Whether Bashar al-Assad falls or not, the fighting in Syria is likely to persist for a long time.

Why Syria Will Keep Burning

Why Syria Will Keep Burning

Military analysis.
July 20 2012 5:56 PM

The Syrian Endgame

There are no guarantees. But in almost every scenario, the violence will persist.

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Most nervous are the Shiite leaders of Iran. For many years, Syria has served as the main funnel through which Iran has expanded its regional influence, not least by pouring money and weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon. For that reason, early on in his presidency, Barack Obama tried to lure Assad away from Iran through diplomatic means; various Sunni Arab leaders have made similar overtures, all to no avail. Now, if Assad is toppled, his successors—whoever they might be—are unlikely to remain Iran’s lackeys. In other words, the effect will be what Obama and the Sunnis had aimed for: the weakening and isolation of Iran. With one important exception: This new Syria, whatever else it might be, is likely to be seething with persistent violence.

In one sense, the Israeli government would be happy to see Assad go; he and his father before him have long declared Syria to be at war with Israel. In another sense, though, the Golan has been fairly stable in recent years: Few Israelis have worried about a Syrian invasion from the north, and, judging from Assad’s redeployment of all his troops from the Golan to his own cities, he isn’t much worried about an Israeli invasion from the south.

Israelis do have this worry, though: If Syria tumbles into anarchy, if no new government can be formed, or if the new government isn’t strong enough to contain (or kick out) the smattering of jihadists who have crossed into the country to exploit the current chaos, the Golan Heights could turn into a festering wound of instability and a haven for terrorists, like southern Lebanon during its long civil war in the 1980s.


What can the United States do to advance the rebels’ cause and help stabilize their rule when they form a new government? There really isn’t much we (or any other outside power) can do, beyond what we seem to be doing already (and it’s a good guess that the New York Times article on the CIA’s efforts just begins to skim the extent of those measures). The neocons who call for an American invasion of Syria seem already to have forgotten the brutal lessons of the last 10 years of war. (Toppling Assad? No problem, with one arm tied behind our back. Imposing order and democracy afterward? Another matter entirely.) Imposing a “no-fly rule” on Assad’s regime, as some have suggested, is the stuff of cliché: Assad isn’t doing much shelling from the air; and if he started doing so, any airplane we’d shoot down would probably land on civilians in cities.

Assuming Assad keeps resisting a settlement (as seems likely), the best course of action is to continue condemning his actions, support the rebels in a low-key way (doing a lot overtly might be ineffective, as well as harmful to the rebels’ long-term political prospects and a confirmation in many eyes of Assad’s claim that the rebels are western agents), and—if they do win the battle—help them, to the extent they want our help, in the aftermath.

One thing we definitely should not do is to inflate this crisis into something much vaster than warranted. Michael Ignatieff has a batty essay in the latest New York Review of Books arguing that the Syrian civil war has mutated into “a proxy war between the Great Powers,” an epochal, transformative event in which a “loose alliance of struggling capitalist democracies now finds itself face to face with two authoritarian despotisms—Russia and China—something new in the annals of political science.”

First, Russia and China have engaged in outrageous behavior, supplying Assad with arms and vetoing three U.N. resolutions calling for sanctions. But the notion that this marks “something new” is a head-scratcher. The United States is far from an innocent in the business of bolstering hideous tyrants for the sake of some national interest, however dubiously contrived.

Second, a “proxy war” means a war between rival nations, fought on some third party’s territory in order to minimize the destruction. Vietnam was a proxy war; Nicaragua was a proxy war. (Or at least the superpowers saw them as such; the Vietnamese and Nicaraguans had a different viewpoint.) America is not at war with Russia or China. If it were, Syria would be unlikely terrain for such a contest: None of the “Great Powers” (a quaint term in this polycentric, if not a-centric, world) is sending troops or anything more potent than fairly small arms. The conflict could escalate into something more serious. One job of diplomats is to keep it from doing so, not to indulge in fantasies reeking of nostalgia for Cold War gun-boating and childhood board games of Risk.