Why U.S. troops won't be coming home from Iraq anytime soon.

Now that an Iraqi government is taking form, however haltingly, how much longer will American troops have to stay? Judging from the data in two recent official U.S. reports, they probably won't be coming home soon.

Read together, the two documents—the latest quarterly report by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, just released today, and the State Department's "Iraq Weekly Status Report" dated May 4—suggest that the Iraqi leaders have a long way to go (by some measures, as long as they've ever had) before they can rebuild their country, secure order, stabilize their regime, and protect their borders without a large American military presence.

The paradox that stumped the U.S. occupation forces two years ago, shortly after the fall of Baghdad, continues to stump them today. On the one hand, their efforts to provide security won't succeed until they restore essential services. On the other hand, they can't restore essential services until the country's key assets—especially its roads, oil pipelines, and electrical generators—are secure.

Oil revenue was supposed to galvanize Iraq's postwar economy. Yet crude oil production has flattened out at around 2 million barrels a day, well below its prewar level of 2.5 million. Electrical power production hovers around 80,000 kilowatt hours—considerably short of the 100,000 KWH output before the war and far below last summer's declared goal of 120,000. Baghdad homes have electricity for nine to 11 hours a day; in other cities, the figure drops to eight or nine hours.

Iraq's reconstruction was going to be funded by a massive infusion of U.S. aid, $18.4 billion worth. Yet that aid—allocated a year and a half ago—is being directed and disbursed very slowly. Just $12.8 billion (roughly two-thirds) has been appropriated—and a mere $4.8 billion (less than one-quarter) has been spent.

In some sectors, the flow of aid is barely a trickle. For instance:

• For the oil infrastructure, $1.72 billion was allocated; just $1 billion has been appropriated to specific projects; only $263 million—about 15 percent of the original amount—has been spent.
• For transportation and communication, $509 million was allocated; $327 million has been appropriated, just $70 million (14 percent) spent.
• For health care, $786 million was allocated, $557 million appropriated, and only $77 million (less than 10 percent) spent.
• For water resources and sanitation, $2.16 billion was allocated, $1.06 billion appropriated, a mere $117 million (5 percent) spent.

(For more about this slow rate of spending, and how the situation is even worse than these numbers suggest, click here.)

Part of the reason for this sluggishness is mismanagement. Most of it stems from problems with security. The road to be repaired is impassible; the oil pipeline to be modernized keeps getting blown up.

Yet progress in security is moving slowly, too. Of the $5 billion in U.S. aid allocated to security and law enforcement, $2 billion (or 40 percent) has been spent. The inspector general's report cites March testimony by Joseph A. Christoff, director of the Government Accountability Office's international affairs and trade division: "As of mid-December 2004," Christoff told a House government reform subcommittee, "paramilitary training for a high-threat hostile environment was not part of the curriculum for new recruits" to the Iraqi security forces. By early 2005, he continued, multinational training commanders had only "begun work on a system to assess Iraqi capabilities." Moreover, "It is unclear at this time whether the system under development will provide adequate measures for determining the capability of Iraqi police." (Italics added.)