Cybersecurity and Cyberwar excerpt: What real pirates can teach us.

What Can (Real) Pirates Teach Us About Cybersecurity?

What Can (Real) Pirates Teach Us About Cybersecurity?

The citizen’s guide to the future.
Jan. 1 2014 11:45 PM

Shiver My Interwebs

What can (real) pirates teach us about cybersecurity?

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Today, there are modern cyber equivalents to these pirate havens and markets. And much like the pirate-friendly harbors of old, a substantial portion of those companies and states that give cybercrime a legal free pass are known. These range from known malware and other cyber black marketplaces to the 50 Internet service providers that account for around half of all infected machines worldwide. Without the support of these havens and networks, online criminal enterprises would find it harder to practice their illegal action, which not only would clean the cyber seas, but also make it easier to identify and defend against the more serious attacks on infrastructure and the like.

Melissa Hathaway, who led the White House’s policy team on cyberspace issues, has talked about this as a strategy to “ ‘drain the swamp’ of malicious cyber activity and tilt the playing field [back] in our favor.” Much as with piracy at sea, some of the efforts might be taken as part of a cooperative global effort, while other actions could be taken on a unilateral basis, such as operations to disrupt or destroy the markets where hacker tools are traded, and tracking and targeting the assets of attackers themselves.

This links to the second strategy, the building of a network of treaties and norms, something explored in a following section. Fleury’s attack launched a golden age of piracy that was great for the pirates but not everyone else, including the governments of the time. Pirates, who had been tolerated at the individual level, began to be seen as general threats to economic prosperity. In turn, privateers, who had been viewed as useful tools, turned into the bureaucratic rivals of the formal navies being built up in these states (here again, akin to how patriotic hackers lose their shine when states build out more of their own formal cyber military units). As Janice Thompson recounts in her seminal study of why the pirate trade ended, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns, maritime hijackers (and their state-approved counterparts) became marginalized as nations’ values changed and they saw the need to assert greater power and control.


Soon a webwork of agreements was established that set a general principle of open trade across the high seas. The agreements, some bilateral and others multilateral, also asserted that maritime sovereignty would only be respected when a nation took responsibility for any attacks that emanated from within its borders. Slowly, but surely, they paved the way toward a global code of conduct. By 1856, 42 nations agreed to the Declaration of Paris, which abolished privateering and formally turned pirates from accepted actors into international pariahs to be pursued by all the world’s major powers.

The cyber parallel today, again, is that all netizens have a shared global expectation of freedom of action on the Internet, particularly online trade, just as it is ensured on the open ocean. If you knowingly host or abet maritime pirates or privateers, their actions reflect back on you. The same should be true online. Building those norms will motivate both states and companies to keep a better check on individual hackers and criminals (the pirate equivalent). It will also weaken the value of outsourcing bad action to patriotic hackers (the latter-day privateers).

In addition to encouraging new accountability, this approach also offers opportunities for what are known as “confidence-building measures,” where two states that don’t get along can find ways to work together and build trust. After the War of 1812, for example, the British Royal Navy and nascent U.S. Navy constantly prepared for hostilities against each other, which made sense since they had just fought two outright wars. But as the network of norms began to spread, they also began to cooperate in anti-piracy and anti-slavery campaigns. That cooperation did more than underscore global norms: It built familiarity and trust between the two forces and helped mitigate the danger of military conflict during several crises. Similarly, today the United States and China are and will certainly continue to bolster their own cyber military capabilities. But like the Royal Navy and new American Navy back in the 1800s, this should not be a barrier to building cooperation. Both countries, for instance, could go after what the Chinese call “double crimes,” those actions in cyberspace that both nations recognize as illegal.

The lesson here is that the world is a better place with commerce and communication made safe and freewheeling pirates and privateers brought under control. Indeed, the period was never all that good even for the pirates. Jean Fleury made away with all that Aztec gold, but he should have quit while he was ahead. Just five years after the ultimate pirate score, he was caught by the Spanish on another raiding expedition and hanged.

Peter W. Singer is director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at the Brookings Institution.

Allan Friedman is a visiting scholar at the Cyber Security Policy Research Institute, School of Engineering and Applied Sciences at George Washington University.