This is the first part in a series of eight exploring why the United States suffered no follow-up terror attacks after 9/11. To read the series introduction, click here.
Despite some initial euphoria, 9/11 and its bloody aftermath appear to have worsened al-Qaida's standing not only among Muslims generally but even (Peter Bergen and Paul Cruikshank argued in a June 2008 New Republic article) among jihadis, who have observed that 9/11 led to the death of many more Muslims (especially in Afghanistan and Iraq) than anyone else. Many of these Muslims were killed directly by al-Qaida and other Islamist terrorists. In Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, John Mueller, a political scientist at Ohio State, relates how al-Qaida-linked coordinated suicide bombings in three Jordanian hotels in 2005 ended up killing a large group of Palestinians and Jordanians who were attending a wedding party. "It would be difficult," Mueller writes, "to imagine a target likely to be more stupid from the perspective of the terrorists." Members of al-Qaida in Iraq, an insurgent group affiliated with al-Qaida, alienated their fellow Sunnis by targeting civilians, imposing Taliban-style repression and provoking attacks from the country's Shiite majority. In response, Sunni militias banded together to form the Awakening, a U.S.-funded fighting force that, depending on whom you ask, deserves either some or most of the credit usually given to the U.S. troop surge for reducing the level of violence in Iraq since 2006.
Even some inside al-Qaida have come to view terrorism's costs as too high. In June 2008, Wright profiled a founding leader of al-Qaida known as Dr. Fadl. The author of two books used by al-Qaida to recruit members, Dr. Fadl more recently wrote from his Egyptian jail cell, "We are prohibited from committing aggression, even if the enemies of Islam do that." In Dr. Fadl's view, the 9/11 attacks were suicidal not only for the hijackers but for al-Qaida as a whole. Writing in 2007, Dr. Fadl argued that it was immoral to fight Muslim heads of state if they were believers and that it was unwise to do so if these leaders possessed sufficient power to prevail. Quoting the Prophet Mohammed, Dr. Fadl wrote: "Those who rebel against the Sultan shall die a pagan death." Dr. Fadl further argued that it was immoral under any circumstances to kill even non-Muslim civilians. These arguments stirred considerable debate in the Islamist world, and one can't rule out that Dr. Fadl produced them under threat of torture. But they were seconded by a Kuwaiti cleric named Sheikh Hamid al-Ali, who has been identified by the U.S. Treasury as an al-Qaida fundraiser. Al-Qaida's al-Zawahiri felt it necessary to write a lengthy rebuttal in which he claimed, preposterously, "no difference" between 9/11 and President Clinton's 1998 bombing of the Al-Shifa pharmaeutical plant in Sudan (believed, mistakenly, to be an al-Qaida chemical-weapons facility). The 1998 bombing killed one night watchman—a tragic blunder, but hardly comparable to the deliberate slaughter of 3,000 noncombatants.
However nonsensical, al-Zawahiri's views still prevail within al-Qaida. But does al-Qaida have the means for another U.S. attack? "Let's have some healthy skepticism … when we read about these terrorist masterminds who were poised to kill thousands of people and do incalculable damage," wrote cryptographer Bruce Schneier in a June 2007 column for Wired online titled "Portrait of the Modern Terrorist as an Idiot." Schneier believes that terrorism remains a real threat, but he also believes that the danger posed by the various alleged and would-be terrorists who've been caught inside the United States since 9/11, many of them lured into plots by undercover law enforcement, has been greatly exaggerated. (I'll have details about these sting operations in two later installments.) In The Looming Tower, Wright quotes Issam al-Turabi, a Bin Laden friend from his days in Sudan, thus: "I loved that man. … Unfortunately, his IQ was not that great."
Are terrorists dumb?
It may be that Bin Laden's family wealth and otherworldly dedication far outstrip his native intelligence. (Al-Zawahiri appears to be the brains of the operation.) But the real question isn't whether terrorists are smart per se but whether they are rational. "Acts of terrorism almost never appear to accomplish anything politically significant," prominent game theorist Thomas C. Schelling observed nearly two decades ago. Max Abrahms, a pre-doctoral fellow at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, reaffirmed that conclusion in a 2006 paper for International Security titled, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work." Abrahms researched 28 groups designated "foreign terrorist organizations" by the U.S. State Department since 2001, identifying among them a total of 42 objectives. The groups achieved those objectives only 7 percent of the time, Abrahms concluded, and the key variable for success was whether they targeted civilians. Groups that attacked civilian targets more often than military ones "systematically failed to achieve their policy objectives."
In a 2008 follow-up essay, "What Terrorists Really Want," Abrahms explained that terrorist groups are typically incapable of maintaining a consistent set of strategic goals, much less achieving them. Then why do they become terrorists? To "develop strong affective ties with fellow terrorists." It's fraternal bonds they want, not territory, nor influence, nor even, in most cases, to affirm religious beliefs. If a terrorist group's demands tend to sound improvised, that's because they are improvised; what really matters to its members—even its leaders—is that they are a band of brothers. Marc Sageman, a forensic psychiatrist and former Central Intelligence Agency case officer in Afghanistan, collected the biographies of 400 terrorists who'd targeted the United States. He found that fully 88 percent became terrorists not because they wanted to change the world but because they had "friendship/family bonds to the jihad." Among the 400, Sageman found only four who had "any hint of a [psychological] disorder," a lower incidence than in the general population. Think the Elks, only more lethal. Cut off from al-Qaida's top leadership, they are plenty dangerous, but not nearly as task-oriented as we imagine them to be.
[Update, April 6: In a column published after this series ("Jihad Lite") I consider whether a recently-discovered al-Qaida recruitment manual suggests the terror group is having difficulty attracting new members.]
Next: "The Near-Enemy Theory," in which we'll consider whether al-Qaida is too preoccupied with opportunities in Pakistan and Afghanistan to plot against the United States.
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