Mosul’s collapse is Nouri al-Maliki’s fault: Iraq’s prime minister failed to rule inclusively.

Why the Fall of Mosul Isn’t America’s Fault

Why the Fall of Mosul Isn’t America’s Fault

Military analysis.
June 11 2014 5:18 PM

After Mosul

If jihadists control Iraq, blame Nouri al-Maliki, not the United States.

Civilian children stand next to a burnt vehicle during clashes between Iraqi security forces and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul, on June 10, 2014.

Photo by Reuters/Stringer.

The collapse of Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, has little to do with the withdrawal of American troops and everything to do with the political failure of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

Fred Kaplan Fred Kaplan

As the U.S. pullout began under the terms of a treaty signed in 2008 by then-President George W. Bush, Maliki, the leader of a Shiite political party, promised to run a more inclusive government—to bring more Sunnis into the ministries, to bring more Sunnis from the Sons of Iraq militia into the national army, to settle property disputes in Kirkuk, to negotiate a formula on sharing oil revenue with Sunni districts, and much more.

Maliki has since backpedaled on all of these commitments and has pursued policies designed to strengthen Shiites and marginalize Sunnis. That has led to the resurgence of sectarian violence in the past few years. The Sunnis, finding themselves excluded from the political process, have taken up arms as the route to power. In the process, they have formed alliances with Sunni jihadist groups—such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, which has seized not just Mosul but much of northern Iraq—on the principle that the enemy of their enemy is their friend.


Something like this has happened before. Between 2005 and 2006, jihadists who called themselves al-Qaida in Iraq, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, took control of Anbar province, in the western part of the country, by playing on the population’s fear of the anti-Sunni ethnic-cleansing campaigns launched by Maliki’s army.* ISIS, an offshoot of Zarqawi’s organization, is following the same handbook, picking up support from one of northern Iraq’s leading Sunni militias, Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqah al-Naqshbandia, or JRTN. That is a risky move for a group like JRTN, which shares neither the millenarian goals nor the extremely violent tactics of ISIS (which, it’s worth noting, was expelled from al-Qaida because even current al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri considered the group too violent). But JRTN’s leaders have accepted the risk for now to advance their own goal of overthrowing Maliki. (They boast that they have been fighting alongside ISIS, but disavow involvement in the killing of civilians.)

The fall of Mosul is particularly poignant because that was the city where peace and prosperity seemed most likely in the early days of the American occupation. David Petraeus, then the three-star general who commanded the 101st Airborne Division, applied his theory of counterinsurgency to all of Nineveh province, of which Mosul was the capital. And, for a while anyway, it worked.

While most U.S. commanders in post-Hussein Iraq were ordering their soldiers to bust down doors and arrest or shoot all men who seemed to be insurgents, Petraeus and his team took steps to create a government. Using funds pilfered from Saddam Hussein’s coffers, they vetted candidates for a citywide election (selecting leaders from all factions and tribes), started up newspapers and TV stations, coordinated fuel shipments from Turkey, and reopened businesses, communication lines, and the university. This game plan was classic “nation-building,” a phrase anathema to most Army generals and the secretary of defense at the time, Donald Rumsfeld. The idea was not to make the people of Mosul love America, but rather to make them feel invested in the future of the new Iraq.

Petraeus’ campaign wasn’t entirely about civil affairs. Mosul was home to many of Hussein’s top officers and, in the wake of his downfall, a hotbed of emerging Sunni militias, who would wage a war of resistance against both the Shiite government and the American occupiers. Petraeus made remarkable progress in turning Mosul around, but toward the end of his yearlong tour of duty, protesters began to riot, Petraeus responded by setting up a counterterrorist operation, and the conflict turned more violent. Then he and 101st Airborne (along with all 120,000 of the American troops who’d taken part in the invasion) were ordered home. In Mosul, his division was replaced by a single brigade, with one-third the number of troops and a commander who had no interest in what Petraeus had been doing and instead reverted to what most commanders were doing—raiding, arresting, and shooting men that they thought might be bad guys—thus fueling the insurgency.

A year later another commander came in and, having studied Petraeus’ playbook, restored order to some extent. Similar operations were undertaken in other areas of Iraq, most notably Tal Afar and Anbar province. (I describe this effort more fully in my book The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War.)