunchly Republican judges of the type appointed during the last three Republican administrations. This issue should energize the Democrat base, and it should also give moderates pause before they side with McCain.
It's like the old quip my grandfather used to tell me: "There are only two kinds of judges: Republicans and Democrats." Whom do you want on the bench?
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