One of the first things you learn in law school is that if a client doesn’t trust you, he’s won’t allow you to speak on his behalf in court. There is a massive cultural divide between the legal system in which Mohammed was raised, and the legal framework of an American military trial. When Mohammed fired his first group of court-appointed attorneys in 2008, for example, he explicitly rejected the legitimacy of U.S. constitutional law in favor of Islamic Sharia law. Wright points out that even while trying to establish a relationship of trust with his client, reminders that he is a U.S. soldier are inescapable. “It’s very challenging to try to build any relationship when a government has gone to extraordinary lengths to torture someone and to silence them. I wear the same uniform as the guards.”
JAG attorneys operate under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Defense. They are part of the very government that tortured them in CIA dark sites before their transfer to Guantánamo. KSM was subjected to water boarding 183 times in a single month before being brought to the base.
But the Army simply doesn’t believe that Major Wright’s removal will have any lasting effect on the defense team’s ability to continue representing Mohammed. Lt. Col. Alayne P. Conway, an Army public affairs officer, argues that reassigning a JAG—even from a death penalty case—will have a minimal impact on the attorney-client relationship because the civilian attorney, David Nevin (referred to as “Learned Counsel” within the commission setting) will remain on the case.
“In this case, Major Wright’s reassignment did not violate any precept of justice,” Conway says. “The law is clear: the defendants—to include Mr. Mohammed—being tried by the military commissions have the right to qualified and certified military counsel. Therefore, upon Major Wright's resignation, the defendant, Mr. Mohammed, was immediately assigned a military defense counsel with military defense experience to join his defense team under the supervision of a lead Learned Counsel.”
Other JAG attorneys contend that Wright’s removal constitutes an impermissible breech of the defendant’s rights to effective assistance of counsel and due process under the law. U.S. Air Force Captain Michael Schwartz, who served as a JAG prosecutor before being appointed as defense counsel for Walid bin Attash, one of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s co-defendants, worries that the reassignment of a JAG defense attorney creates a substantive legal issue. David Nevin explains that Wright’s removal not only disrupts Mohammed’s relationship with Wright, but also with the attorneys remaining on the defense team. Torture creates mistrust, they argue. Defense attorneys are seen as just another one of these relationships designed to gain a detainee’s trust only to destroy it. “You don’t have to be a psychologist,” says Nevin, “to know that if I’ve come to trust my team to protect me, and suddenly [Major Wright] gets removed—that says that I can’t count on any of you. Any one of you could be gone tomorrow.”
The Army reassignment orders Wright received in February are nothing unusual. As Lt. Col. Conway explained, the graduate program to which Wright was assigned is a requirement for all active Army JAGs. What is unusual, according to the Mohammed defense team, is that the Army has not granted an exception to allow Wright to stay on the team. Based on the magnitude of the case, and the fact that Wright’s deferral to the graduate program was granted without issue the year before, the team expected another routine deferral. When the Army denied the deferral, Wright and Nevin immediately appealed to the Army for an explanation. They were told that under the new detailing orders, Wright had two options: He could either leave the Mohammed defense team and attend the graduate program, or leave the Army.
According to Conway, the denial of Wright’s deferral request had nothing to do with his role as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s defense attorney. “The decision to approve a deferral request is made on a case-by-case basis, balancing the need for the deferral and the need of the officer,” said Conway in an email interview. “In Major Wright's case, The Judge Advocate General [Lieutenant General Flora Darpino] denied the second deferral request because a suitable and competent military defense attorney replacement was available, Major Wright was not the lead or sole counsel, and it ensured Major Wright remained professionally competent and competitive for promotion.”
The defense team won’t say that the Army denied Wright’s deferral for the express purpose of removing him from the team; they simply don’t have enough information to speculate as to the Army’s motives. There is, however, an obvious undercurrent of suspicion among the Mohammed team. The defense team points out that the prosecutor in the case, Mark Martins, has not been similarly reassigned during his three years on the KSM case, though the Army insists that "all military attorneys, including Brig. Gen. Martins, are subject to reassignment.”
Regardless of the Army’s motives, when his deferral from the graduate program was denied Wright faced an ethical dilemma: leave his client for the required graduate course, or quit the Army? Wright reasoned that resigning would allow him to carry out his professional obligation to his client for a few months longer, and to perhaps continue representing Mohammed as a civilian after he leaves the Army. So two weeks ago, Major Wright flew to Guantánamo Bay to represent Mohammed at a series of pre-trial hearings, the last time he did so as a JAG.
In his last week in the Army, Jason Wright is crisscrossing the Washington, DC area, carrying around a two-page checklist that reads like something from a scavenger hunt: a signature from the Housing Office. A mandatory briefing on Military benefits. Another signature from the Career Transition Office. All tasks he must complete before he officially returns to civilian life.
The Mohammed defense team has explored other avenues that would allow Wright to remain permanently on the case. They have requested the Convening Authority—which authorizes funds for the various legal teams—to appoint Wright as a civilian, but to date they have declined to do so. Wright and Nevin have also asked the trial court judge, Colonel James Pohl, to order that a civilian position be created to keep Major Wright on the Mohammed defense team. Pohl has questioned whether he had the authority to do this.
The long-term consequences of Wright’s removal have yet to be seen. The 9/11 military commissions have been unable to shake the perception of illegitimacy, and Wright’s removal seems to heighten this perception. The worst-case scenario would be that Wright’s removal has the effect that Guantánamo defense attorneys like David Nevin and Captain Schwartz fear: The relationship between the defense team and their client is weakened past the point of functionality.
If Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is tried and convicted, the issue of Wright’s reassignment away from the case will almost certainly become an issue on appeal. “I think [Wright’s reassignment] imperils the case for the prosecution,” says Nevin. He contends that the disruption of the attorney-client relationship denies Mohammed his constitutional rights to due process and to the effective assistance of counsel. “At some point an appellate court will step in and say ‘Enough. This is not a valid result, given all of these shenanigans.’ ”
In the meantime Wright returns to civilian life, critical of the legitimacy of the military commissions and cynical about his client’s chances for a fair trial. “It’s more disbelief than disillusion,” he says. “I don’t have any illusions any more that this process has problems. It’s more a disbelief that we have a justice system where we can add up all of these barriers to the attorney-client relationship and the defense function and still call it a court system.”