Gen. John Allen is confident the U.S. military will prevail in Afghanistan

Meet the Last Man Who Thinks America Will Prevail in Afghanistan

Meet the Last Man Who Thinks America Will Prevail in Afghanistan

Military analysis.
March 22 2012 7:21 PM

General Optimism

Gen. John Allen believes that America will prevail in Afghanistan. At least someone does.

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The key in any effort to beat back an insurgency is to shore up the government’s legitimacy in the eyes of its people. This has nothing to do with idealism or with George W. Bush’s frothy dream of turning Afghanistan into a bastion of Western democracy. It’s much more elemental: It’s about providing the people with security, basic services, and a system of justice. It’s about doing the things that governments do.

The administration of services and justice is not going well, mainly because the Afghan government, from top to bottom, is riddled with corruption. President Hamid Karzai’s power base is essentially a vast patronage network, much of it criminal. As long as this is so, and perceived to be so, there will be a vacuum of authority and legitimacy that the Taliban can fill. In fact, in many parts of southern Afghanistan, Taliban courts and shadow structures of governance are seen as fairer and more efficient than the official institutions. (Part of this is ethnic as well; the Taliban are Pashtun, as are most southerners.)

Success in this sort of war requires not only fighting the insurgents militarily but also competing with them politically and thus drying up, or co-opting, their popular support.


The strictly military operations are going well, better than anyone might have predicted a couple of years ago—at least that part of the operations that General Allen is stressing: building up the Afghan army and police. But this assessment sidesteps the crucial question in a counterinsurgency campaign: Are the people being protected?

According to some unclassified charts that Allen gave the House committee, but which nobody brought up at the hearing, the verdict here is gloomy. Insurgents launched 350 successful attacks with homemade bombs just this past January—compared with fewer than 200 in December 2009, when Obama announced his new policy. Taliban suicide bombings also killed 80 percent more civilians in 2011 than in 2010. Yes, the Taliban are culpable, not the United States, NATO, or the Afghan government. But this is beside the point in a counterinsurgency campaign: The task is to protect the people, and we are seen as unsuccessful at doing that.

Then there’s the biggest security problem of all: the insurgents’ safe havens across the border in Pakistan. In the early phase of the Obama administration’s buildup, the U.S. military leaders—Petraeus, McChrystal, and former Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen among them—said success is extremely difficult if the Pakistanis don’t do more to shut the safe havens down.

In Thursday’s hearing, Sen. John McCain, the committee’s ranking Republican (and a leading supporter of the war), asked Allen if he agreed that “the two major remaining obstacles to success” were Pakistan’s sanctuaries and the Afghan government’s corruption. Allen said, “Yes.” McCain asked if anything had changed about the status of the sanctuaries. Allen replied, “No.”

The House hearing on Tuesday delved a bit more deeply into the issue of corruption. Allen was asked if any Afghan officials have been arrested for their illegal activities, most notably the Afghan army’s surgeon general, who stole millions of dollars’ worth of drugs from the country’s main military hospital. Allen replied that no corruption trials have taken place but that Karzai recently started an “official inquiry” into the charges against the surgeon general. He called this gesture “a great step forward.”

Allen’s characterization is breathtaking hyperbole. Major Gen. H.R. McMaster, who until recently directed the command charged with probing and minimizing Afghan corruption, unearthed a huge cache of documents more than a year ago, substantiating the case against the surgeon general. He showed them to Karzai, who did the same thing that he he’d done when presented with evidence that the head of the Kabul Bank had extorted money to build private villas in Dubai—nothing.

One reason that Gen. Allen is focused almost exclusively on building and training the Afghan security forces is that this is something we can do. More to the point, it’s probably all we can do. But that may not be enough to hold Afghanistan together.