What’s Obama’s Nuclear Endgame?
Obama told Medvedev that he’ll have more “flexibility” to deal with nukes after November. What could he possibly mean?
EPA/Ekaterina Shtukina/Ria Novosti/Kremlin.
Much fuss has been stirred over President Obama’s open-mic remark to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev that he’ll have more “space” and “flexibility” to negotiate the dispute over missile defense after he’s reelected.
Several Republicans have charged that his remark reflects a secret plan to “sell out” the U.S. missile-defense program and thus “capitulate” to the Russians (who, Mitt Romney seems to believe, are still “our No. 1 geopolitical foe”).
Obama has since explained that he merely meant that the issue’s “technical aspects” are too “complicated” to resolve in the heat of an election year—as this trumped-up controversy shows.
What to make of this kerfuffle? Obama’s explanation, while clearly true, seems a little bit disingenuous. But the Republicans’ accusations, while theoretical, are totally out of whack with reality on several levels.
It’s obvious that presidents have more flexibility when they’re no longer facing another election. The question is, what are they likely to do with it? Newt Gingrich has thundered that Obama will make war on the Catholic Church from the first day of his second term. This, of course, is sheer lunacy. But is there anything to the prediction that Obama will set out to destroy missile defense?
If there is, he has a funny way of going about it. The military budget he submitted to Congress last month cuts the allotment for a lot of high-profile weapons projects—but it requests $9.7 billion for missile defense (with forecasts of $47.4 billion over the next five years). In other words, no cut at all.
And it’s not just the money. One item on the agenda at the NATO summit in Chicago this May is the announcement that the missile-defense system will have achieved “interim capability”—which is to say that, to a limited extent, it’s right on schedule. The USS Monterrey, the first Aegis-class cruiser designed to carry a ballistic-missile-defense system, will in fact be carrying SM-3 interceptor missiles in the Mediterranean. At the same time, as agreed late last year, an early-warning radar system will be switched on at the Kurecik base in Turkey. Meanwhile, Spain has agreed to serve as the home port for four Aegis cruisers. Agreements have also been signed with Romania and Poland to serve as sites for land-based SM-3s in 2015; already, Polish and Romanian officers have been rotating in and out of a training base for operating the sites.
Now it’s true, Obama could junk all these accords after swearing the oath for his second term. They are executive actions, requiring no congressional approval. But why would he have gone to the trouble of spending all this money, redesigning all these ships, and arranging all these NATO agreements, if he was just going to scuttle them? It’s a lot to scuttle. If his real agenda all along were simply to cuddle up with the Russians, it would have made more sense not to build these projects and make these commitments in the first place; the cuddling wouldn’t seem such a conspicuous reversal.
Obama entered the White House a skeptic on missile defense, but after his first few months in office, for better or worse, he came around. First, the program in development was no longer Ronald Reagan’s “Star Wars” fantasy of a space-based missile shield; it had been whittled down to a more reality-based defense against limited nuclear attacks launched by rogue regimes or terrorists—a much more plausible mission scientifically. Second, tests of the SM-3, which is designed to shoot down short- to medium-range missiles, have been more successful than earlier generations of interceptors (though there’s still controversy over just how successful the tests have been).
In September 2009, Obama did abandon George W. Bush’s plan to deploy interceptors inside the Czech Republic and Poland, deciding instead to go with a “phased adaptive approach” to install the interceptors on ships at sea, with the possible option of putting some a few years later in Poland and Romania. This decision stemmed, in part, from Obama’s broader desire to “reset” U.S.-Russian relations, which Bush had left in deep disrepair. But it also stemmed from the Pentagon’s analysis that a sea-based system would be better; the interceptors would be less vulnerable to a preemptive strike, and, because ships are mobile, they could deal with attacks from a broader range of foes.
So what did Obama mean when he said he’d have more “flexibility” in his second term? Flexibility to do what? To get at this requires, first, an understanding of why the Russians are so nervous about the prospect of a U.S. (or NATO) missile-defense program so close to their border, in the heart of their former empire.
That second question almost answers itself. No weapon is purely defensive, not even one that’s designed to shoot down an offensive missile. Back in the darkest days of the Cold War, the superpowers maintained a durable peace because of nuclear deterrence: If one side launched a nuclear attack, the other would retaliate in kind. Victory in any meaningful sense was impossible. But if one side developed an effective ballistic-missile-defense system, it could launch a first strike and, when the other side retaliated with whatever weapons survived the attack, it could shoot most of them down. Victory was possible, at least on paper.
This scenario, of course, was loony. Even in the most optimistic scenarios, the “winning” side would lose at least 10 million people, and suffer hundreds of billions of dollars in damages, as a result of the retaliation. (As Gen. Buck Turgidson, the George C. Scott character, in Dr. Strangelove put it, “I’m not saying we won’t get our hair mussed up …”) But really (readers under the age of 30 or so will have to trust me on this), educated scholars and statesmen actually held forth on such scenarios, with straight faces and furrowed brows, not just in the depths of the Cold War but well into the 1990s.
It is definitely bizarre that the Russians seem to be obsessing over this scenario so many years later. After all, even George W. Bush’s plan envisioned a couple dozen interceptors in Eastern Europe. No way they could have neutralized the Russians’ arsenal of well over 1,000 ballistic-missile warheads.
This is all true, for now. But a Russian might wonder about the future. NATO’s plan calls for these interceptors to grow in number, and to expand in range and power. By 2020, an upgraded version of the SM-3 will have, at least on paper, the ability to shoot down not just short-range missiles but intercontinental-range models as well. And the interceptors in Poland and Romania, as well as the radar in Turkey, may be well-situated to deal with missiles launched from Iran. But if you twist the compass a little, they could also deal with some launched from Russia.
Fred Kaplan is Slate's "War Stories" columnist and author of the book, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War. He can be reached at firstname.lastname@example.org. Follow him on Twitter.