It takes a great strategic mind, something like a chess master's, to think three or four moves ahead in plotting international diplomacy. It would be nice if the Bush administration, now and then, could think one move ahead.
The pattern is hair-raising. In Iraq, Bush & Co. crashed the gates with no plan for what to do after the country crumbled. In North Korea, they called off nuclear talks and waited for the tyrant's regime to collapse with no plan for how to stop his weapons program if he managed to stay at the helm. In the Palestinian territories, they pushed for elections with no plan for how to react if the wrong side won.
India, where President Bush travels this week, is the latest spot where shortsightedness might land us in trouble. At least in this case, the trip is driven by tangible interests and a real strategic vision, as opposed to a leap and a fantasy. But again, the basic elements of pulling off an ambitious policy—laying the groundwork, pondering the possible consequences, and devising a Plan B in case things don't go as you'd hoped—seem to have been ignored.
It began last July, when Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh issued a joint statement pledging to "transform" their two countries' relations—for many decades hostile, even now ambivalent—into a "global partnership." This was a shrewd geopolitical maneuver. A grand alliance with India—the world's largest democracy, one of the fastest-growing economies, a natural partner in the war on terrorism, a vast market already oriented toward American goods and services, a counterweight against the prospect of an emergent China—would serve U.S. interests in every way and help regain our standing on a continent where our influence has waned.
But there was a catch, or at least a knot that would have to be untangled. What India wanted out of this deal, above all else, was access to materials for nuclear energy. India faces staggering energy demands over the coming decade, yet it lacks the resources to meet them. The Nonproliferation Treaty obliges the existing nuclear-armed powers—including the United States—to supply such resources to the treaty's signatories, under specific terms of inspection, as a reward for forgoing nuclear weaponry. However, India already has an arsenal of A-bombs, and it never signed the NPT.
Bush and Singh dealt with this dilemma last summer by simply ignoring it. India, their joint statement declared, would be treated "as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology" and should therefore be allowed to "acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states."
In other words, India would receive the same rewards as countries that had signed the NPT—without actually having to sign it and thus to put up with its restraints. (America's reward would be that India buys the nuclear materials, as well as a lot of other products, from U.S. companies.) The deal violates the NPT—and a treaty governing the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, an organization of 44 nations that sets rules on importing and exporting nuclear materials.
One could make a case that the trade-off is worth it—that the benefits of a grand alliance with India more than compensate for the costs of exempting India from the NPT's restraint clauses. India is not going to disarm, anyway; it has agreed, as part of the deal, to open its civilian reactors (though not its military ones) to international inspectors and safeguards; it's better, one could say, to impose some controls than none at all.
But a few things are worth noting. First, the United States has no authority to grant such an exemption on its own. The NPT is a treaty signed by 187 nations; it is enforced by the International Atomic Energy Agency; and it is, in effect, administered by the five nations that the treaty recognizes as nuclear powers (the United States, Russia, China, Britain, and France). This point is not a legal nicety. If the United States can cut a separate deal with India, what is to prevent China or Russia from doing the same with Pakistan or Iran? If India demands special treatment on the grounds that it's a stable democracy, what is to keep Japan, Brazil, or Germany from picking up on the precedent?
Second, the India deal would violate not just international agreements but also several U.S. laws regulating the export of nuclear materials.
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