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Posted
Monday, April 14, 2008 5:47 PM
| By
Diane Marie Amann
I tend to agree with Kenji that the overt
mixing
of poetry and law can be ill-advised: adding the former often will
not enhance analysis in the latter. Yet the deployment of poetry – or any
literary reference, for that matter – serves to reveal something about the
legal writer who deploys it. Justice Harry A.
Blackmun's homage to Casey
at the Bat, no less than Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist's tribute to
Barbara Frietchie in the 1st flag-burning case, told much about each
author's approach to the subject matter at bar. Some observers may not welcome
what is revealed; these 2 examples, for instance, might be seen as evidence that
a Justice lacked detachment and thus engaged in less than rational reasoning.
(That conclusion is not inevitable – consider those studies that refute the
commonly held assumption that emotion clouds jurors' judgment.) Adding
literature to law may serve, moreover, to make more humanly accessible a process
seldom understood by those humans whom it most affects.
Kenji's right, too, that the
best
law poetry may be those lines that we commit to memory not because of some
intentionally catchy cadence, but rather because their simplicity belies a
deeper social meaning. The warnings set forth in
Miranda
v. Arizona surely qualify. Another nominee jumps to mind. It is the
essence of another opinion by Chief Justice Earl Warren, a line on which
Brown v. Board of
Education and all its progeny depend. If I may be indulged a bit of
verse, it is:
Separate
educational facilities
are
inherently unequal.
As for
W., the
verbal contributions that Kenji cites link this President with another
W. besides Shakespeare. To this ear, the inestimable "
misunderestimate"
inevitably recalls "
normalcy,"
the once-abnormal word for which America owes a debt to President
Warren G.
Harding.
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