Lesson No. 2: Aim for something specific.
The HGP had a clear goal: to uncover the precise sequence of billions of DNA bases inside each of our cells.
That’s not to say the project was obviously worth doing or that it was expected to be easy. From the onset, the scientists involved knew that the existing technologies for DNA sequencing would be too cumbersome and slow to do the whole genome. They knew—just as the organizers of BRAIN know—that the first wave of investment would have to go toward technology development.
The HGP was also similar to BRAIN in that it was conceived as a series of complementary projects distributed across many laboratories. It would tackle not only the sequence of the human genome, for example, but the DNA sequences of worms, fruit flies, and mice.
Unlike BRAIN, though, the HGP boosters were smart enough to focus their marketing around one specific end goal. It was spelled out explicitly in the first sentence of its first five-year plan: “The Human Genome Initiative is a worldwide research effort that has the goal of analyzing the structure of human DNA and determining the location of all human genes.”
Contrast that with the vague and befuddling aims of BRAIN. As Obama put it in his April announcement: “[T]here is this enormous mystery waiting to be unlocked, and the BRAIN Initiative will change that by giving scientists the tools they need to get a dynamic picture of the brain in action and better understand how we think and how we learn and how we remember.” Oh, is that all?
(The pathetic infographic that accompanied the White House announcement was even worse. According to it, BRAIN money would help the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in “understanding the dynamic functions of the brain,” as well as allowing the NIH “to develop new tools” and the National Science Foundation “to support research that spans physical, biological, social, and behavioral sciences.”)
The only thing that’s clear about BRAIN’s intentions is that it doesn’t have clear intentions.
There’s no doubt that investing in basic neuroscience will have payoffs, probably huge payoffs. But without a specific goal, there’s no way to evaluate the success of such a project. And more to the point, there’s no way to convince people of its value. There’s no way to sell it to the masses.
Lesson No. 3: Always be closing.
To recap: The Human Genome Project benefited from its friends in government and its concrete and specific goal. There was also a crucial third ingredient to its success: hype.
Scientists and science journalists (me included) often get irritated by hype, and understandably so. It’s just a sugarcoated way of lying to the public. But our complaints are no match for hype’s swagger and effectiveness.
The HGP launched with the expectation that the human genome would “be the source book for biomedical science in the 21st century” and “help us to understand and eventually treat many of the more than 4,000 genetic diseases that afflict mankind,” according to its first five-year plan. That hype only grew over the next decade, as the project rapidly met its goal. When President Clinton announced the completion of the genome’s first draft, in 2000, he said it would “revolutionize the diagnosis, prevention and treatment of most, if not all, human diseases.”
That turned out not to be true, not even close. And though outside scientists have repeatedly berated the project for its hype—sometimes in major newspapers, even—the criticism hasn’t mattered much. The scientists got their money, did good science, and haven’t suffered any real consequences: Genomic science continues to get a big slice of the federal funding pie.
So it makes sense that the BRAIN project, too, came with a giant dose of hype. Here’s a taste from Obama’s April announcement:
But think about what we could do once we do crack this code. Imagine if no family had to feel helpless watching a loved one disappear behind the mask of Parkinson’s or struggle in the grip of epilepsy. Imagine if we could reverse traumatic brain injury or PTSD for our veterans who are coming home. Imagine if someone with a prosthetic limb can now play the piano or throw a baseball as well as anybody else, because the wiring from the brain to that prosthetic is direct and triggered by what's already happening in the patient's mind. What if computers could respond to our thoughts or our language barriers could come tumbling down. Or if millions of Americans were suddenly finding new jobs in these fields—jobs we haven’t even dreamt up yet—because we chose to invest in this project.
In BRAIN’s case, though, there’s no clear plan to back up the hype, no goal to rally around and feel good about once we’ve completed it.
For all of those reasons, I highly doubt that the BRAIN project will be the next Human Genome Project, or receive anywhere close to its fame. But perhaps that’s for the best.
Despite the trendiness of Big Science, it’s not a good strategy for every scientific problem. As recently argued in a commentary on biomedical innovation, there’s been woefully little research on the effectiveness of Big Science. Nobody’s really studied when the approach is likely to be effective — and when it’s not.
In fact, the biggest successes in Big Science—the Human Genome Project, the moon landing, the Manhattan Project—were essentially engineering projects, not basic discoveries. Take the Large Hadron Collider, which the European Organization for Nuclear Research built over 10 years to find the elusive Higgs particle. “It tested a hypothesis rather than developing it,” writes neuroscientist Paul Matthews in a review of brain projects.
A lot of scientists—most scientists, I’d guess—don’t have any big, sweeping projects to sell the public. They just want to do the unsexy-yet-indispensable work of testing specific hypotheses and gradually filling in the mysteries of how the world works.
For most scientists, then, Big Science is probably not the answer. They depend instead on small-scale government grants, of the kind that are all in limbo now thanks to the government shutdown. If these scientists want the government to keep funding their work, then they—we—have to figure out how to better sell the public on the big benefits of Little Science.